Monthly Archives: March 2008

Beating Hollywood

Plagiarized from http://outsidethewire.com/blog/documentary-series/beating-hollywood.html

People often complain about Hollywood’s leftward tilt when it comes to Iraq, but few do anything pro-active about it.

JD Johannes is trying to do something about it. 

He has nearly died a few times trying to do something about it.  

Hollywood and the entertainment industry is a business focused on the bottom line.  If people want Hollywood to produce a pro-victory film, or a pro-troop television series, they will have to demonstrate that it is economically viable.

Most of the anti-war films have taken a beating at the box office.

Brian DePalma’s ‘Redacted’ grossed $65,388, but cost $5million to make and
‘Home of the Brave’ only brought in $51,708 domestically.

To put that in perspective, JD  made his documentaries for under $60,000–that is
the trip to Iraq and editing, audio studio, music, digital animations,
etc., EVERYTHING.

To beat ‘Redacted’s’ box office gross, takes the sale of 2,900 DVDs.  Just 2,900 DVDs sold.

To demonstrate to Hollywood and the cable TV networks that a pro-victory documentary is viable, he needs to sell 2,900 in 6 weeks.

2,900 total DVDs.  It doesn’t matter if it is 2,000 individual episodes and 900 of the double-disc trilogy .

2,900 DVDs sold pokes Hollywood in the eye and shows that a pro-victory documentary can beat the studios.

Are you willing to prove to Hollywood that a pro-victory documentary is viable?

Are you willing to take on Hollywood and do something about the ongoing flood of anti-war propaganda films?

If you are, here is what you can do:

  1. If you can afford to, buy a DVD .
  2. If you are a blogger, blog about the movie.
  3. If you are a radio show host, talk about the movie.
  4. If you listen to local talk shows, call up and tell the
     screener/producer about the movie.  (I already do a lot of shows, but
     there is no such thing as too many shows.)
  5. If you are a blog reader, email your favorite bloggers about the movie.  Or, email your favorite columnist/reporter about the movie.

JD’s advertising budget is $0.  They’ve already ran out of money twice while making the movie.

He depends on the kindness of others to help promote the movie .

JD and I am asking for your help.  JD  can make a movie, but it takes people like you to spread the word so people know it exists.

So, do you want to take on Hollywood?  Do you want to poke Hollywood in the eye?

The Outside the Wire Project would not exist without the support of  generous patrons.  Freedom isn’t free, and neither is traveling to Iraq to show a different side of the War on Terror.

Please help support Outside the Wire by purchasing a DVD !

http://outsidethewire.com/get-the-outside-the-wire-documentaries.html

I know this guy.  I bought one of his DVD’s.  It was great. 

Trust me on this.  Buy the DVD.

5 Comments

Filed under Electronic Counter Media, Heroes

FITNA A film by Geert Wilders

UPDATE:  Read Samizdat over at The Belmont Club.

Unless society does it job of protecting life and liberty effectively, its failure will spur the rise of freelancers.

. . . information about freedom and the free world is now on a distributed, rather than a centralized model. There are pluses to that, but the immediate negative is the perception that Western governments are not taking the informational war seriously. A perception sadly confirmed by the lack of other efforts.It’s going to be up to anonymous people in widely-flung corners of the internet who take on the burden of the informational fight. The Western governments and worldwide media are sadly derelict in this.  —  Elmondohummus

Geert Wilders is the model civilian irregular information operator.  Government, military, intelligence community, law enforcement officers, bureaucrats, and contractors can’t or won’t get it done. 

It falls to us.

See my Pamphleteers and Samizdat from two years ago.

8 Comments

Filed under Cyber Guerrilla Chieftains, Info Warriors

it’s preferable to keep the sites operating as a way of tracking the spread of radical Islam, rather than try to quell them one by one

They don’t have the credibility to convince me of that.

Unwittingly hosting terror by Boston Globe journo Bryan Bender.

 “What’s useful about them is to understand the relationships between the various people that are on the sites, obviously in some cases their identities,” said a senior US counterterrorism official who asked not to be identified because of his sensitive position.

