Monthly Archives: May 2008

I Ran Out of Cheeks Way Before the C-in-C Did

Tom W., in a comment over at MilBlogs, expresses the anger of the Counter Insurgent Supportive Irregular Information Operator better than I ever had. The Jacksonian element among the die hard third of the country who won’t quit are pretty well disgusted.

Pelosi I understand. She’s all about power, and she doesn’t care about the country, our troops, or Iraq. One look at that repulsive mug tells you the whole story.

President Bush, however, clearly cares about the country and the troops, so he should have clamped down on this dried-up hag years ago. But he hasn’t.

President Bush has failed us. And I say that as a Bush supporter.

He has utterly failed in his duty as commander-in-chief to vigorously and forcefully defend his policies. Instead, he personalized the attacks against him, which he had no right to do.

He chose to “turn the other cheek” and “let history decide.” As a result, he allowed an information vacuum to form, which the Democrats filled.

Now, we all know–thanks to Rep. Paul Kanjorski (D-PA)–that the Dems never had any intention of surrendering in Iraq. They only said that to get elected.

I suppose President Bush knows this, too, so he chose to never defend himself or to refute the lies told about him, or to criticize Nancy Pelosi for her many seditious and defeatist statements and actions. It was more important to “get along” and be “gentlemanly.”

Bush knew that the Dems wouldn’t surrender in Iraq, but our enemies don’t know that. They’ve chosen to fight on, costing us thousands of more American lives.

President Bush has allowed this to happen. He has shown no courage or leadership in confronting Pelosi. In fact, he smiles at her in public as if he loves her. And she smiles back.

As angry as I am at Pelosi, I’m even angrier at President Bush.

His refusal to refute the worst allegations against him continues to this day. He said he has no comment about McClellan’s book. His former press secretary accuses him of lying us into a war, and he has no comment.

President Bush’s refusal to engage in information operations is pathological. He is mentally unbalanced in this area, and I don’t say that lightly.

He let us all down. He had no right to personalize the attacks against him. He has a duty as our president to refute the allegations that U.S. foreign policy is based on lies.

His decision to play the long-suffering martyr has negatively impacted our national security.

Bush’s failure to punish domestic enemies encourages them to multiply and discourages the otherwise well-disposed.

Carrying his water in a leaky bucket has been demoralizing to the only people left still trying to maintain national will for prosecuting the war.

15 Comments

Filed under Morale Operations

Taliban – MSM Collaboration

phil found this before I did.

“The Taliban have not been very advanced as far as the media war is concerned. But we are making efforts to catch up with the latest methods, and we will soon be available on YouTube,” a non-Pashtun and non-combatant member of the Taliban’s media cell told Daily Times, his face covered up to evade the identifying gaze of invited lenses.



Nice of the Daily Times to bestow noncombatant status on this Taliban information operator. No doubt when the Predator launches a Hellfire on his propagandizing ass there will be much wailing and gnashing of teeth.

Go over to Amicable Collisions and read it all.

1 Comment

Filed under Morale Operations, Old Media, The Forgotten War

Red Chinese Cyber-Militia

Computer hackers in China, including those working on behalf of the Chinese government and military, have penetrated deeply into the information systems of U.S. companies and government agencies, stolen proprietary information from American executives in advance of their business meetings in China, and, in a few cases, gained access to electric power plants in the United States, possibly triggering two recent and widespread blackouts in Florida and the Northeast, according to U.S. government officials and computer-security experts.

This is Computer Network Attack by Chinese Civilian Irregular Information Operators.

Brenner, who works for Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, looks for vulnerabilities in the government’s information networks. He pointed to China as a source of attacks against U.S. interests. “Some [attacks], we have high confidence, are coming from government-sponsored sites,” Brenner said. “The Chinese operate both through government agencies, as we do, but they also operate through sponsoring other organizations that are engaging in this kind of international hacking, whether or not under specific direction. It’s a kind of cyber-militia.… It’s coming in volumes that are just staggering.”

These “other” organizations the Chinese Regulars sponsor are the plausibly deniable cats they herd.

The Chinese make little distinction between hackers who work for the government and those who undertake cyber-adventures on its behalf. “There’s a huge pool of Chinese individuals, students, academics, unemployed, whatever it may be, who are, at minimum, not discouraged from trying this out,” said Rodger Baker, a senior China analyst for Stratfor, a private intelligence firm. So-called patriotic-hacker groups have launched attacks from inside China, usually aimed at people they think have offended the country or pose a threat to its strategic interests. At a minimum the Chinese government has done little to shut down these groups, which are typically composed of technologically skilled and highly nationalistic young men. Officially, Chinese military and diplomatic officials say they have no policy of attacking other governments’ systems.

CNA is way outside my lane, and I’m only a self-tutored amateur PSYOPer, but countering any form of hostile irregular information operation, be it PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, or CNO, is a way for friendly irregulars to annoy the enemy, and I’m for it.

“The U.S. government doesn’t really have a policy on the use of these techniques,” said Michael Vatis, a former director of the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center. “The closest analogy is to covert actions,” he said, meaning spy operations undertaken by intelligence agencies against foreign governments. “They take place, and people have strong suspicions about [who’s responsible]. But as long as they’re not able to prove it, there’s very little that they can do about it. And so there’s often not as much outrage expressed.”

The U. S. Government is always going to be a day late and a dollar short, hindered, hampered and handicapped by bureaucratic infighting, information hoarding, and Lefty congresscritters. Cyber Space Command may as well accept that and commence outreach to develop networks of Irregular iWarriors and prepare to conduct People’s Information War with Concerned Netizens.

Here’s an oldie but goodie about Civilian Irregular PSYOP counter propaganda:
The Unorganized Cyber Militia of the United States

2 Comments

Filed under CNA, IW

Michael Nazir-Ali and the Last Crusade

Bishop says collapse of Christianity is wrecking British society – and Islam
is filling the void

Finally, some push back. The Bishop of Rochester has had personal experience of dhimmitude.

