Monthly Archives: January 2009

“Frau ist Frau.”

‘They raped every German female from eight to 80’

Now their great-granddaughters won’t breed and their race is dying.


Filed under PSYOP

Marine Corps Information Operations Center


“provide Marine Air-Ground Task Force commanders and the Marine Corps, a responsive and effective full-spectrum information operations planning and psychological operations delivery capability by means of deployable support teams and a comprehensive general support IO reachback capability to integrate IO into the Marine Corps.”

Information Operations Center informs Marines of new opportunities

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Filed under PSYOP

H. R. 645: National Emergency Centers Establishment Act (Introduced in House)

National Emergency Centers Establishment Act (Introduced in House)

HR 645 IH


1st Session

H. R. 645

To direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish national emergency centers on military installations.


January 22, 2009

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned


To direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish national emergency centers on military installations.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,


    This Act may be cited as the `National Emergency Centers Establishment Act’.


    (a) In General- In accordance with the requirements of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish not fewer than 6 national emergency centers on military installations.
    (b) Purpose of National Emergency Centers- The purpose of a national emergency center shall be to use existing infrastructure–
      (1) to provide temporary housing, medical, and humanitarian assistance to individuals and families dislocated due to an emergency or major disaster;
      (2) to provide centralized locations for the purposes of training and ensuring the coordination of Federal, State, and local first responders;
      (3) to provide centralized locations to improve the coordination of preparedness, response, and recovery efforts of government, private, and not-for-profit entities and faith-based organizations; and
      (4) to meet other appropriate needs, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security.


    (a) In General- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall designate not fewer than 6 military installations as sites for the establishment of national emergency centers.
    (b) Minimum Requirements- A site designated as a national emergency center shall be–
      (1) capable of meeting for an extended period of time the housing, health, transportation, education, public works, humanitarian and other transition needs of a large number of individuals affected by an emergency or major disaster;
      (2) environmentally safe and shall not pose a health risk to individuals who may use the center;
      (3) capable of being scaled up or down to accommodate major disaster preparedness and response drills, operations, and procedures;
      (4) capable of housing existing permanent structures necessary to meet training and first responders coordination requirements during nondisaster periods;
      (5) capable of hosting the infrastructure necessary to rapidly adjust to temporary housing, medical, and humanitarian assistance needs;
      (6) required to consist of a complete operations command center, including 2 state-of-the art command and control centers that will comprise a 24/7 operations watch center as follows:
        (A) one of the command and control centers shall be in full ready mode; and
        (B) the other shall be used daily for training; and
      (7) easily accessible at all times and be able to facilitate handicapped and medical facilities, including during an emergency or major disaster.
    (c) Location of National Emergency Centers- There shall be established not fewer than one national emergency center in each of the following areas:
      (1) The area consisting of Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions I, II, and III.
      (2) The area consisting of Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV.
      (3) The area consisting of Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions V and VII.
      (4) The area consisting of Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI.
      (5) The area consisting of Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions VIII and X.
      (6) The area consisting of Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IX.
    (d) Preference for Designation of Closed Military Installations- Wherever possible, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall designate a closed military installation as a site for a national emergency center. If the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense jointly determine that there is not a sufficient number of closed military installations that meet the requirements of subsections (b) and (c), the Secretaries shall jointly designate portions of existing military installations other than closed military installations as national emergency centers.
    (e) Transfer of Control of Closed Military Installations- If a closed military installation is designated as a national emergency center, not later than 180 days after the date of designation, the Secretary of Defense shall transfer to the Secretary of Homeland Security administrative jurisdiction over such closed military installation.
    (f) Cooperative Agreement for Joint Use of Existing Military Installations- If an existing military installation other than a closed military installation is designated as a national emergency center, not later than 180 days after the date of designation, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense shall enter into a cooperative agreement to provide for the establishment of the national emergency center.
    (g) Reports-
      (1) PRELIMINARY REPORT- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting jointly with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to Congress a report that contains for each designated site–
        (A) an outline of the reasons why the site was selected;
        (B) an outline of the need to construct, repair, or update any existing infrastructure at the site;
        (C) an outline of the need to conduct any necessary environmental clean-up at the site;
        (D) an outline of preliminary plans for the transfer of control of the site from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of Homeland Security, if necessary under subsection (e); and
        (E) an outline of preliminary plans for entering into a cooperative agreement for the establishment of a national emergency center at the site, if necessary under subsection (f).
      (2) UPDATE REPORT- Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting jointly with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to Congress a report that contains for each designated site–
        (A) an update on the information contained in the report as required by paragraph (1);
        (B) an outline of the progress made toward the transfer of control of the site, if necessary under subsection (e);
        (C) an outline of the progress made toward entering a cooperative agreement for the establishment of a national emergency center at the site, if necessary under subsection (f); and
        (D) recommendations regarding any authorizations and appropriations that may be necessary to provide for the establishment of a national emergency center at the site.
      (3) FINAL REPORT- Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting jointly with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to Congress a report that contains for each designated site–
        (A) finalized information detailing the transfer of control of the site, if necessary under subsection (e);
        (B) the finalized cooperative agreement for the establishment of a national emergency center at the site, if necessary under subsection (f); and
        (C) any additional information pertinent to the establishment of a national emergency center at the site.
      (4) ADDITIONAL REPORTS- The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting jointly with the Secretary of Defense, may submit to Congress additional reports as necessary to provide updates on steps being taken to meet the requirements of this Act.