So ask the Irregulars nicely to cut you some slack on that particular web site and suggest sites whose disappearance you would applaud, Mr. Unidentifed.

“There is nothing to learn from them,” said Yigal Carmon, a former Israeli military intelligence officer who founded the Middle East Media Research Institute in Washington. “The damage they are causing is far beyond anything that can be learned.”

Yigal has cred with me.  Mr. Unidentified doesn’t.  That’s why we have counterinsurgent-supportive vitual militias conducting Computer Network Attack and applying Counterpropaganda Restrictive Measures ourselves.  We think it needs to be done and we no longer buy excuses.  Our perception has been managed to perceive the Regulars as negligent in protecting the domestic target audience from enemy propaganda.

For the government to shut them down would be “pointless,” the senior counterterrorism official said, akin to a “whack-a-mole approach to counterterrorism.”

Well Mr. Unidentified, much of what the government does is pointless.  Some of us are coming to that realization and finding non-governmental solutions to problems political appointees and career bureaucrats can’t be bothered with.

Posted this over at Dreaming 5GW:

Every mole that gets whacked inconveniences some adolescent onanistic jihadi wannabe who might begin to question the competence of people who can’t keep a site up.Whack enough moles and a certain percentage of lurkers will give it up. Irregular measures of effectiveness don’t have to withstand Congressional scrutiny, so even a small percentage of discouraged wannabes is worth doing.

It is bad for citizen morale to leave everything to Regulars, especially when the citizens become uncomfortably aware of the Regular’s wardrobe deficiencies.

Comments Off on it’s preferable to keep the sites operating as a way of tracking the spread of radical Islam, rather than try to quell them one by one

Filed under Info Warriors, PSYOP Auxiliaries

Who Still Takes Dahr Jamail Seriously?

Never heard of him?  Lucky you.

Debunking people like him is a necessary task that nobody in our government has the political backing to accomplish.  Civilian Irregular Counterpropagandists can do this.

I first became aware of this via Chief Glenn, who linked to and thus instalanched into blogospheric conciousness Jules Crittenden’sBruce Kesler‘s, and K. Crary’s blog entries on this.

A pack, not a herd. 

Mr. Reynolds may not understand why I have him blogrolled under Cyber Guerilla Chieftains, but I mean it in a good way.  He is a yellow node in the Blogospheric Resisitance.  I was in Anbar when I posted that, and we didn’t have to take malaria pills, so how bad could the malaria be?  The pecker checkers in Afghanistan were always pushing Malarone.

Comments Off on Who Still Takes Dahr Jamail Seriously?

Filed under PSYOP Auxiliaries

concerned Afghan citizens dime out Taliban

First official use of the term “concerned Afghan citizens” I’ve seen so far. 

Afghan, Coalition Forces Detain Taliban Facilitators

Comments Off on concerned Afghan citizens dime out Taliban

Filed under G-2

The police in Shahjoy no longer resemble a “posse,”

Army Capt. Dave Perry and Afghan National Police Lt. Fazal Rahman brief Afghan patrolmen before a presence patrol in Nowrak village, Afghanistan. Rahman commands these patrolmen from a patrol base in the Shahjoy district of Zabul province. Perry leads the district’s police mentoring team, which is training the Afghan officers to extend their presence beyond the road into the nearby villages. Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class David M. Votroubek, USN

Team Works to Turn ‘Posse’ Into Professional Police Force

Capt. Dave Perry and Afghan National Police Lt. Fazal Rahman brief Afghan patrolmen before a presence patrol in Nowrak village in the Shahjoy district of Afghanistan’s Zabul province. Rahman commands these patrolmen from a patrol base in the district, where they maintain security along Highway One. Perry leads the district’s police mentoring team, which is training the Afghan officers to extend their presence beyond the road into the nearby villages. Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class David M. Votroubek, USN

3 Comments

Filed under IW, The Forgotten War

No Sons of Afghanistan Need Apply

I had the honor to address this morning Major General Robert Cone, Commanding General for the Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan, based in Camp Eggers in Kabul.  The whole Blogger’s Roundtable transcript is here.  I added the links, bolding, and comments in brackets to the transcript below:

On the Afghan police side, I think we’ve made some significant progress in reform. But very candidly, we have a long way to go in terms of reforming the Afghan National Police because, in fact, we started several years later than the army. A major program I talked about last time was a program called Focused District Development that allowed us to really focus our resources on the unit that we think is most important to the Afghan people: local police in the districts. And we began this process of identifying — the first round had about eight districts in it. They were in some of the toughest neighborhoods in Afghanistan, essential to COMISAF’s plan for security for the spring.