The collapse of Christianity has wrecked British society, a leading Church of England bishop declared yesterday.

It has destroyed family life and left the country defenceless against the rise of radical Islam in a moral and spiritual vacuum.
The Pakistani-born bishop dated the downfall of Christianity from the ‘social and sexual revolution’ of the 1960s.

He said Church leaders had capitulated to Marxist revolutionary thinking and quoted an academic who blames the loss of ‘faith and piety among women’ for the steep decline in Christian worship.

Dr Nazir-Ali said the ‘ newfangled and insecurely founded’ doctrine of multiculturalism has left immigrant communities ‘segregated, living parallel lives’.

Christian values of human dignity, equality and freedom could be lost as the way is left open for the advance of brands of Islam that do not respect Western values.

The KGB succeeded in undermining the West. That was what 1968 was all about. That was what Soviet support to Arafat was all about. The situation the West finds itself in today has been forty years in the making.

I went to Afghanistan an agnostic. I came back a Christian; lapsed, back-sliding, only born once, but comfortable lining up on the Christian side.

I am a Proud Infidel, and I Will Not Submit.

3 Comments

Filed under Idea War, Morale Operations

“We do not wear our politics on our sleeves.”

Some of you do, Admiral.  Or did.  Many of your Soldiers wear combat patches and American flags on their sleeves, which, according to CJCS, when our new overlords demand they take them off because vocal constituencies of theirs are offended, they must willingly subordinate their pride in service and pride in their country to the greater good of appeasing vital party special interests. Guess that’s why they’re velcro’d on. 

The handwriting is on the wall for all who can be pegged as Former Regime Loyalists come January 20.

 

 

 

5 Comments

Filed under Idea War

Where They’ve Been, What They’ve Done

 AFGHANISTAN

 KOSOVO

 

SOUTHWEST ASIA SERVICE

LIBERATION AND DEFENSE OF KUWAIT 1991    SOUTHWEST ASIA CEASE-FIRE 1991-1995     

 

ARMED FORCES EXPEDITIONARY

GRENADA 1983      PANAMA 1989-1990     

 

VIETNAM SERVICE

VIETNAM DEFENSE 1965
VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1965-1966
VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE II 1966, 1967
VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE III, 1967-1968
TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1968
VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE IV 1968
VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE V 1968
VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE VI, 1968-1969
TET 69/COUNTEROFFENSIVE, 1969
VIETNAM SUMMER-FALL 1969
VIETNAM WINTER-SPRING 1970
SANCTUARY COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1970
VIETNAM COUNTEROFFENSIVE, PHASE VII, 1970-1971
CONSOLIDATION I 1971
CONSOLIDATION II 1971-1972
VIETNAM CEASE-FIRE 1972-1973   
  

 KOREA

UN OFFENSIVE 1950
CCF INTERVENTION 1950-1951
FIRST UN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 1951
CCF SPRING OFFENSIVE 1951
UN SUMMER-FALL OFFENSIVE 1951
SECOND KOREAN WINTER 1951-1952
KOREA SUMMER-FALL 1952
THIRD KOREAN WINTER 1952-1953
KOREA SUMMER 1953     

 

 WORLD WAR II, EUROPEAN-AFRICAN-MIDDLE EASTERN THEATER

AIR OFFENSIVE, EUROPE 1942-1944
ALGERIA-FRENCH MOROCCO 1942
TUNISIA 1942-1943
SICILY 1943
NAPLES-FOGGIA 1943-1944
ANZIO 1944
ROME-ARNO 1944
NORMANDY 1944
NORTHERN FRANCE 1944
SOUTHERN FRANCE 1944
NORTH APENNINES 1944-1945
RHINELAND 1944-1945
ARDENNES-ALSACE 1944-1945
CENTRAL EUROPE 1945
PO VALLEY 1945     

WORLD WAR II, ASIATIC PACIFIC THEATER

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 1941-1942     
BURMA 1941-1942
CENTRAL PACIFIC 1941-1943
EAST INDIES 1942
INDIA-BURMA 1942-1945
AIR OFFENSIVE, JAPAN 1942-1945
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 1942-1943
CHINA DEFENSIVE 1942-1945
PAPUA 1942-1943
GUADALCANAL 1942-1943
NEW GUINEA 1943-1944
NORTHERN SOLOMONS 1943-1944
EASTERN MANDATES 1944
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO 1943-1944
WESTERN PACIFIC 1944-1945
LEYTE 1944-1945
LUZON 1944-1945
CENTRAL BURMA 1945
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 1945
RYUKYUS 1945
CHINA OFFENSIVE 1945 

  

WORLD WAR II, AMERICAN THEATER   

  WORLD WAR I

SOMME DEFENSIVE 1918
LYS 1918
AISNE 1918
MONTDIDIER-NOYON 1918
CHAMPAGNE-MARNE 1918
AISNE-MARNE 1918
SOMME OFFENSIVE 1918
OISE-AISNE 1918
YPRES-LYS 1918
ST. MIHIEL 1918
MEUSE-ARGONNE 1918
VITTORIA VENETO 1918

 

PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION

ILOILO 1899
MALOLOS 1899
LAGUNA DE BAY 1899
SAN ISIDRO 1899
ZAPOTE RIVER 1899
CAVITE 1899-1900
TARLAC 1899
SAN FABIAN 1899
MINDANAO 1902-1905
JOLO 1905, 1906, 1913 

 

CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION   

YANG-TSUN 1900
PEKING 1900     

 

WAR WITH SPAIN

PUERTO RICO 1898
MANILA 1898     

  INDIAN WARS

TIPPECANOE 1811
CREEKS 1813-1814, 1836-1837
SEMINOLES 1817-1818, 1835-1842, 1855-1858
BLACK HAWK 1832
COMANCHES 1867-1875
MODOCS 1872-1873
APACHES 1873, 1885-1886
LITTLE BIG HORN 1876-1877
NEZ PERCES 1877
BANNOCKS 1878
CHEYENNES 1878-1879
UTES 1879-1880
PINE RIDGE 1890-1891 