    This Act does not affect–
      (1) the authority of the Federal Government to provide emergency or major disaster assistance or to implement any disaster mitigation and response program, including any program authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.); or
      (2) the authority of a State or local government to respond to an emergency.


    There is authorized to be appropriated $180,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to carry out this Act. Such funds shall remain available until expended.


    In this Act, the following definitions apply:
      (1) CLOSED MILITARY INSTALLATION- The term `closed military installation’ means a military installation, or portion thereof, approved for closure or realignment under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) that meet all, or 2 out of the 3 following requirements:
        (A) Is located in close proximity to a transportation corridor.
        (B) Is located in a State with a high level or threat of disaster related activities.
        (C) Is located near a major metropolitan center.
      (2) EMERGENCY- The term `emergency’ has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122).
      (3) MAJOR DISASTER- The term `major disaster’ has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122).
      (4) MILITARY INSTALLATION- The term `military installation’ has the meaning given such term in section 2910 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).


I made this comment on the previous post before seeing this.

Only those who prepared themselves mentally, physically and materially before the “event” will be empowered to rely upon themselves and evade the round up.

The camps may no longer stand on the cold deserts of Wyoming or the shimmering deserts of Arizona. But they’re there. In the executive orders. In the plans. In the memos. In the minds of those with a will to control.

It’s a will that has swelled through 50 additional years of unchecked power. A will that will burn children and shoot mothers and say the innocents were to blame for their own destruction. A will that engineers the survival of government while treating free people as resources or enemies.

Next time, I think, wind and loss won’t be our worst punishments.

The first WTC bombing, Waco, AWB, Elian Gonzalez. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

Related post:   Violent, Strategic Dislocation Inside the United States


Filed under Resisters

Dumbass amateurs

Ever seen The Shootist?

There’s always some six-fingered bustard that couldn’t hit a cow in the tit with a tin cup.

Professionals don’t like amateurs, hobbyists or enthusiasts doing for free what they get paid for. A profession has to have entry credentials, some sort of officially recognized certificate of competency to practice, arcane jargon with which to baffle outsiders, and overweening certitude that nobody can do what they do as well as they do.

Yet it was the bar tender that finally killed The Shootist.

A recent post about the Alaska Territorial Guard in WWII got me to thinking about sub-national military and paramilitary capabilities.  Sub-national as in echelons below  The ATG had to be recruited because the Alaska National Guard had been mobilized for federal service and sent off to Washington State before the war started.  That could happen again to your state.  The Army National Guard and Air National Guard are Reserve Components of the federal armed forces, paid, equipped, and trained with federal taxpayer money, and if you have a Category 5 hurricane while the best part of your state’s National Guard is in Darfur delivering  pizza, well, DoD regrets the inconvenience, I’m sure.

Every state lost their National Guard during both World Wars.  The States tried to replace them with State Guard units recruited from men exempt from the draft.  They were better than nothing.  A little less than half the states still have State Guards or State Defense Forces.  Most of those are not armed.  My SDF forbids any weapons, especially  personally owned firearms.  When a buddy was trying to recruit me, he told me my main mission would be to prepare to assume responsibility for the armory of a GAARNG Mechanized Infantry Company in a town south of me.  That Company went to Iraq, and the SDF held the fort while they were gone.  Not high speed, low drag, but honorable service.  Better than nothing.

Because of their proximity to the Nation’s Capitol, Maryland State Guard in 1942 had so many missions Governor O’Conor needed yet another force, The Maryland Minute Men.

To these men, many of whom will be veterans of the last war, who incidentally may have “chafed at the bit” when they have observed their sons and younger men marching away recently to the Country’s defense, let me say that here is an opportunity that will make them truly an important part of the public defense forces. Here is a function of military organizations to which they can address themselves with enthusiasm, because it will be of utmost importance and will thereby release a number of regular Army forces for combat service abroad.

How Obsolete Is The Unorganized Militia? (Scroll down when you hit that link.)

The concept is not obsolete, it’s execution at the state level has become problematic, because self-reliance and the people’s confidence in the competence of local yokels are not as common as they used to be. Only professionals will do, you see. The Guild can always find imperfection in the craftsmanship of the hobbyist.

