Monthly Archives: November 2009

It’s time to sue Google

Why, Google Without Terrorist Propaganda is Like Whip Cream Without the Cherry!

Google: helping make terrorist dreams come true

How many Jihadi videos did Hasan watch on YouTube?

Self-radicalization without Jihadi videos is like self-gratification without porn. Pictures get you there quicker.

UPDATE:  200911271035  The next time the Taliban kill an American, thank Google’s YouTube service for helping spread their vile propaganda.

Countering enemy propaganda is a mission self-mobilized Civilian Irregular Counter-Insurgent Supportive Information Operators can do.

Why does Google get away with it?

UPDATE: 200912311016 Dawn Patrol-alanche! Welcome, Dawn Patrollers.

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Filed under Lawfare, Morale Operations, PSYOP, PSYOP Auxiliaries

Putting More Afghan Feet Into Boots On The Ground

The Afghan National Army still isn’t ready for prime time.   

The Afghan National Police are more likely to shake you down at a check point on the highway than do any silly cop stuff like fight crime or lock up criminals. The most gung ho Police Mentoring Team can’t fix the courts and the jails.

The National Directorate of Security gets mentored by whom, exactly?

Afghan National Security Forces need more help than we can give them and they can absorb between now and Obama’s declaration of “Peace With Honor.”

So how ’bout we spread some love to sub-national Security Forces at the provincial, district, and tribal levels?

I hate the New York Slimes. I hate linking to them.

I don’t hate Dexter Filkins.

As Afghans Resist Taliban, U.S. Spurs Rise of Militias

Reader’s Digest version:

The American and Afghan officials say they are hoping the plan, called the Community Defense Initiative, will bring together thousands of gunmen to protect their neighborhoods from Taliban insurgents. Already there are hundreds of Afghans who are acting on their own against the Taliban, officials say.

“The idea is to get people to take responsibility for their own security,” said a senior American military official in Kabul, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “In many places they are already doing that.”

The first phase of the Afghan plan, now being carried out by American Special Forces soldiers, is to set up or expand the militias in areas with a population of about a million people. Special Forces soldiers have been fanning out across the countryside, descending from helicopters into valleys where the residents have taken up arms against the Taliban and offering their help.

One of the most striking examples of a local militia rising up on its own is here in Achin, a predominantly Pashtun district in Nangarhar Province that straddles the border with Pakistan. In July, a long-running dispute between local Taliban fighters and elders from the Shinwari tribe flared up. When a local Taliban warlord named Khona brought a more senior commander from Pakistan to help in the confrontation, the elders in the Shinwari tribe rallied villagers from up and down the valley where they live, killed the commander and chased Khona away.

The feud between the Taliban and the Shinwari elders caught the attention of American officers, who sent a team of Special Forces soldiers to the valley. This reporter was unable to reach the interior of the valley where the men live, so it was difficult to verify all of the elders’ claims.

Both the Shinwari elders said that “Americans with beards” had flown into the valley twice in recent weeks and had given them flour and boxes of ammunition. (Unlike other American troops, Special Forces soldiers are allowed to wear beards.)

American officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said they intended to help organize and train the Shinwari militia. They said they would give them communication gear that would enable them to call the Afghan police if they needed help.

Read the whole thing.

That ODA working with the Shinwari are having some hellacious adventures.  Allowing  their story to be told could persuade, change and influence elements of the domestic target audience in ways beneficial to U. S. Army Special Forces and maybe even beneficial to “victory.”

Meanwhile, back at Camp Eggers . . .

UPDATE 1123090128:  Tim Lynch sez Dexter Filkins writes a great article and it is worth reading but unfortunately as in most things published by the New York Times it is complete bullshit.

UPDATE 1124090215:  Beaucoup links

A question of tribal policy,  November 24, 2009 12:00AM

Secret U.S. plan to support Afghan militias echoes Canadian general’s ideas, Monday 23 November 2009

Gravediggers Disinter Tribal Militia Corpse,  November 23, 2009

US pours millions into anti-Taliban militias in Afghanistan, Sunday 22 November 2009 18.48 GMT

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Filed under IW, The Forgotten War

Message: Local forms of security emerge once an area is cleared and villagers have something to protect.

Trudy Rubin, Philadelphia Enquirer, Bypassing the Karzai Problem

5. Local security helps keep the peace. At intervals along the newly paved “Chinese road” stand armed local home guards. They are the controversial Afghan Public Protection force, known as the AP3, who are recruited by local elders, paid by the Afghan Interior Ministry, and trained (briefly) by U.S. forces. They are a transitional force meant to watch for outsiders. I was skeptical about their usefulness when I visited Wardak in May. But Fidai, who promoted the AP3, says that “where there are AP3 there are no IEDs,” because locals are more willing to give intelligence tips to homeboys. So the AP3 should be retained until the Afghan national police can be expanded sufficiently to staff remote areas of Wardak.

Message: Local forms of security emerge once an area is cleared and villagers have something to protect.

An AP3 skeptic sees the light.

Been scanning for positive news of the AP3. Not much out there. The Quiet Professionals are too quiet. Who is supposed to be strategically communicating to the American target audience about the successes ( there are some, aren’t there?) of what may be one of the most successful programs for using civilian forces since the Civilian Irregular Defense Group in Vietnam?

More on the Chinese Road. How are they going to get all that copper to China? There’s no road through the Wakhjir Pass trafficable for vehicles.

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Filed under IW, The Forgotten War

The Lukewarm Civil War

Che-Supporting Commie Goons Beat Tea Party Protesters In Florida (AMAZING Video)

The Cold Civil War warmed up while you weren’t paying attention.

Unarmed self-defense techniques and handiness with video cameras will be worth more than CCW’s and marksmanship in persuading, changing and influencing the fence-sitters.

UPDATE: Tango Mike Dana Loesch

Comments Off on The Lukewarm Civil War

Filed under Idea War, IW, PSYOP, Resisters