We essentially went in and did a unit set fielding, where we took the units — these police units — out of the district, brought them back to our regional training center and backfilled them with our best police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police. And for eight weeks they held the fort, actually showed the Afghan people what real professional policing is about, while the local police, in some cases, were found not to be competent enough to go through training.

And we continued to recruit, but refilled these districts with nationally vetted leaders, with police of some competence, and then took them through eight weeks of training, gave them full equipment, gave them full access to ID cards, the national payment system for police, and then brought them back out and replaced them in the districts.

And right now we’re in the process of assessing their performance.

We leave police mentors on the ground with these folks to make sure that they don’t return, perhaps, to — or they resist the temptations of corruption that perhaps they’ve seen in the past. Reviews are very good on the first eight districts. We have the second group of districts is now currently in training, and we’re in the process of conducting shuras with the local communities of the districts that have been identified for round three.

Overall, we’ll do 52 districts in critical areas this year, and those districts are linked to other parts of the rule of law — for instance, the judicial system, the corrections system — and then we’re also working to link economic development. Once security is established in these districts, they become the face of the government to the Afghan people, security is established, and then all of the other components of reconstruction can begin in thesedistricts.

So we’ve had a lot of support and a lot of partnership with other entities here, to include the minister of — Ministry of Rural Reconstruction, the independent Directorate of Local Governance, all working with us to leverage our program.

With that, I’d like to stop and take your questions.

MR. HOLT: Okay, Doug?

Q Hey, General Cone, this is Doug B. from Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group. Focused District Development in Nimroz province — have we done any of this for that province yet?

GEN. CONE: Technically, Delaram will be — because it’s right on the tip there, on the very top — it’s technically in Delaram. [Delaram is in the extreme northeast corner of Nimroz on the Herat Road] We will be doing that as part of our future efforts. But right now we haven’t gotten a lot into Nimroz simply because ISAF isn’t into Nimroz yet. As ISAF moves in in the future, and I believe there are plans, I think we’ll start to find out what we have in there and get into that area.

Q Okay. Next question: is there anything similar to FDD in the works for the Border Police?

GEN. CONE: Right now there are a couple of initiatives that are working with the border police. I think after — initially, FDD to the Afghans seemed a little bit alien. They sort of believed that they could make these changes incrementally. And part of the problem in the past has been that that hadn’t really worked as well as everybody would like, particularly because of the corruption that’s involved. I think what has happened in the mind’s eye of a lot of people, to include the minister of Interior, is he’s seen the effect of doing this sort of unit set approach, replacing people, basically doing things like drug testing and taking a hard look at this way to field, and I believe the Minister of Interior is interested in doing border police forces in this manner in the future. He’s talked to me about it.

Right now our priority, because of the insurgency, is really local policing. But as more resources become available, we will attempt and broaden this program into Afghan border police.

There are some initiatives ongoing right now in focused border police training. But we believe it’s going to take a fairly comprehensive approach and maybe changing out some of the key players, maybe recruiting nationally, bringing those people in to change what is effectively an area that is very rife for corruption based upon what they do for a living.

And so I think it’s a good fit. It’s just a matter of us getting the resources necessary to do it.

Q Okay, sir, one last question: On the subject of auxiliary police, I understand, they’re supposed to be phased out in October. My question is this: Sir, what is the plan to make use of turned Taliban, who were former bad guys and now they’ve come and seen the light and chieu hoi‘d. We want to make use of them. Is there something in the works to do that?