Back before lawyers litigated common sense out of existence, whoever could, did.  Amateurs, hobbyists and enthusiasts with useful skills were officially encouraged to lend a hand, and recognized for their contributions. Certification not required.  Professional perfection not required.  Good enough was acceptable back then.   Not great but Better Than Nothing immediately available was generally accepted as an improvement over Highly Professional Special Response Teams two hours out.   This elementary common sense is no longer generally accepted everywhere.  The idea that it is better the local citizens do it tolerably, now,  than waiting for the Feds or the State to do it perfectly, later, is more credible in Red States, and Red Counties of Blue States, than it is in the rest of the country.  It’s part of the rural vs. urban, renter vs. owner Culture War.

UPDATE: Saturday, 07 March 2009 The Militia: In History and Today


Filed under Idea War, IW

Last Survivors of the Tundra Army

Not that many of us down here in the Lower 48 know all that much about the ATG
That’s too bad, because back in the day, after Pearl Harbor, when the Japs seized the Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska, the Alaska Territorial Guard was for many months the only force available to   protect the only source of the strategic metal platinum in the Western Hemisphere against Japanese attack and to secure the land around the vital Lend-Lease air route between the United States and Russia.

“Muktuk” Marston was something of an unsung American T. E. Lawrence.  He deserves to be more widely known among American students of Irregular Warfare.  The indigenous irregulars he raised and led are leaving us, along with the rest of the Greatest Generation, but the Last Survivors of the Tundra Army face one final test.

The Alaska Territorial Guard: A Debt of Honor Unpaid
That eminent Former Regime Loyalist the erstwhile Warlord of Castle Argghhh! points out that Since the failure is in the wording of the legislation and the Army’s initial read of it, the solution is legislative as well.

The Tundra Army: Patriots of Arctic Alaska

Muktuk Marston’s VJ Day Speech in Nome

Army Revokes Pay Raise for World War II ‘Eskimo Scouts’

Army plans payment to Territorial Guard veterans

The Secretary of the Army has authorized emergency funds for 26 surviving members of a World War II Alaska militia unit whose retirement pay was being reduced because of a legal technicality, Alaska’s congressional delegation said today.

Army Secretary Pete Geren will dip into an emergency fund to cover the pay for the 26 former members of the largely Native guard, according to the delegation. The one-time emergency payment will equal two months’ pay while Congress works on legislation to fix the law to allow the service in the unit to counts as active duty for calculating retirement pay.


UPDATE: Despicable: Barack Obama Orders Pensions Cut Off To WWII Veterans

This situation is incredibly disturbing. All indications are these brave WWII veterans served Alaska and the nation with honor. To purposely cut these aged men off, in the twilight of their lives, goes against everything America stands for. In fact, as this cuts off not only a substantial part of their paycheck, but other benefits, such as medical, one might even say this is sort of a death panel, especially knowing that winter is coming, and heating fuel is quite expensive in Alaska.

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Filed under Heroes, IW

An Integral Part of OEF


Our Nation is at war, and JTF-Guantanamo serves as an integral component of OPERATION
Enduring Freedom. We are the model organization for safe and humane enemy combatant detention operations, and for the collection and dissemination of strategic intelligence supporting the Global War on Terror. We operate under the watchful gaze of the Nation and the world. We are a strategic asset operated by a highly trained and patriotic team of military and civilian professionals, dedicated to supporting our Nation’s interests in the Global War on Terror.

You have done a hard job well. Your new political masters’ “reward” for devotion to duty will be much less than you deserve.

Guantanamo Bay was chosen as a detention facility and site for trials because of its unique legal standing. The 45-square-mile U.S. naval base was liberated by U.S. Marines during the Spanish-American War in 1898. The indefinite 1903 lease for Guantanamo Bay grants the U.S. power to exercise complete jurisdiction and control over the base while leaving ultimate sovereignty with Cuba.  These distinct parameters were the basis for the U.S. Government’s early assertion that detainees had no access to U.S. courts and, therefore, could not challenge their detention using habeas corpus. — Jeffrey H. Norwitz, Defining Success at Guantanamo: By What Measure?




I thought it was brilliant to store ’em at Gitmo. The alternatives were Diego Garcia or prison ships in the Indian Ocean, and the Brits would have wimped out on DG, just like we’re wimping out now.

We keep these unlawful combatants alive for two reasons:

1) Intelligence from interrogation

2) Lawfare

If it weren’t for lawfare we could execute them when their intelligence value has been exhausted. Lawfare, according to Colonel Charles Dunlap,

describes a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective. There are many dimensions to lawfare, but the one ever more frequently embraced by U.S. opponents is a cynical manipulation of the rule of law and the humanitarian values it represents. Rather than seeking battlefield victories, per se, challengers try to destroy the will to fight by undermining the public support that is indispensable when democracies like the U.S. conduct
military interventions.”25 


They will end up turning most of them loose. Probably about 10% will go back to Jihad. They will kill people. The MSM will bury those stories. They’ll be too busy providing megaphones for the few we bother to try in court, who will probably go scott free.

And when an outraged American caps one of these assholes, the MSM will whine about vigilantes.

UPDATE 020220091720: Moe names names.


Filed under Heroes, Lawfare, Morale Operations

Regime Change

Vaya Con Dios

Vaya Con Dios

Every four or eight years, regular as clock work.