 

WAR OF THE REBELLION 

 BULL RUN 1861
HENRY & DONELSON 1862
MISSISSIPPI RIVER 1862-1863
PENINSULA 1862
SHILOH 1862
VALLEY 1862
MANASSAS 1862
ANTIETAM 1862
FREDERICKSBURG 1862
MURFREESBOROUGH 1862-1863
CHANCELLORSVILLE 1863
GETTYSBURG 1863
VICKSBURG 1863
CHICKAMAUGA 1863
CHATTANOOGA 1863
WILDERNESS 1864
ATLANTA 1864
SPOTSYLVANIA 1864
COLD HARBOR 1864
PETERSBURG 1864-1865
SHENANDOAH 1864
FRANKLIN 1864
NASHVILLE 1864
APPOMATTOX 1865

  MEXICAN WAR  

RESACA DE LA PALMA 1846
MONTEREY 1846
BUENA VISTA 1847
VERA CRUZ 1847
CERRO GORDO 1847
CONTRERAS 1847
CHURUBUSCO 1847
MOLINO DEL REY 1847
CHAPULTEPEC 1847     

  WAR OF 1812

CHIPPEWA 1814
LUNDY’S LANE 1814
BLADENSBURG 1814
MCHENRY 1814
NEW ORLEANS 1814-1815     

  REVOLUTIONARY WAR

TICONDEROGA 1775
BOSTON 1775-1776
QUEBEC 1775, 1776
CHARLESTON 1776, 1780
LONG ISLAND 1776
TRENTON 1776
PRINCETON 1777
SARATOGA 1777
BRANDYWINE 1777
GERMANTOWN 1777
MONMOUTH 1778
SAVANNAH 1778, 1779
COWPENS 1781
GUILFORD COURT HOUSE 1781
YORKTOWN 1781 

    

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Filed under Heroes

Hodes-DeLauro-DeFazio amendment

Congressman Paul Hodes Submits Amendment to Defense Authorization Act to Prevent Propaganda

House aims at Pentagon ‘propaganda’ on Iraq war

“In a free and democratic society, our government should never use the public airwaves to propagandize our citizens,”

Thank God for cable.

So much for PSA’s. Somebody investigate the fair housing guy with all the accents. I’ll miss Smokey The Bear. Only you can prevent forest fires, and perpetual incumbents.

 

 

2 Comments

Filed under PSYOP

Shouldn’t We Be Calling These Guys Head Constables and Sub-Inspectors?

Afghan National Police Gain More Than 1,600 New NCOs

Entry-level training for the Afghan National Police consists of an eight-week program in general police duties, weapons proficiency, first aid, human rights training, community policing, basic border police training, and Afghan law and culture.

This group of NCOs received the next level of training on law, police tactics and operations, management and criminology.

Warrior Leader Course for Afghan 31B20’s?

Col. Nezamudeen Tabish . . . is a 20-year member of the force. He has seen many changes in the police force in his tenure and said he has high hopes for the future.

I’ll bet he has. May 15, 1988 the Soviets began their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Back in those days Mohammad Najibullah, former head of of the KGB’s local affiliate, was the Soviet puppet in Kabul. No telling what the young Tabish absorbed during his formative years as a cop.

Doesn’t say which of the six different police organizations these junior leaders belong to. Counter Terrorism Police probably ought to have military ranks.

UPDATE:  Found this by accident.  Shows what colonialists can get accomplished when they embrace their colonialism and get ‘er done.

The Commission of July 18th last provided for the establishment under the general supervision of the Governor General of an insular constabulary: This is in charge of a Chief, and is to consist of not less than 15 and not more than a 150 privates, with proper officers, for each province. The archipelago has four police divisions, each under an Assistant Chief. There is a corps of inspectors, not to exceed four for each province, to inspect the municipal police. Sergeants, corporals and privates are selected from the residents of each province and serve two years. The Chief and the force generally are declared to be peace officers, and are authorized and empowered to prevent and suppress brigandage, unlawful assemblages, riots, insurrections, and other breaches of the peace and violations of the law. Capt. Henry T. Allen, Sixth United States Cavalry, late Major of the Forty-third Volunteer Infantry, and Capt. David J. Baker of the Twelfth United States Infantry have been detailed to serve, respectively as Chief and First Assistant Chief of the Insular Constabulary upon the appointment of the Civil Governor. — The New York Times November 29, 1901

 

1 Comment

Filed under IW, The Forgotten War

The Enemy Has No Rules

LTC Norman E. Emery, Irregular Warfare Information Operations:
Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities and Effects

The non-state actor reigns supreme in the Information Environment. Information is the commodity with which it purchases cooperation, survivability, perceptions of victories, and silence amongst supporters. The terrorist and insurgent do not have an IO doctrine, which is a Western term. They use three broad methods in their information effects strategy: Projection of its message to various target audiences, Protection of vital information to enhance survivability and decision making, and Collection of information on its enemies.28 Our adversaries have a strong understanding how to leverage the IE, and the US military should not abdicate that battlespace in pursuit of perpetual raids and kill/capture operations. Because the AGF does not have military parity with the U.S., it seeks its successes not on the streets but in the information environment, where it uses its advantage of not being bound by the rules and ethics of responsibly releasing truthful information. The enemy has no rules. It can exaggerate claims, sensationalize events, omit facts, purposely mislead, and release information quickly to the media without extensive staffing. In decades past, the method of reaching audiences was traditional media, but now largely depends on the asymmetric and ubiquitous Internet realm, where ―the keyboard equals Kalashnikov.‖2930 In the IW environment, the gap between US military and adversaries‘ capabilities and use of various means of media and the Internet is much smaller than the gap between their respective military forces capabilities. Islamic terrorist and insurgent groups whom we once considered ignorant and primitive are making effective use of cyberspace as a message and communication medium. The concern is not just command and control via the Internet, which is to be expected in the 21st Century, but the proliferation of messaging and propaganda directly connected to AGF engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially as it relates to causing or exploiting U.S. and allied casualties. Groups boosting video output include those affiliated in Iraq‘s predominately Sunni Arab insurgency, as well as the Taliban, who ironically opposed cameras when it ruled Afghanistan.31 Inevitably, before long other extremists groups will adopt this practice. Libyan firebrand Abu Laith ―al-Libi recently urged Islamic insurgents in Somalia, who have mostly ignored the medium, to begin using videos to foster awareness of their fight.‖32 Information Operations not only projects our messages, but also seek to deny and degrade adversarial messages and deny his access and effectiveness on the Internet. Countering these videos is of urgent importance, because research shows that ―Internet chat rooms and forums are replacing mosques as venues for recruitment and radicalization.‖33 This course of action requires the ability and willingness of the US military to directly and indirectly engage adversarial operations and propaganda on the Internet.

