Monthly Archives: October 2007

USA Civilians Killed al Qaeda on the Internet

Reposted here because Internet Anthropologist recognizes the successes of the CIIDG/Civilian Information Militia / 101st Fighting Keyboardists / Cyber Vigilantes:

USA Government missed some things during the 6 yrs GWOT.

And to be fair the Army the Military branches of the Government have done an outsanding JOB of WAR. They adapted faster than any Corporation could have, the technology they have developed and deployed is awesome.

The KIA stats as compared to WWII and Vietnam show a clear focused effective Paradigm.

The USA Military are the most successful effective corporation in the world.

In gearing up for this war ( USA is always gearing up for the next WAR, its their job ) the Government missed the Internet effect and its capabilities as a force multiplier.

The civilian population were the first to experience, observe al Qaeda on the Internet, al Qaeda were the first to adapt the WWW paradigm. We found their Internet Risks and exploited them. The Internet is a force Multiplier, but also opens a back door to al Qaeda.

Just as the Americans on the jet liner took over the plane from the hijackers.
( On 911 it was Civilians that first stepped in and confronted al Qaeda face to face. )  American civilians saw the WWW void and stepped in, stepped up to serve.

Keyboard to keyboard.

Western Blogs stepped in to counter the Propaganda war, or the Infowar, and countered the lies and propaganda.

The thing that really amazed me and was unexpected is the quality of WAR analysis from the Civilian sector.

And I want to call this the “Brilliant civilian sector“.
It included the likes of Bill Roggio,Dancho Danchev, Douglas Farah, Ray Robison, team at Counter terrorism Blog, Jamestown, Laura Mansfield, Memri, Site, and many many others.And there have been Civilians leading the effort to shut down terror sites, when it was easier for Armed forces to get an approval to bomb a house and kill everyone than an OK to take down a server. The Civilian sector stepped in and took care of it. Thinking ‘leaving up’ or ‘taking down’ terror sitesEverytime al Qaeda screwed up the civilians were there to point it out, catch them and expose it.And there is another secret civilian sector with hacking abilities that regularly report to Government agencies.  Even Civilians to be-friend the terrorist on line and report their actionsWE all fight al Qaeda to the extent of our abilities and I salute you ALL.


Distributed, independent, non-hierarchical, agile.  Our non-state actors are better than their non-state actors.   



Filed under CNA, PSYOP Auxiliaries

VI Day?

RAMADI — The last parade held in downtown Ramadi was by insurgent forces in the fall of 2006 when the city was gripped in daily violence.

Times have changed now as government officials and city locals recently held a parade down Route Michigan here.

“The Iraqis were able to conduct this event without any attacks or influence from terrorist organizations because stability is to the point now where events like this can happen,”

 UPDATE:  Iraqi Islamic Party: “Al Qaeda is Defeated”

1 Comment

Filed under G-2

Democracies at 4GWar

Wolf Pangloss synthesizes Hammes and Claessen, and comes up with a great graphic

explaining the connection between the enemy and the more radical wing of the domestic opposition.  The self-described “moderate” wing of the domestic opposition cannot disassociate themselves from the enemy-sympathizing radicals because they need them to be the other bad cops in their good cop-bad cop-worst cop game of cut throat pool over the American domestic target audience.  But the good cop and the bad cop are in it together to clean the worst cop’s balls off the table

The counterinsurgent cannot start a war without justifying it to his electorate; he cannot include the opposition in the government and abandon the government’s political priorities for the entire duration of the war; and he cannot curtail the activities of the active minorities that oppose the counterinsurgency.

But active minorites that support the counterinsurgency can, perhaps not curtail, but expose, impede, demonize and degrade such activities.  These supportive minorities can do for the counterinsurgent what the counterinsurgent is forbidden to do.  The collusion between the ‘”moderate” opposition and the radical opposition, and that between the radical opposition and the enemy is a sledgehammer with which to impugn their patriotism. They hate that.  Throw the patriotism rock into that pack and listen to which dogs howl the loudest.

UPDATE:  See also
4GW Jihad and the role of the World Media and Conflict Map of the Counterjihad


Filed under Idea War

Who the hell is Glenn Greenwald?

The counterpropaganda technique of silence is overused, but does have one advantage:  silence does not call attention to the propaganda.

Made the mistake of looking at Instapundit, which took me to Patterico, which took me to to the moonbat in question, whose keyboard diarrhea wasted my time and whose commenters waste everybody else’s oxygen.  The port side of the blogosphere is now in bad need of Immodium.  I should never have come to the computer.  What little light has been shed by all this heat was not worth the sleep lost. 

Hard to know which moonbats to take seriously.  COL Boylan took him seriously enough to respond to him, if that was COL Boylan.

Comments Off on Who the hell is Glenn Greenwald?

Filed under Moonbats

The Best Explanation I’ve Seen

 . . . for why we are losing our ass in the infowar.

The Missing Component of U.S. Strategic Communications

by Colonel William M. Darley, USA, Director of
Strategic Communications for the Combined Arms
Center at Fort Leavenworth and Editor-in-Chief of
Military Review.

Read the whole thing, then go over to Swedish Meatballs and read the comments. 

Some of the best:

Not only does lack of consensus agreement directly impact our ability to develop a national strategic communications process to support agencies attempting to fight the current wars, but, more ominously, such agreement also is directly relevant to whether we as a nation will be able to survive the “Long War” now taking shape in the face of withering ideological challenges we can expect to those basic national values that have heretofore defined the United States as a nation and its citizens as uniquely American.