Millions of my fellow citizens who previously couldn’t can now bring themselves to wave flags and cheer and support our troops.

Millions of my fellow citizens who previously didn’t now do think our Westphalian nation-state deserves to survive and is worth defending.

Millions of my fellow citizens who previously rejected with bitter cynicism and venomous ridicule all Administration strategic communications now Believe in Hope and Change.

For what millions of my fellow citizens are about to receive, may the Lord make them thankful.


Filed under Idea War

Israeli Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group

Israel recruits ‘army of bloggers’ to combat anti-Zionist Web sites

By Cnaan Liphshiz

The Immigrant Absorption Ministry announced on Sunday it was setting up an “army of bloggers,” to be made up of Israelis who speak a second language, to represent Israel in “anti-Zionist blogs” in English, French, Spanish and German.

The program’s first volunteer was Sandrine Pitousi, 31, from Kfar Maimon, situated five kilometers from Gaza. “I heard about the project over the radio and decided to join because I’m living in the middle of the conflict,” she said.

Before hanging up the phone prematurely following a Color Red rocket alert, Pitousi, who immigrated to Israel from France in 1993, said she had some experience with public relations from managing a production company.

“During the war, we looked for a way to contribute to the effort,” the ministry’s director general, Erez Halfon, told Haaretz. “We turned to this enormous reservoir of more than a million people with a second mother tongue.” Other languages in which bloggers are sought include Russian and Portuguese.

Halfon said volunteers who send the Absorption Ministry their contact details by e-mail, at, will be registered according to language, and then passed on to the Foreign Ministry’s media department, whose personnel will direct the volunteers to Web sites deemed “problematic.”

Within 30 minutes of announcing the program, which was approved by the Foreign Ministry on Sunday, five volunteers were already in touch, Halfon said.

Sounds like New Media engagement by Civilian Irregular Public Diplomacy Auxiliaries. I’d love to see the Foreign Ministry’s list of ‘problematic’ English-language Web sites.  The Bush Administration could have done something almost exactly like this, could have rounded up an Army of Counter Insurgent Supportive Bloggers to represent the pro-victory side on anti-war blogs, could have pushed back.

Hook this Army of Bloggers up to GIYUS and Megaphone and let the CYOP begin.

UPDATE 200901200010:  Latest hasbara weapon: ‘Army of bloggers’

Comments Off on Israeli Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group

Filed under PSYOP Auxiliaries

“They undermine the confidence and certitude of Hamas.”

Psychological Tricks to Demoralize the Enemy

I hope U. S. Army PSYOP profits from IDF experience in this war like U. Army Armor profited form IDF experience in the Yom Kippur War.

What can be seen can be hit; what can be hit can be destroyed.

Comments Off on “They undermine the confidence and certitude of Hamas.”

Filed under PSYOP

A slow-motion shoot-out and siege that mesmerized the world’s news media

The Lessons of Mumbai, with emphasis on IO. Bolding and IO capability demonstrated added by me:

 Why Mumbai? Mumbai is India’s commercial and entertainment center—India’s Wall Street, its Hollywood, its Milan. It is a prosperous symbol of modern India[PSYOP]. It is also accessible by sea. From the terrorist perspective, the Taj Mahal Palace and Trident-Oberoi Hotels provided ideal venues for killing fields and final bastions. As landmark properties, especially the historic Taj, they were lucrative targets because of the psychological effect [PSYOP] of an attack on them. They were filled with people—foreigners and the local elite. The attacks on foreigners guaranteed international media coverage [PA]. The message to India was, “Your government cannot protect you. No place is safe.” And the international publicity [PA] would inevitably result in travel to India being cancelled or postponed with consequent damage to India’s economy. The selection of targets—Americans, Britons, and Jews, as well as Indians—suggests that LeT intended the attack to serve a multiplicity of objectives that extended beyond this terrorist group’s previous focus on Kashmir and India.


 The multiple attacks at different locations prevented the authorities from developing an overall assessment of the situation. Media reports consistently overestimated [PA, MILDEC] what we now know to be the actual size of the attacking force.


 Indiscriminate bombings, as in the London and Madrid bombings, have been criticized, even by some jihadists, as contrary to an Islamic code of warfare [PSYOP]. So it is possible that by relying on shooters, the 2008 attack would appear to be more selective [PSYOP], even though the vast majority of those killed in Mumbai were ordinary Indians gunned down at random. This pretension of selectivity [PSYOP] was underscored by the terrorists’ purported search for Americans and Britons, bythe brutal murders at the Chabad Centre, and by what appear to have been considered decisions to kill certain hostages. It also enabled the attackers to eventually engage the police and soldiers in what their supporters could portray as a heroic last stand [PSYOP].


An armed assault might also have been more attractive than suicide bombings to the attackers themselves. Once they opened fire, their fate was sealed, but the prolonged nature of the operation enabled them to engage in a sustained slaughter where they could see the results.