The terrorist and insurgent do not have an IO doctrine — but they do have an As Sahab and a GIMF, which, doctrinally-deficient as perhaps they are, still accomplish the propaganda mission.

Our adversaries have a strong understanding how to leverage the IE, and the US military should not abdicate that battlespace — the US military abdicated the domestic home front battlespace decades ago when they decide Smith-Mundt applied to them and strategic counterpropaganda wasn’t their job.

. . . the ability and willingness of the US military to directly and indirectly engage adversarial operations and propaganda on the Internet — is questionable. I have been looking for evidence of .mil competence in this area and haven’t found much to brag upon. INDIRECT engagement by plausibly deniable Irregular proxies may be happening. I would like to think so.

1 Comment

Filed under IW

Fuzzy Bunny Slippers IO — The Rise of Pajamahadeen, Virtual Militias, and Irregular Information Operators

 Y’all don’t steal my title (unless you’re PurpleSlog). This may be what my Grand Unified Field Theory of Counterinsurgent Supportive Communications evolves into. I think I will keep coming back to this post as I think of stuff. Mostly I will put links and quotes here.

1. Major Elizabeth L. Robbins, U. S. Army Muddy Boots IO: The Rise of Soldier Blogs, http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/robbinsengseptoct07.pdf

2.  Pajamahadeen?
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article396024.ece

3. Buckhead/ Harry MacDougald
Scott Swett and Tim Ziegler, To Set The Record Straight: How Swift Boat Veterans, POWs and the
New Media Defeated John Kerry
http://www.tosettherecordstraight.com/docs/CH13.pdf

4.  Shannen Rossmiller

5.  Joseph Shahda / jveritas

6. Phillipe Karsenty

 7. La Shawn Barber, The Blogosphere’s Smaller Stars
 http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/barber200412200814.asp

8. PWNING Jihadis for Fun and Profit

2 Comments

Filed under Info Warriors, IW

What YOU Could Be Doing If You Had the Imagination and Motivation

https://i0.wp.com/graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/05/20/world/20blogger.190v.jpg

Jane Novak is a heroine in the Army of Davids, an empowered, arguably super-empowered individual influencing events thousands of miles away from her living room. How she developed and cultivated her ability to influence events in Yemen should be an inspiration to all who aspire to contribute more to the war effort than shopping at the mall and paying taxes.

She is an inspiration for Strategic Citizens and Civilian Irregular Information Operators to emulate.

Her face should be up there on the blogospheric virtual Mount Rushmore with Shannen Rossmiller.

H/T: Chief Glenn
What a great way to spend your free time, pestering Islamofascist-abetting tyrants.

CBC Radio As It Happens interviews Jane.  20080528-aih-2.wmv Listen 00:48  to 08:36 

 

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Filed under Heroes

Democrats and Our Enemies

Joe Lieberman explains the difference. Remember him? They kicked him out of their party because he didn’t want to surrender in Iraq.

. . . Rather than seeing the Cold War as an ideological contest between the free nations of the West and the repressive regimes of the communist world, this rival political philosophy saw America as the aggressor – a morally bankrupt, imperialist power whose militarism and “inordinate fear of communism” represented the real threat to world peace.

It argued that the Soviets and their allies were our enemies not because they were inspired by a totalitarian ideology fundamentally hostile to our way of life, or because they nursed ambitions of global conquest. Rather, the Soviets were our enemy because we had provoked them, because we threatened them, and because we failed to sit down and accord them the respect they deserved. In other words, the Cold War was mostly America’s fault.

Blame America First started a long time ago. So did Communist Party USA and Soviet penetration of organized labor and the Democratic Party. Did you think Alger Hiss was the only one?

More Lieberman:

. . . If the Democratic Party had stayed where it was in 2000, America could have confronted the terrorists with unity and strength in the years after 9/11.

Instead a debate soon began within the Democratic Party about how to respond to Mr. Bush. I felt strongly that Democrats should embrace the basic framework the president had advanced for the war on terror as our own, because it was our own. But that was not the choice most Democratic leaders made. When total victory did not come quickly in Iraq, the old voices of partisanship and peace at any price saw an opportunity to reassert themselves. By considering centrism to be collaboration with the enemy – not bin Laden, but Mr. Bush – activists have successfully pulled the Democratic Party further to the left than it has been at any point in the last 20 years.

They consider Bush the main enemy. They have since November of 2000. And they have done everything in their power to hinder, obstruct, undermine, and deny legitimacy. Had Republicans tried that on FDR he would have jailed them. Democrats tried that on Lincoln and he jailed them or exiled them to the Confederacy. Democrats have hampered the war effort of my side and automatically helped out that of the other side.

I question their patriotism.

8 Comments

Filed under Idea War

How Long Can We Tread Water?

Logistics and strategy being discussed over at Chief Wretchard’s.