GEN. CONE: Yes, there is. And in fact, it’s called the — it’s the PTS program. [Program Takhim-e-Solh] And I’m not sure what that acronym stands for, but it basically is an Afghan-led program that reforms former Taliban, basically looks at their individual case.

They come forward. The Afghan government decides what would be the appropriate requirements for them to fully transition, declare their support for the government. And then they are brought back onboard as full citizens in Afghanistan.

That program is under way. It is not significant in terms of the numbers. But there have been numbers, a good number of people, that have been involved in this. The number escapes me right now off the top of my head, but it’s out there.

I think, on the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, Afghanistan has struggled with this problem of warring tribes and warlords; this problem, as you know, going back to the defeat of the Soviets, and then the warlords being present in the country.

The Afghans have a major program called the disarmament of illegally armed groups that works very hard to disarm the tribes and cause them to declare their allegiance to the national government and to rely upon the rule of law in Afghanistan, to solve problems, and not have armed tribes.

The Afghan national auxiliary program about two years ago was an attempt to arm the tribes again in Afghanistan. And what we saw was the effect of paying people essentially to do — to support us when we needed them and stay home. Although it initially had a very positive impact, over time it essentially degraded to really the effect of arming people who not — were not necessarily in alliance with the government. And their corruption became rampant, and that’s the reason that we have disassembled them.

We are now in the process of taking people who are in the Afghan National Auxiliary Police that are truly worthy, that are — that can — that have positive recommendations from their tribes, that have a good record of service, and transitioning them to the Afghan National Police and doing away with the Afghan Auxiliary Police. And I think that is because that is what the Afghans wanted and shows us over time, in a country like this that’s had such a problem with armed groups, what can happen to these sanctioned armed groups.

I perk up when I hear about the ANP. In the winter of 2005 I was involved in screening a squad of ANP who were taking over responsibility for manning three perimeter towers at Kandahar Air Field. Having the ANP guard us while we slept was considered a big deal at the time. These guys had just been issued thick wool uniforms of the damnedest shade of green I’d ever seen. Lots of National Geographic moments for me that week.

If I wanted to smuggle Afghan heroin to Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Gaza, and Europe the Border Police in Nimroz would be on my payroll.

I have my doubts about betting the Internal Defense and Development farm on recruiting and training a multi-ethnic Royal Afghan Mounted Police loyal to Kabul.  They’ve never had that.  Not sure that the Pashtun tribal lashkars, drug lords and Taliban won’t eat their lunch or turn them once Western Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams leave.  I wish the Police Mentoring Teams success.   May they prove me wrong.

Richard F. Miller blogged this, too.  See The Moral Side of War: The Rubber Meets the Road in Afghanistan

More posts on the ANP:
Maintiens le Droit
Bitter Masochistic Scab-Picking Cynicism
Abdul Hakim Jan — Cop, Alokozai Arbakai, Militia Chief
Focus District Development
in a counterinsurgency environment the best force to use is generally taken to be indigenous security force
No Boots on Nimroz Ground
The Law West of the Hindu Kush

7 Comments

Filed under IW, The Forgotten War

This Is A Test

Dutch Quran film website shut down

Will any American company host “Fitna?”

Geert Wilders meets with Restrictive Measures:

Restrictive measures. This technique denies the audience access to the propaganda. Jamming, physical destruction, and occupation of media outlets are some examples of this technique. Restrictive measures must be evaluated for their potential negative feedback potential before being implemented. This technique may also bring additional attention to the propaganda and encourage the audience to seek out the propaganda via covert means. When used in peacekeeping operations by U.S. forces, restrictive measures (such as shutting down radio stations) invite hostile propaganda against the supported unit concerning freedom of the media and freedom of speech. In addition, these measures are often used by repressive regimes, inviting the inevitable comparison.

The enemy has managed to annoy us. We shall now see how long it takes for the internet to route around this censorship.

1-888-642-9645 Network Solutions customer service. Give them a piece of your mind.

Network Solutions: Bought by Terrorists.

My email to Network Solutions:

Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2008 17:11:35 -0700 (PDT)
From: “Doug B.” <crusader_3_alpha@yahoo.com>
Subject: HIZBOLLAH.ORG
To: customerservice@networksolutions.com

It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide “material support or resources” to a designated FTO. (The term “material support or resources” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as ” any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes “the term ‘training’ means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.’’