Still martyrs in their own minds, they could also think of themselves as being more like warriors than mere button-pushing suicide bombers [PSYOP] .



The attackers reportedly used cell phones and a satellite phone, both their own and others taken from their victims. They also carried Blackberries. A thoroughly preplanned attack, which Mumbai certainly was, would have required no communications between the terrorist operators and their headquarters. According to a dossier released by Indian authorities, however, the terrorists were in frequent contact with their handlers, presumably based in Pakistan, during the attack. In the transcripts of these phone calls, intercepted by Indian authorities and released in early January, handlers in Pakistan urged the attackers on, exhorting them to kill, reminding them that the prestige of Islam was at stake, and giving them tactical advice that, in part, was gleaned from watching live coverage of the event on television. Despite these exhortations to murder hostages and not to be taken alive, some observers believe—and there are reports that the surviving terrorist thought—that the attackers felt that somehow they were going to get out alive [PSYOP]. The terrorists called each other during the siege to discuss their routes of maneuver. They also talked to the news media via cell phones [PA] to make demands in return for the release of their hostages. This led Indian authorities to think that they were dealing with a hostage situation, [MILDEC] which further confounded their tactical response.



Given that the terrorists seek to maximize the psychological impact [PSYOP] of the attacks, we can expect that future attacks will aim at both large-scale casualties and symbolic targets. The jihadists have stated, and the Mumbai attack demonstrates, the determination of the terrorists to seek high body counts, go after iconic targets, and cause economic damage.

The terrorists will continue to demonstrate tactical adaptability, which will make it difficult to plan security measures around past threats or a few threat scenarios. Terrorists innovate. They designed the Mumbai attack to do what authorities were not expecting. There were no truck bombs or people attempting to smuggle bombs onto trains, as in previous attacks.

Since attacks against high-profile soft targets are relatively easy and cheap to mount, such institutions will remain targets of future attacks. The protection of those targets presents particularly difficult challenges [Physical Security]. Many of India’s older symbolic buildings were not built with security considerations in mind or are in exposed locations.

Suicide bombing has become passé. A thinking, adapting enemy will continue to come up with new and newsworthy ways to kill and destroy and gain the attention effective terrorism must have, aided, comforted and abetted by willing accomplices in the Global Media machine, who profit from 24/7/365 coverage of each incident.

Comments Off on A slow-motion shoot-out and siege that mesmerized the world’s news media

Filed under G-2

What MICHAEL in MI Said

. . . over at Blackfive that 99% of the US mass media may as well be the enemy needed to be said.

And PA needs to hear it.


Filed under Old Media

Mangal Tribal Police

Found a link at Old Blue’s to [My] State Failure Blog‘s discussion of traditional Pashtun law enforcement, which links to  Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan


The Arbakai have also been involved in counter-insurgency. In late 2006 the Mangal tribe in Loya Paktia made the decision to punish those who tried to conduct insurgency activities in their region. They were unique in their approach. In the south-eastern region most tribes were confused about the situation in which they found themselves. They could not take a clear position about insurgents and insurgent activities as the relationship between insurgency and the ‘war on terror’ was a new issue. Tribal leaders had problems analysing it. Insurgency will only be fought if it is recognised as a shared threat to the tribes.


The Mangal tribe declared that any person who conducts insurgency related activities would be banished and his house would be burnt. Thus, the prevention of insurgency was added to the responsibilities of the Arbakai in areas where the Mangal tribe lived and they took this seriously. For example, in the early months of 2007 a person was attempting to place an improvised explosive device intended to blast police vehicles passing through the Musa Khil District of Khost Province. The IED exploded as it was being installed and the insurgent himself was killed. The Jirga still implemented its decision. They burnt the dead man’s house and they asked his family to leave the area of the Mangal tribe. The Mangal Jirga also passed a decision to prohibit poppy cultivation, promising to punish those who violated the ban by burning their houses. This was a preventive measure as the southeast region is not a poppy growing region.

I’ve blogged a lot on the arbakai since Gordon Brown introduced me to them last year. The U. S., NATO, ISAF, Coalition and Karzai regime are all fighting Armed Oppositional Groups who are 90-95% ethnic Pashtun. The Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek citizens of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are mostly Government Supporters, and those who are Uncommitted are not particularly troublesome, yet. They will get troublesome if the Government doesn’t start demonstrating some competence. Pashtuns are the problem. Pashtuns are going to be the solution.  More Pashtun feet in boots  (or sandals or barefoot) on the ground fighting miscreants instead of being miscreants is our ticket out of there. 

We have tried creating a Regular Afghan National Army, with modest success.  Still not enough of them, and very few kandaks  are capable of independent operations. 

We have tried creating a Regular Afghan National Police, with very modest success.  So far as has been strategically communicated to me, we haven’t created an Afghan National Judiciary or Corps of Honest District Attorneys, so even if we could create the politically correct, multicultural Royal Afghan Mounted Police we think we want to extend the writ of Kabul to places it has never run before, even if they always got their man that man would be back out on the street real quick.