Things in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not going to continue as they have. Significant changes not yet entirely understood will be forced upon somebody.

Comments Off on How Long Can We Tread Water?

Filed under Logistics, The Forgotten War

Pashtun Irregulars Disbanded

Damn shame. LOCAL Regional/Popular Force paramilitaries have been a feature of previous counterinsurgencies. They require special handling that nobody nowadays seems to want to do.

NATO disbands Afghan auxiliary police, focuses on full-time cops

Born out of frustration in the aftermath of Operation Medusa, the 2006 Canadian-led offensive, the auxiliary police were meant to provide security in remote villages and districts, much like a neighbourhood watch.

They were supposed to serve as a backup to full-time Afghan National Police officers in major centres such as Kandahar.

NATO didn’t have enough troops to hold the ground it had captured from Taliban militants. British Gen. Sir David Richard, the alliance commander in Afghanistan at the time, ordered the auxiliary units created to prevent territory from falling back into insurgent hands.

Some of the 11,000 auxiliary police – who receive $70 US per month in the six southern provinces of Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Zabul and Ghazni – will be absorbed into the slightly better trained and equipped national police force. The rest will be told to go home.

The auxiliary police, modeled on the traditional community defence initiative called arbakai, was initially heralded by Canadian commanders as way to instill confidence in isolated communities where villagers are suspicious of foreigners and the federal police.

Not many will go home. They’ll go work for the heroin cartels, or the Afghan-owned, tribally operated private security companies squeezing the NGO’s, and NATO will have less influence over them than they had when these guys were AUXPOL.

I had a buddy who got paid pretty good to drink a lot of tea and palaver with headmen over who was going to provide gun men for which particular section of Ring Road construction security. The Pashtun tribes have their own lashkars and tribal levies and traditional security and law enforcement arrangements, which Kabul and Washington would rather ignore than work with.

Oh, well. CIDG and RUFFPUFFs weren’t real popular with Saigon, either. Insecure central governments with tenous claims of legitimacy worry more about potentially mutinous auxiliaries than they do about the insurgent, thus losing legitimacy with those they once trusted, who once wished them well.

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Filed under IW, The Forgotten War

Those Who CAN Must Speak Out For Those Who Can’t

The pitifully small percentage of Americans mentally, morally and physically fit enough to meet the high standards required to defend the other 295 million of us, have, along with writing a blank check to the Constitution of the United States payable, if necessary, with their lives, forfeited their First Amendment right to express contempt, disgust, disdain, or any other powerful negative emotions towards Senators or Member of the House of Representatives. No matter how contemptible, despicable, treasonous or deserving of eternal damnation their political masters may be, our Defenders, in the interest of good order and discipline, and in accordance with the requirements of Article 88 of the UCMJ, must remain silent in the face of even the most egregious provocation.

The War of Ideas and the Cold Civil War cannot be fought by serving officers, nor should they be. Domestic enemies are beyond the reach of our military and law enforcement organizations, because powerful elements within our own government share the ideology of those domestic enemies, profit from the damage they do, and protect them from the justice they deserve.

Many of our own law makers are objectively pro-Islamofascist. They hysterically deny this, and it is an unwelcome and unpalatable truth many find easier to block out than to follow this line of questioning to its logical conclusion. It is through our own inattention, ignorance and apathy, and that of our neighbors, that such ambulatory coprolites are perpetually re-elected to positions of power over men and women of integrity whose devotion to duty
precludes them from defending their own honor. In a just world this would shame those of us who are still capable of that emotion, and fill us with a terrible resolve to prove ourselves worthy of the sacrifices made for us and redeem ourselves for our silence in the face of such cowardly bullying of those duty-bound not to defend themselves by punishing the bullies.

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Filed under Idea War, PSYOP Auxiliaries

Today’s international terrorism was conceived at the Lubyanka

Civilian Irregular Information Cyber Scout and Auxiliary Extraordinaire suek designates an HVT for your reading pleasure: Russian Footprints, an oldie but goodie that I hadn’t seen, written by a former Romanian DIE general I have referenced on this blog before. The Left and Islamic terrorism have common gene pools. Terribly politically incorrect of me to dare question anybody’s patriotism, but I’m not running for anything and I don’t care if you vote for me or not. This Soviet-Syrian-PLO-Black September-Hamas-Fatah-Hezbollah-Iran-anti-Israeli-anti-American-anti-Western connection that the Left and powerful elements within the Counterinsurgent’s polity share is the reason Regulars can’t effectively engage external adversaries in the War of Ideas. Debunking the Far Enemy’s ideology is unacceptable to the Near Enemy, who deny legitimacy and exercise veto.

Interesting comments over at Flopping Aces, who found this for suek.

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Filed under G-2

Homemade Transcript of “5th Generation Warfare–What does it all mean?”

Saw something that needed doing, and did it. Didn’t do it perfectly, and I wouldn’t recommend hiring me as a transcriptionist, but this ought to be good enough for non-government work.

purpleslog was on Covert Radio last Friday, 9 May, 2008 and he and I both agree that his words from that interview deserve cut & pastable dissemination.

Welcome everybody to a brand new edition of Covert Radio. I’m your host, Brett Winterble. Over the next 25 minutes or so we’re going to be visiting with somebody who explores the theoretical angles of warfare. This isn’t a policy-maker or any kind of a head of state or any kind of a participant in any think tank. This is a gentleman who blogs in a different kind of area, an area that deals with the theory of warfare, that being Fifth Generation Warfare. So, without any further ado, let me go to an interview that I did with purpleslog. I don’t know his name, I just know his handle. purpleslog runs a blog, I don’t mean for that to rhyme, and he breaks down what he thinks will be the next arena of warfare. The next school of thought in warfare. It’s a kind of warfare called Fifth Generation Warfare, or 5GW, or 5G Warfare. Over the course of the next 15 minutes of so, he’ll take us into that sort of thinking, and into what he thinks wil be the challenges as we move forward in this country. I invite you now to join me in my discussion with purpleslog on the challenges of Fifth Generation Warfare, here on Covert Radio. I’m Brett Winterble, and this, is tomorrow’s headlines today. This is Covert Radio. Welcome to the show, purple.

purpleslog: Hi, thanks a lot, Brett.