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm

Hisbollah has been designated a Terrorist Organization by the United States Department of State.Your hosting of an officially designated terrorist organization, coupled with your treatment of Geert Wilders, raises grave questions about Network Solutions.I urge you to cease and desist your support of terrorist organizations.

C. Number IV

Executive Director
Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group

UPDATE: Network solutions has a blog. Why not drop by and share your concerns with them.?

4 Comments

Filed under G-2

Jules Crittenden Saves You 4.5 Hours

and demonstrates the counterpropaganda techniques of direct refutation and conditioning.

Frontline’s ‘Bush’s War’: Not About Bush or His War

2 Comments

Filed under Old Media, PSYOP

There Won’t Always Be An England

PC multiculti tranzie Eurowienies.

  “Home Office policy precludes applications with tattoos on lower arm, hand, face or neck that are prominent, which may cause offence and/or invite provocation from the public or colleagues.”

“A family who aren’t of English origin who see England on your arm could feel you might discriminate against them.

“We live in a diverse society and try to ensure we give everybody equality.”

H/T:  Nealz Nuse

Comments Off on There Won’t Always Be An England

Filed under Idea War

Blockade

Explosions and fire destroy trucks, injure dozens at Pakistan-Afghan border

Cl III.  Westerners can’t fight a war in Central Asia without it.

 

Listen to your Loggy Toads.

 

H/T:  Lord Bill

2 Comments

Filed under Logistics, The Forgotten War

WHY DO US COMPANIES LIKE NETWORK SOLUTIONS HELP SUPPORT HIZBALLAH AND OTHER RACISTS?

Implementing Epaminondas‘ idea for attracting attention and directing scrutiny through bots.

Comments Off on WHY DO US COMPANIES LIKE NETWORK SOLUTIONS HELP SUPPORT HIZBALLAH AND OTHER RACISTS?

Filed under G-2

Some Regulars Just don’t Get IW

Cyber Vigilantes Track Extremist Web Sites, Intelligence Experts Balk at Effort

Michael Radu, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on terror-related Web sites, said the government is already overburdened trying to monitor the thousands of sites on the Web believed to contain radical Muslim messages. These cyber vigilantes, he said, are not helping.

“It is very unlikely they will find something of significance in the Internet that the government doesn’t already know,” Radu said. “They are redundant at best.”

“There are a lot of weekend warriors and quasi vigilantes out there that think they can do what the government can’t,” said a private intelligence contractor for the U.S. government who has been investigating jihadist Web sites for more than 15 years. The contractor spoke to FOXNews.com on condition of anonymity due to his continuing work with U.S. intelligence.

He said that when cyber-sleuths alert authorities or ISPs to the whereabouts of an extremist site, the page is removed — only to reappear somewhere else, and sometimes within hours.

“For those working in the intelligence community, it becomes extremely costly, because then they have to go looking for the sites all over again,” said the private intelligence contractor, noting that U.S. intelligence often knows of the sites for a long time and monitors their traffic to look for clues to their origins, creators and visitors.

When the site comes down, he said, intelligence investigations can be ruined.

“They have good intentions, but end up doing more harm than good,” he said.

Doing more harm than good to whom is the question.

Michael Tanji asks assume our Uncle gets his act together WRT leveraging irregulars; what guidance would you like to receive/be willing to accept; what resources would you find useful/accept; what level of C2 would you be willing to accept?

Additionally, how do you define success?

4 Comments

Filed under IW, PSYOP Auxiliaries

Andropov Is Dead, But His Disinformation Machine Carries On

Kerry’s Soviet Rhetoric  The Vietnam-era antiwar movement got its spin from the Kremlin.

KGB priority number one at that time was to damage American power, judgment, and credibility. One of its favorite tools was the fabrication of such evidence as photographs and “news reports” about invented American war atrocities. These tales were purveyed in KGB-operated magazines that would then flack them to reputable news organizations. Often enough, they would be picked up. News organizations are notoriously sloppy about verifying their sources. All in all, it was amazingly easy for Soviet-bloc spy organizations to fake many such reports and spread them around the free world.