Focused District Development  is taking too long.   We are running out of time and patience and national will.  Running everything out of Kabul doesn’t seem to be working so well, and disempowers people in the Provinces, Districts, and Villages whose help we need.  We need to re-introduce some federalism.  How did they police themselves before the Soviets invaded? 

The concept of Tribal Police  should not be this damn hard to understand.  They don’t have Reservations in Afghanistan, but they do have valleys and villages and districts where one khel dominates and its jirga is the local government.  These remote places have been running their own affairs with out much help from Kabul for a long time.  Old School traditional enforcers of the Pashtun Code could be holier than the Taliban in the eyes of many traditional Pashtuns.  These would be our natural allies.  The safest convoys in Afghanistan would be those escorted by traditional badragas,  and the money paid for badraga would favorably impact the local economy and considerably dampen tolerance for IED construction and emplacement in their Area of Responsibility.  

Now outside of these ethnically homogenous enclaves where jirgas have little influence, tribal police aren’t such a great idea.  Try them where they might work and try something else in other places.  But try something.

Other posts mentioning  arbakai:

Wardak Awakening

Good Guy Militias — ‘community based local defence forces’

Tribal Ruff Puffs

We will also work to increase the involvement of Afghan tribes.

One Man Human Terrain Teams for IW

Afghan tribes will not fit into a modern framework

Pashtun Irregulars Disbanded

CLC’s Good, Arbakai Bad

UPDATE 07012010: Atta-ur-Rehman’s My Cultural Values (Pukhtoonwali)


Filed under IW, The Forgotten War

Operational Verification

Could U. S. Military Information Operators do this?

Or would our own doctrine preclude COMCAM from supporting and PA from relating?


Filed under PSYOP

Obama’s Online Army

The eResistance will have to contend with his legions of Civilian Irregular Information Operators:

On Nov. 18, Obama’s campaign manager David Plouffe e-mailed the online legions and asked them to rank the following four “goals for this movement”: helping Obama “pass legislation through grassroots efforts”; electing “state and local candidates who share the same vision for our country”; training “volunteers in the organizing techniques we used to elect Barack”; and “working on local issues.”

The Interactive Presidency

The civilian versions of Psychological Operations, Deception, Operational Security,  Electronic Warfare and Computer Network Operations will be used as never before by Supportive elements of the domestic target audience as weapons of political warfare against the Unsupportive and Uncommitted elements of the domestic TA.  If the Unsupportive expect to have any restraining influence at all, they will have to form coalitions and downplay their internal ideological differences.  Libertarians have much of the Unsupportive techsense.  Capitalists and Entrepreneurial Frontiersmen have much of the Unsupportive advertising and marketing expertise.  American Exceptionalists and Patriots have some veteran military information operators.  The “conservatives” and the “right” have a few good writers and thinkers.  Can such a herd of cats work together to counter collectivist nutroots information dominance?


Filed under Idea War, Resisters

Informational Armor

encryption armor — conceals the target from enemy view.

Taboo armor — diplomatic immunity, kindergarten school, hospital or baby milk factory armor

What is essential is invisible to the eye


Filed under Cyber Guerrilla Chieftains, Info Warriors

“How do we supplement what the government is already doing?”

Shannen Rossmiller asks.

“I’m just a private citizen,” . . . “I’m not out there saying, ‘Sure, join up the effort, do it from home.’ . . . You might find yourself in legal trouble. You might mess up something ongoing and not realize it,”  . . . “I feel it’s the right thing to do,” she said. “If you have something to offer that is valuable or helpful why not offer it? If more people did, can you imagine what a different world it would be?”

Web-based terrorist hunter to teach

At the first FBI-sponsored International Conference on Cyber Security, held at Fordham University in New York City, Rossmiller, 39, said she planned to team with an as-yet-unnamed defense contractor to form a “cyber corps” of intelligence experts who will search out terrorists on the Internet.

“Everybody finally understands what the terrorists have known since 9/11,” said Rossmiller, an FBI counter-intelligence asset.

“With just a few thousand dollars and the Web, terrorists can be more efficient than our own government. And we have to do something about that.”

. . .

“There are a lot of people who can be trained to do what I do,” Rossmiller said. “I don’t want the notoriety or the pressure. I can teach people who will be paid professionals, not volunteers like me.”




Filed under Heroes, Info Warriors

Foreign Civilian Irregular Information Operations

Irregulars can mix PSYOP propaganda/counterpropaganda with CNA (Computer Network Attack) botnets to hit enemy web sites with DDOS attacks, thus applying Restrictive Measures to sources of enemy propaganda.  A certain amount of PSYOP expertise is required to influence Supporters to volunteer for the CNA botnet, which will be used for PSYOP.  Civilian Irregular PSYOP’ers and Civilian Irregular hackers can work together nicely.


Citizen Propaganda in Contemporary Conflicts: The Case of Israel-Gaza, Russia-Georgia and China-Tibet

Install a trojan for Israel? Uh, no thanks.