Brett: Now, for the benefit of my listeners out there who might not be familiar with this, what exactly is Fifth Generation Warfare and how does that relate to things going on in the world today?

purpleslog: We’ll get you there quick. A guy named Bill Lind a bunch of years ago came up with generations of war for a modern war framework which implies that First Generation Warfare in his point of view was more muskets and things like that, Second Generation Warfare was more attrition warfare, you got manuever warfare, it’s just an interesting category framework for describing conflict modes. In my little corner of the blogosphere we’ve kind of moved past Lind’s definition and [unintelligible] came out to that currently many of the wars and battles and conflicts the United States was in and has been in in the last say, thirty years, our opponents have been Fourth Generation Warfare opponents. They’ve moved beyond just fighting on the battlefield, and it’s more the weaponization of things that are not weapons and using that against us, and what’s the best way for the United States. I am a a U. S. citizen, you know, yay United States! How is the best way for the United States to respond to Fourth Generation Warfare? With more Fourth Generation Warfare or is there a Fifth Generation? You know if there is a Fourth Generation what would a Fifth Generation of warfare look like that could be used to counter it? And we start from there and have been fully mapping out the possibility for some other ways to combat Fourth Generation Warfare opponents and our extrapolation was to, well we’ll call it Fifth Generation Warfare. I’m actually going to read off the definition we’re currently working on, I say “our” I’m also a co-blogger at Dreaming 5GW. The current working definition we’re using is Fifth Generation Warfare is the secret deliberative manipulation of actors, networks, institutions, systems, and any other First Generation through Fourth Generation forces to achieve a goal, or set a goal, probably a combination of socio-economic and political domains while trying to avoid or minimize the retaliatory or defensive actions of your opponent.

Fifth Generation Warfare is when [unintelligible] is really very small actors that are not going to be trying to explicitly, there not going to necessarily be involved with fire fights. What they’re going to be trying to do they’re going to change the world around them in secret. They’re going to try to take a lot of institutions because global actors, whether states or non-states, are still working around in a sea of global institutions and they’re going to effect the results they want by manipulating these institutions and other actors out there. The Fifth Generation Warfare actor is not very powerful in the sense they don’t have a lot of guns, they don’t have weapons, so they’re willing to use secrecy and once they’re discovered, once their Fifth Generation Warfare activity is discovered, the force placed before it’s results are there, it’s pretty much destroyed. Exposure destroys the ability of the Fifth Generation Warfare effort. [crosstalk]

Brett: Now, I know that the typical Middle Eastern terror group would be considered Fourth Generation Warfare, right? Like al Qaeda, Hezbollah, things like that?

purpleslog: Right. And there are different variations of it too, you know, some of them are more centralized than others. I mean, you look at the PLO and how it is very centralized and Hezbollah is much more decentralized and they’re very effective at what they do. The last Israeli war with Hezbollah, I don’t want to say that Israel lost necessarily, they didn’t get the, they certainly didn’t achieve the strategic goals they wanted to. Hezbollah proved to be very adept at fighting them and pre-planning it. They’re good light infantry fighters but they’re also very decentralized. Their small maneuver groups, very small units, ten or twelve guys, and once the war started they didn’t get instructions from commanders above, they had areas they could operate in freely, maneuver in, and I hate to say they did a pretty good job. I’m not trying to say Yay, Hezbollah! but

Brett: No, no, no, but certainly, certainly you’re applauding at least the tactical innovation, you’re not applauding what the group’s trying to do. I understand. My name is Brett Winterble, this is Covert Radio, talking to purpleslog, our special guest this segment, talking about Fifth Generation Warfare. Here’s my question, though: so if al Qaeda or these little cellular groups are operating as Fourth Generation Warfare people, would domestically, would like ELF or ALF be a Fifth Generation incarnation? Because these are small groups that rely on secrecy, that may not even know each other. Would ELF and ALF be considered like a fifth Generation entity?

purpleslog: No, I would still consider them, they’re playing with Fourth Generation Warfare states, for the most part. They’re still the cellular organization, they’re using . . . , violence isn’t the end in itself. The terrorist action isn’t really what they’re trying to accomplish, it’s the message they’re trying to send to people. They’re trying to send some messages to those who are going to directly oppose them “hey, don’t mess with us, we’re powerful, we can cause mischief” but they’re also trying to draw attention to their cause, they’re going to try to get the government to overreact and whomp on them so they can, so other people go “that was way too much reaction by the U. S. Government, we feel bad for them.” Try to get the scrappy underdog effect. “Look at us! We’re the only ones out there fighting for animals, or for the environment, you should be sympathetic toward our cause, and perhaps give us money and take upon those views yourself.” That’s what they’re going after. That’s all Fourth Generation Warfare. It’s really Information Warfare, it’s message sending, trying to shape perceptions and minds there and get sympathy. It’s still Fourth Generation Warfare.

Brett: Can states harness Fifth Generation Warfare? Can you think of an instance where states can harness Fifth Generation Warfare to their advantage?

purpleslog: It won’t be states directly. It will be people outside the state doing for the benefit of the state, or one of these samll groups inside the state, and i’ll give you an example of the United States did this. This was the post World War II group that set up the institution and the framework that really let us to win the Cold War. By the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union actually fell, if you were around then, around the U. S. population, most of the U. S. population really wasn’t that sympathetic toward fighting the fight against the Soviet Union anymore. people weren’t really interested in confronting them. There was large [unintelligible] looking at many U. S. institutions and across academic communities, ther were people overtly, openly sympathetic with the opposition cause. But the guys, the 1947’ers, let’s call ’em that, they put in play the institutions, the military-industrial complex, they got national and global institutions in place so we kind of fought the Cold War in some ways on automatic. Even as support and sympathy for that effort fell, it was still in place and kept going. If you look at it in some ways that effort they put in place, the military-industrial complex, is still there now. The opponent it was put in to place to fight is gone, but it was such a strong set of tools it still exists even though it’s primary mission now is gone.