This is from 2004, but I hadn’t seen it before.  Ion Mihai Pacepa is credible to me.  The Palestinians, Iranians, Hezbollah, As Sahab owe much of their success to Soviet IPB and Soviet sympathizers in the West.

H/T: 

6 Comments

Filed under Idea War, PSYOP

The Belmont Club: We’ve got him now

The Belmont Club: We've got him now

Comments Off on The Belmont Club: We’ve got him now

Filed under G-2

Distributed Resistance

Wretchard’s cooking with gas today:

Osama Bin Laden has just said “ouch”.

 What makes the Mohammed Cartoon attack on radical Islam so potent that Bin Laden himself must oppose it, is two things. First, anyone can make fun of radical Islam. Second, the Cartoons are aimed at the weakest point of the Jihad: it’s sources of authority.

What Geert Wilders has done is draw a line in the intellectual sand which he invites everyone to cross.

Many pixels have been burned out arguing that the distributed Islamic insurgency is invincible. But what about distributed resistance? What about distributed blasphemy? How long will Osama Bin Laden’s dogma survive that?

It’s Radical Islam’s worst nightmare: a Swarm directed against authority.

You’ll want to read the whole thing, including the comments.

If you are reading this YOU already have everything you need to join the Resistance.

We can do this.  Irregulars are the only force that can.  The West’s professional satirists, humorists, comedians and film makers lack the courage to lampoon Islam.  The West’s Regular Psychological Operators lack the political support to lampoon Islam because politicians are still peddling PC ROP BS, and we’re trying to train up Muslim boys so American boys can come home.  But professionals aren’t the only players on this field.

Comments Off on Distributed Resistance

Filed under Morale Operations, PSYOP Auxiliaries

NYT to Civilian Irregular Information Operators —

Go back to the mall, the Regulars are doing much better than you give them credit for.

Interviews with more than two dozen senior officials involved in the effort provided the outlines of previously unreported missions to mute Al Qaeda’s message, turn the jihadi movement’s own weaknesses against it and illuminate Al Qaeda’s errors whenever possible.

A primary focus has become cyberspace, which is the global safe haven of terrorist networks. To counter efforts by terrorists to plot attacks, raise money and recruit new members on the Internet, the government has mounted a secret campaign to plant bogus e-mail messages and Web site postings, with the intent to sow confusion, dissent and distrust among militant organizations, officials confirm.

Disrupting Cyberprojects

Terrorists hold little or no terrain, except on the Web. “Al Qaeda and other terrorists’ center of gravity lies in the information domain, and it is there that we must engage it,” said Dell L. Dailey, the State Department’s counterterrorism chief.

Some of the government’s most secretive counterterrorism efforts involve disrupting terrorists’ cyberoperations. In Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, specially trained teams have recovered computer hard drives used by terrorists and are turning the terrorists’ tools against them.

“If you can learn something about whatever is on those hard drives, whatever that information might be, you could instill doubt on their part by just countermessaging whatever it is they said they wanted to do or planned to do,” said Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler, director of cyberoperations for the Air Force and a former deputy director of the antiterrorism office for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Since terrorists feel safe using the Internet to spread ideology and gather recruits, General Schissler added, “you may be able to interfere with some of that, interrupt some of that.”

“You can also post messages to the opposite of that,” he added.

So, after almost two years, .mil/.gov finally attempts to strategically communicate to me to change my perception that the Regulars are under-resourced, over-lawyered and too PC to win the infowar. 

Wonder why they waited so long.

Think they might be noticing

The Jawa Report

YouTube Smackdown

Civilian Cyber Corps

People’s Information Support Team?

Nah.  They’ve been on top of things all along.  They just couldn’t tell us or they’d have to kill us.

3 Comments

Filed under PSYOP Auxiliaries

There is a known problem with Jihadist sympathizer infiltration within the media

A few amongst the readership here undoubtedly have pre-planned paragraphs protesting the paranoia of people who point out such problems.