Hacktivist tool targets Hamas

Wage Cyberwar Against Hamas, Surrender Your PC

Hackers Take the Fight Over Gaza Online

Help Us Win

UPDATE 200901121951: Israel’s Looking for a Few Good Cybermen

Help Israel Win

UPDATE 200901141557:  Technology Delivers War Propaganda to Gaza, Israeli Citizens

UPDATE 200901141643:   Gaza crisis spills onto the web

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Filed under CNA, Info Warriors, PSYOP, PSYOP Auxiliaries

What used to be called confidence has been renamed arrogance

Unfortunately, we require a sea change in Western Thought. What used to be called confidence has been renamed arrogance. (The difference between arrogance and confidence is competence). We have lost our confidence to guilt about our competence. Multiculturalism is a refusal to decide because we are afraid to be correct, making others wrong and proving our competence. — Michael Hoskins

This is how Guilty White Liberal Gyno-Americans control the thoughts that can be expressed with the vocabulary they leave us.

Multiculturalism is not about tolerance or diversity, it is an anti-Western hate ideology designed to dismantle Western civilization.  —  Fjordman

This is the Culture War, also known as the Cold Civil War, which American Exceptionalists, Patriots and Nationalists must continue to fight in the Homeland if our Westphalian nation-state’s warriors are to be allowed victory in the Afghanistan, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary, and Iraq Campaigns against those who seek to force us to submit to dhimmitude.

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Filed under Idea War

The American Public as Center of Gravity

SWJ has the latest Military Review up, and among the articles is The Truth is Out There: Responding to Insurgent Disinformation and Deception Operations by Cori E. Dauber. Read the whole thing. Some of the best parts:

 Many insurgent groups in Iraq have a real need to impact U.S. public opinion. For them to accomplish their goals, the U.S. has to withdraw from Iraq. The question was, how to accomplish that. What do they think is our center of gravity? Al-Qaeda knows that the U.S. left Vietnam and has interpreted that to mean that if it creates unacceptable casualty rates and exerts enough pressure, America will leave other theaters as well.8

However, the Iraqi insurgents understand they cannot succeed only through their own efforts on the battlefield. Colonel Tovo notes:
I would say that at least for Iraq it’s almost always been a media fight. . . . When you look at insurgent movements in history, clearly there are some [insurgencies] that thought they could win militarily. But in the end, really the center of gravity is always the people. You’re always fighting a battle for the hearts and minds of the people, so Idon’t think it has changed with the rise of the internet and cameras everywhere. It’s just easier for insurgents to reach the people. But even when you go back to Algeria,…the media is certainly present, but it’s much less ubiquitous on the battlefield. They’re still looking to get the biggest IO[information operations] effect out of every event.…That’s the same with a lot of insurgencies, although Iwould say the thing about the one we’re fighting now is that there’s much more of an information component and much less of a military component. So whereas you look at the Vietnamese model where truly they thought that they would wear us down and somewhat beat us on the battlefield (although they did not), Ithink the insurgents in Iraq clearly don’t think they have any hope of beating us militarily. It’s purely a fight for influencing the population [and] the U.S. population to lose heart and will, influencing the other international actors to drop support for the U.S. effort. So I’d say the information component has grown in importance over time.9

 The Internet, meanwhile, is a door that swings both ways. For the first time insurgents can now monitor the way their efforts are covered in the American press—almost in real time—from thousands of miles away. This is not only the first war fought with unlimited, global access to their audience, it is also the first war fought as the global press has moved online. Even the smallest newspapers now have an online presence, and television networks all stream their coverage on their own websites, to greater or lesser degrees. Insurgents can watch the way their efforts are covered for the audiences they hope to influence and adapt strategies if they do not like what they see. At the same time, they know the Western press carefully monitors their own websites—even if they are designed and maintained predominately to recruit new members or mobilize existing support. Thus, they can use their web presence as a ready conduit through the press to the American audience. 

The result is the first war in which virtually every attack is filmed by the enemy for propaganda purposes.10 So many IED attacks on convoys, suicide bombings, executions of hostages, and sniper attacks on Soldiers are filmed that it is often suggested the attacks are being staged to provide material for filming. As Susan B. Glaser and Steve Coll of The Washington Post wrote of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq: “[n]ever before has a guerrilla organization so successfully intertwined its real-time war on the ground with its electronic jihad, making Zarqawi’s group practitioners of what experts say will be the future of insurgent warfare, where no act goes unrecorded and atrocities seem to be committed in order to be filmed and distributed nearly instantaneously online.” They continue, “Filming an attack has become an integral part of the attack itself.”11

 David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency expert who advised General Petraeus, notes the “‘information’ side of al-Qaida’s operation is primary; the physical is merely the tool to achieve a propaganda result.”12 Lieutenant Colonel Guild adds: “A U.S. Soldier does a pre-combat inspection, he checks and makes sure he’s got his bullets, his water, all that stuff. Well, our enemy is doing that, those pre-combat checks [but they] include making sure that the video guy is there with the camera, with batteries, to either courier that video to some safe house or to get it uploaded to some web site, make sure that…that message gets out. And it’s ingrained. . . . [It] would be unusual if they did not do it.”13

These “duck-blind” videos clearly serve an internal purpose for these groups, but we are missing something critical if we only analyze them from the perspective of the role they play as part of a system of persuasion between the Islamists and their constituents. The videos are also intended, and used, as a way to communicate with and persuade the American audience. Such communication is possible because American news networks, unable to obtain regular combat footage any other way, have systematically downloaded this material and integrated it into their news reports, often quite seamlessly, for years.