Brett: So you’re saying these guys, for example, at the end of World War II when OSS was about to be disbanded, Harry Truman indicated that he did not want a Central Intelligence Agency kind of a framework to happen, the guys who kind of quietly labored behind the scenes in secret at the pentagon and the old OSS who gave birth to that Cold War fighting situation, that would be 5GW?

purpleslog: Truman and his guys put together the containment strategy, and help set up NATO, and doing all those things. NATO and the other institutions like that around the world, which were meant in some ways to put a institutional boundary around the Soviet Union from the rest of the non-Soviet world. Those guys put in place the institutions, the military-industrial complex to build the weapons, to actually fight the Soviet Union if need be, and to challenge them economically. Those things that were put in place were soon ran on automatic in the ’50’s and the ’60’s and the ’70’s. I’m not sure that’s the only reason the Cold War was won but it certainly increased the chances of eventually the West triumphing over the Soviet Union. That’s an example of Fifth Generation Warfare. They did small changes, they were behind the scenes, nobody at the time really fully understood at the time I think what they were doing and what they were accomplishing, and when they wer long gone and out of government the changes they made, the steps they put in place, the programs they did, ran on automatic, and even when I say a plurality, it’s not even a majority of U. S. citizens [unintelligible] there was a re-vote on the whole anti-Soviet program in 1976, i don’t know if it would have won. But it didn’t matter, because these 5G’ers back in th elat ’40’s put in place where it didn’t need to be re-voted on. Even if the U. S. population’s morale and will wasn’t there what they put in place was going to work and run on regardless. Now we can do the same sort of thing nowadays today. One big deficiency the United States has is short-term thinking and i don’t think we have a will to be in a decades long fight. If you want to fight al Qaeda, or some other similar type groups, you need to put in a counterterrorist/anti-terrorist/anti-al Qaeda Fifth Generation Warfare effort put in place now, today, to fight that kind of fight long-term.

Brett: Do you believe the United States has the will power to do that, or are we so short-sighted that we want the quick resolution?

purpleslog: I think the U. S. for the most part we want the quick resolution. U. S. citizens, we, we tend to not, I don’t think we like to begin wars. I think when we’re in ’em we like to win ’em and win ’em fast and move on to the next thing, making some money, that sort of thing, living our lives. And that’s where a Fifth Generation Warfare effort can come in here, is to behind the scenes, put in place the institutions and and things you need to fight. One area in my part of the blogosphere where we kind of read like the Thomas Barnett stuff [unintelligible] United States, and what you can probably do is set up the institution to do in Barnett’s phrase, the SysAdmin type work that can be used to shrink the gap, shrink the dangerous places in the world, all the dangers to the United States comes from these gap areas which for the most part doesn’t include the Middle Eastern areas. A Fifth Generation Warfare effort to fight the Middle Eastern sorts of terrorism would be to set up a military-industrial SysAdmin complex, to put in, to be in place now, the institutions needed to shrink the gap so even there isn’t the will that’s there to do it, the leaders 20 years from now will already have the tools in front of them.

Brett: This is very revolutionary thinking, and what I’m visualizing is legions of civil libertarians going out of their minds saying “The U. S. Constitution does not provide for perpetual motion machines fighting terrorists.” So how would you then, even though you’re right, I believe you’re right, how would you answer those charges, that all this sounds very extra-Constitutional, that these become institutions that are not accountable to the elected officials in Washington?

purpleslog: Well, you know, NATO was set up [unintelligible] treaties [unintelligible] approval by the Senate. [unintelligible] SysAdmin, military SysAdmin complex, you’re just going to be giving leaders at the federal level additonal tools. The thing is right now they see a lot of nails. They got hammers, so things look like nails to them. Leaders, when a crisis come up, they have a problem to solve, they don’t have time, then, to spend say, with the U. S national security establishment, you don’t have five years to rebuild and reshape your institutions at that time. When 9/11 came up the united States really had a Second Generation military, big industrial, attritition might. And some small manuever forces and some Special Ops type forces. We didn’t have time at that point to over night rebuild what the United States needed as far as mostly a counterinsurgency force, so we went to war in Iraq and what not with the forces we had. If your view is that the grand strategy of the United States needs to be shrink the gap going forward, that’s going to be what our generation’s involvement for the next twenty years, let’s get the leaders who 10-15 years from now are going to have to be making what is to them a short-term decision, let’s get them tools now that they’re going to need then, to do that mission. That’s the way we’ll have to do it. If they have the tools available they will make short-term decisions to use those tools to solve problems. If they don’t have the right tools then, they will use tools that are not perfect for the job to try to achieve perhaps the same effect without much result.

Brett: Well this is very cool. This is almost reminiscent of like an Eastern mindset, where the war takes a hundred years to win and you’ve got to be willing to fight that war for a hundred years in a variety of ways.

purpleslog: Absolutely [unintelligible]. This is for United States citizens to get their state, the United States, to win this longish type war that we’re fighting.

Brett: Final question for you. I’m talking to purpleslog about Fifth Generation Warfare. I’m Bett Winterble. This is Covert Radio. Is there a Sixth Generation Warfare?

purpleslog: Well, you know, we’ve discussed that a little bit. I think the consensus among our group and my personal conclusion is no. In our view the Generation Warfare, I’m not really discussing technology at all here. So, ou can see the Generations of War in our way kind of existing throughout time, perhaps. I’m not sure wher the next place is going. We’ve mapped it to like the uh the Boyd OODA loop and I’m really not sure where you go from here to Sixth Generation Warfare. Perhaps, when there’s a technological singularity in a number of years the world will change so much we’ll have to reset and start everything from scratch, but right now I don’t see what would come next. If right now you’re looking at the situation in warfare as perhaps the atomic unit, the atomic actor being individual, how do you get smaller than that? How do you disperse kinetics more? I’m not sure where you would go from that.