People like Jeffrey Imm at Counterrorism Blog.

Last August, the New York Times demonstrated such lack of integrity in publishing an article “If You Were a Terrorist, How Would You Attack?” by Dr. Steven Levitt soliciting suggestions for Jihadists on how to attack the United States. Can anyone imagine the American free press during any wartime era, actively soliciting ideas on how the enemy could attack the United States? Surely the issues on media integrity and infiltration must be addressed by the free press as part of effective reporting on Islamist terrorism.

We know a few milblogs have suffered OPSEC lapses that could aid in enemy Battle Damage Assessment.

Do we know of any journalists whose stories may have alerted the enemy to friendly vulnerabilities he hadn’t discovered yet? 

If we do, let’s out them in the comments section.  That will save me the trouble of cutting and pasting emails.

Comments Off on There is a known problem with Jihadist sympathizer infiltration within the media

Filed under Old Media

Calling all Instigators, Ring Leaders, Rabble Rousers, . . .

 

Trouble Makers, Shit Stirrers and similar reprobates interested in confusing the enemy.

Red on Red IO fratricide is the mission.

Can we do it?

YES, WE CAN!

 New members welcome.


Comments Off on Calling all Instigators, Ring Leaders, Rabble Rousers, . . .

Filed under CNA, Info Warriors, IW, Morale Operations, PSYOP Auxiliaries, The Forgotten War

Illegitimi non carborundum

FM 3-0

LEGITIMACY

Develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

A-21. For Army forces, legitimacy comes from three important factors. First, the operation or campaign must be conducted under U.S. law. Second, the operation must be conducted according to international laws and treaties recognized by the United States, particularly the law of war. Third, the campaign or operation should develop or reinforce the authority and acceptance for the host-nation government by both the governed and the international community. This last factor is frequently the decisive element.

A-22. Legitimacy is also based on the will of the American people to support the mission. The American people’s perception of legitimacy is strengthened if obvious national or humanitarian interests are at stake.

Their perception also depends on their assurance that American lives are not being placed at risk needlessly or carelessly.

A-23. Other interested audiences may include foreign nations, civil populations in and near the operational area, and participating multinational forces. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host-nation government, where applicable. Security actions must balance with the need to maintain legitimacy. Commanders must consider all actions potentially competing for strategic and tactical requirements.

All actions must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy depends on the level of consent to the force and to the host-nation government, the people’s expectations, and the force’s credibility.

The United States has granted veto power over any military operation it might attempt to whoever can delegitimize the mission and kill domestic support.  All current and future enemies and adversaries have to do to paralyze us is partner with domestic oppositional elements such as anti-war organizations, anti-Administration politicians, wealthy Hungarian benefactors, the Perpetually Aggrieved, Guilty White Liberals, the Politically Correct, Multi-cultural, Carbon Dispensationists and Transnational Progressives who can be relied upon to activate their As Sahab media arms in a coordinated effort to magnify all imperfections, exaggerate all negative aspects, accept at face value all enemy narratives, treat all friendly narratives with withering scorn and total skepticsm, and hamsting any effort to employ American power.

Our enemies and adversaries will never be held to these standards.

Abrams Doctrine – put all the CSS in the RC to make expeditionary forces logistically unsustainable without mobilization and public buy in so no future LBJ can repeat Vietnam.

Powell Doctrine – find excuses not to act until the whole American public buys in so no future LBJ can repeat Vietnam.  Spend half a year  amassing an armor-heavy field army to fight a 100-hour set-piece battle.  Quit early because MSM calls you a bully for killing underdogs in large numbers.  Leave job for younger  brothers and sons to finish 12 – 17 years later.

Gates Doctrine – The press is not the enemy.  Getting public buy in is somebody else’s job.  The enemy gets a vote.

America is going out of the super power business.  The ability of enemies, adversaries, and internal opponents to deny legitimacy exceeds .gov/.mil’s ability to sustain or build legitimacy.

Lucky for us .gov/.mil ain’t the only game in town. 

3 Comments

Filed under Idea War, Lawfare, Old Media