Sometimes the segments are used with visual and aural cues indicating they were taken from a terrorist or insurgent site, although the cues are rarely sufficient given that no effort has ever been taken to explicitly address that this is a normal journalistic practice.14 CNN, CBS, and NBC have begun to superimpose the words “INSURGENTVIDEO” on at least some of the material, similar to the graphic all networks use when showing material received from the Department of Defense (usually something along the lines of “DOD FILEFOOTAGE”.) This practice seems to be a perfectly acceptable solution if the networks apply it consistently, and throughout the length of any footage acquired from terrorist or insurgent sites, which does not seem to be the case at present for any network.15 (Applying this solution inconsistently might be worse than not applying it at all, because viewers might believe that whenever the graphic is missing, the footage must by definition not come from insurgent sources.)

There should be no mistake about this. Terrorists and insurgents shot this footage of attacks staged for the explicit purpose of providing propaganda for filming. Perhaps more important, terrorists and insurgents edited the footage, even if network personnel subsequently re-edited it. It is propaganda material, not news footage. As Ben Venzke puts it, the “videos are a form of follow-on psychological attack on the victims and societies the group is targeting. They are designed to amplify the effects of attacks.”16
The insurgents themselves are now the press’s primary source of news footage when it comes to the vital issue of attacks on American military personnel in Iraq. This means the authenticity of the footage is of vital importance, because it played a critical role in shaping the American public’s view of the war. 



Yep.   Our own American Main Stream Old Media is the vector for spreading propaganda pathogens undermining the will of the people to prosecute the war.  They have been willing and eager accomplices since the invasion of Iraq.  How many Americans would be alive today if video of Humvees blowing up had not been turned in to show business?

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Filed under Morale Operations, Old Media, PSYOP

What Ever Happened to the Counterterrorism Communication Center?

Remember them?

They could tell me and the rest of the domestic TA, but then I suppose they would have to kill us.

They might be doing great and wonderful things, but if the domestic TA cannot be told of their successes, what reason does the domestic TA have for being anything other than sceptical about their existence and effectiveness?

Recent discussions of propaganda and counterpropaganda on this blog, at Castle Argghhh! and at SWJ never mentioned the CTCC.

Duncan MacInnes, Principal Deputy Coordinator Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State,  said this to U.S. House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats back on November 15, 2007:


Under Secretary Hughes established the Counterterrorism Communication Center (CTCC) last summer to coordinate overall overt USG strategic communications messaging in the war of ideas and to produce and disseminate effective messaging to counter terrorist ideology, especially in the Arab and Muslim world but also in Europe and elsewhere.


The CTCC is a small but truly interagency organization, with staff currently drawn from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the National Counter Terrorism Center and the intelligence community. Working with State, DoD and other USG agencies, it produces strategic communications plans, develops effective narratives and themes to undermine and counter terrorist messaging, and produces specific messages for use by State and DoD communicators. It responds with talking points to breaking events and works closely with the Rapid Response Unit in the State Department’s Public Affairs Office to put out a daily anti-terrorism message. CTCC messages go to more than 2,000 key U.S. government communicators, including the Combatant Commands and all U.S. Embassies, who build on the themes and information in the messages, customizing them for local audiences in order to achieve the greatest impact. Our efforts focus on undermining and putting extremists on the defensive by exposing how terrorists recruit and exploit young people, destroy mosques and religious sites and murder women, children and innocent victims, such as the tragic events of last week that resulted in the deaths of 59 schoolboys, five teachers, police officers and other innocent adult bystanders in an effort to target members of the Afghan parliament, six of whom died in the attack.


The CTCC is intended to be a small, collaborative, interagency resource with a daily mission of providing the intellectual leadership necessary for countering terrorist ideology and extremist propaganda through coordinated messages. The mission and functions of CTCC were developed in response to needs identified by the defense, foreign policy and intelligence communities. The effectiveness of the CTCC is dependent on its interagency staffing, and we intend for the CTCC to continue drawing on expertise from across the entire government.

So whatever happened to Duncan MacInnes?
Is he a holdover from Madame Secretary’s husband’s regime or does he become a Former Regime Loyalist in 12 days?
Whatever happened to the CTCC?
Did they ever produce anything for the domestic TA?
If they didn’t, should they have?
Is there any reason for optimism that they know what they’re doing and are getting it done?

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Filed under Idea War, PSYOP