Brett: Well I’ll tell you, this has been an incredibly insightful conversation, and purpleslog, where do people go to your blog, obviously if they’re on my blog they can link to your blog directly, but where can my audience go and find the stuff thast you’re working on here?

purpleslog: My own personal blog is at http://purpleslog.wordpress.com/ and i co-blog with a bunch of other Fifth Generation Warfare theorists at Dreaming 5GW dotcom.

Brett: That’s fantastic. purp, thanks so much for your time. I really want to come back and visit with you from time to time as we move forward here on Covert Radio. I think you brought a whole new kind of insight into this and i’m really appreciative for the pink.

purpleslog: Well thanks a lot.

Brett: What a fascinating interview we just had with purpleslog. I do appreciate his time and I hope he’ll come back again in the near future. I would invite you to continue to listen to this show, to learn and to exploreareas that you might not otherwise be familiar with. I would invite you to expand your horizons. and to enjoy the fruits of the labor of the staff here at Covert Radio. Don’t forget, coming up, later in the week, it’ll be the special show we do every week with Long War Journal.org’s Bill Roggio, wher we’ll take a look at the Long War from his perspective. Thank you for joining me. Thank you for listening. And we’ll see you next time here on Covert Radio.

Damn. I’m tired. Yankee isn’t my first language. That was tough for a bitter clinging in-bred banjo-picking canoeist-sodomizin’ typical white person like me. Brett, if there is a copyright issue I’ll take this post down. Be glad to post it over on your blog. purp, come edit the [unintelligible].

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Filed under G-2

Those men of honor had reason to believe their country would back them up

Read The Ghosts of Vietnam at The Belmont Club.

I will not stand silent while the events of February, 1968 and April, 1975 are reenacted.

Never Again
Tet Comes Early This Year
The Terrorists’ Tet
Anybody who questions Our Patriotism is a NAZI 

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Filed under Morale Operations

Money may not buy you love, but it sure pays for propaganda.

What politicians can we trust? What major, or 3rd or 4th party, has no powerful figures that have not been bribed to manage our perceptions?
Heard this read out loud on the radio and it really hit me how We The People have been played like fiddles in a massive influence operation. Read the whole thing, with particular attention to:

Big bucks are allowing the oil sultans and dictators to intimidate US allies, buy politicians and academics, and purchase election outcomes.

I cringe every time I see that pic of Bandar’s brother smooching The King.

The oil sheikhs can “tweak” attitudes towards extremism and terrorism, and buy access to politicians through lobbying and campaign contributions.

Unindicted co-conspirators. Think about how much your Representative spends on getting re-elected. They only make $338,600 honest dollars in a two-year term.

Al Jazeera, the Qatari Arabic and English language TV is a propaganda arm with global reach. Viciously anti-American, it talks to tens of millions of Arabic speaking Muslims worldwide, as well as audiences in Pakistan, India, London and Detroit.

See Al Jazeera Has 2432 videos on YouTube. Up to 4081 now.

Riyyadh also employs an army of lobbyists and other “influencers” in Washington, London, Brussels and elsewhere around the world. These shadow mercenaries promote a benign image for the Kingdom.

They appear on TV, write newspaper and journal articles, direct university programs on Islamic or Middle Eastern studies. Saudi princes have poured tens of millions into prestigious universities, from Georgetown and Harvard to Cambridge and Edinburgh.

Former senior government officials and ambassadors are on the royal payroll influencing their colleagues in the diplomatic service. This is how the Saudi “peace plan” calling for undermining Israel through a massive influx of Palestinian “refugees” received US support at the highest levels.

This is how the Carter Center in Atlanta ended up taking millions in Gulf oil money. This is why Jimmy Carter looks like he’s shilling for the Iranian-Saudi client, Hamas.

So who is clean?

I violate Article 88 so that you Regulars don’t have to. Plausibly deniable auxiliaries beyond the reach of retribution have their uses, you know.

Comments Off on Money may not buy you love, but it sure pays for propaganda.

Filed under Idea War, PSYOP

We’re All Mavericks, Now

Stole that title from Rush. Been thinking along those lines for years.

Made this comment over at The Jawa Report.

 

The greedy, money-grubbing, vote-for-us-because-the-other-side-is-worse Republican Party treats “conservatives” like Democrats treat blacks, and 91% of “conservatives” keep voting Republican.

Give up on the idea of political parties. Build Coalitions of the Like-minded instead. Become a non-hiearchical, entrepreneurial, distributed swarm of attacking Irregular Culture Warriors, making life miserable for Cultural Marxists, and multi-culti carbon dispensationalist tranzies while providing aid and comfort to American Exceptionalists, rugged individualists, Constitutionalists, and the rest of the bitter clingers who have turned their backs on the Republican party but yet cannot abide what the Democrat Party has become.

Don’t vote for incumbents. Period.

What are you “conservatives” trying to conserve?

I need to figure out a way to incorporate that into my Grand Unified Field Theory of Counterinsurgent Supportive Communications magnum opus that I failed to interest greater talents than mine in writing.

Counterinsurgent Supportive Communicators have to fight the Culture War and the Cold Civil War in America to get their messages past the Insurgent Supportive Communicators who control so much of the vocabulary and media. Insurgent Supportive Communicators are powerful operatives of one major American political party’s agit-prop al-Sahab apparat. The political appointees, career bureaucrats, career officers, and contracted ex-career officers who get paid tax money to be Regular Counterinsurgent Supportive Communicators can’t/won’t/don’t want to deal with the consequences of admitting their own impotence to defend the Constitution of the United States from domestic enemies, and are not particularly appreciative of Irregulars who mention the unmentionable.

UPDATE:

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