. . . we cannot agree among ourselves as to what we view as those cultural values of our own we are willing to openly assert are superior and preferable to those championed by our enemies as a reason for engaging in war, which by definition must be promoted and internalized by targeted  audiences in order for a war of ideas to be successful.  Yet the assertion of superiority of values as compared to those of an adversary must be, in fact, the essence of strategic communications messages aimed at achieving wartime political objectives.

The social pressure of a seemingly intractable war is polarizing in increasingly dangerous ways an already ideologically divided society, moving it toward another virtual domestic civil war among advocates of conflicting ideologies.

 . . . actual war between irreconcilable camps of ideological enemies who are increasingly gravitating to, if not openly rallying around, two inimical and antithetical sets of values as distinct as those that divide the Shia and Sunni factions in the Islamic world.

. . . the agendas of the domestic political parties have evolved to a point where they view the outcome of the war in Iraq less as an issue of homeland security than as a key factor in the success of their own parochial struggles to wrest domestic political power as a means to shape national values.  To this end, domestic political opponents increasingly appear to view the war as more about controlling future nominations to the Supreme Court than about defending American citizens or improving Middle Eastern stability.



Filed under Idea War, Info Warriors

Counterpropaganda Techniques

Lesson No. 8 in The School of the Counterpropagandist

A wide variety of techniques exist for countering propaganda. There is no “correct” or “best” technique; the techniques must be based upon the situation at hand.  More than one technique may be used in concert with another in a single product or action. The following are some of the more recognized techniques used:

Direct refutation. This technique is a point-for-point rebuttal of opponent propaganda allegations or themes.  This technique is best used in a very timely manner when Irregular PSYOP Auxiliaries have complete access to factual information regarding the allegation.  Personnel use this technique when they are confident that they can refute the propaganda with complete accuracy.   A disadvantage of using this technique is that direct refutation may draw added publicity, strength, and credibility to the opponent’s allegations. Additionally, this technique may draw additional publicity to the opponent’s propaganda by repeating and then refuting the information.  Irregular PSYOP Auxiliaries should avoid becoming involved in a “mudslinging” contest when using this technique to avoid damage to the supported force’s credibility.


Indirect refutation. This technique seeks to question the validity of some aspect of the opponent’s allegations or the source of the propaganda, thus challenging its credibility. This technique is often seen in courtroom trials where one side seeks to lower the credibility of “expert” witnesses. An advantage of using this technique is that indirect refutation does not bring added publicity or credibility to the propaganda by repeating certain aspects. Irregular PSYOP Auxiliaries should ensure that the facts used to damage the credibility of the propaganda are accurate and have some importance in the minds of the domestic audience. When seeking to lower the credibility of the source of the propaganda,personnel should avoid “name calling,” as this may potentially damage the credibility of the supported force.

Diversion. This technique involves the presentation of more important or relevant themes (in the eyes of the domestic audience) to draw attention away from the opponent propaganda. A critical factor in succeeding with this technique is to select an important topic to use as the diversion. The attempted diversion must be well planned and subtly executed. If the diversion is obvious to the audience, then the attempt will appear clumsy and consequently damage the credibility of the supported force.  Media selection is critical in using this technique, as the media used must be able to reach large numbers of the audience and divert their attention.

Silence. This technique does not respond to the opponent propaganda in any way. One exception to this technique is the use of remarks alluding to the opponent’s propaganda as being “unworthy of comment.” An advantage of this technique is that silence does not publicize the propaganda further or provide the opponent with potential feedback. This technique is used when the use of another technique may prove dangerous or when the situation and audience response is uncertain. One drawback of this technique is that the audience may question the absence of a response from the supported force. 

Restrictive measures. This technique denies the audience access to  the propaganda. Jamming, physical destruction, and occupation of media outlets are some examples of this technique.  Restrictive measures must be evaluated for their potential negative feedback potential before being implemented. This technique may also bring additional attention to the propaganda and encourage the audience to seek out the propaganda via covert means. When used in peacekeeping operations by U.S. forces, restrictive measures (such as shutting down radio stations) invite hostile propaganda against the supported unit concerning freedom of the media and freedom of speech. In addition, these measures are often used by repressive regimes, inviting the inevitable comparison.


Conditioning. Conditioning is a nonspecific means of eliminating potential vulnerabilities in the domestic audience before they can be exploited. This technique is preemptive in nature. Conditioning is very similar to a preventative action measure.  Irregular PSYOP Auxiliaries educate and inform audiences denied to Regular PSYOP forces concerning the supported force’s mission, intent, and operations. This technique does not specifically address potential themes that the opponent may use in a propaganda program against the force, but seeks to remove or reduce potential vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. A common Irregular PSYOP Auxiliary role using this technique is force entry to an area;  explaining the force’s reason for being there, legal justification for being there (UN resolution, and so on), and departure criteria. When using this technique, Iregular PSYOP Auxiliaries must avoid the use of specific end dates for operations, as political forces may change those dates.

Forestalling. This preemptive technique anticipates the specific themes the opponent may use in their propaganda and counters them before they reach the domestic audience. Irregular PSYOP Auxiliaries must know the opponent and be able to anticipate their reactions to an event or operation. This technique uses war gaming in analyzing the different possible outcomes from a planned event, from best-case scenario to worst-case.  Irregular PSYOP Auxiliaries then use counterpropaganda themes to bring the potential themes or issues to the domestic audience before the opponent does.   A detailed knowledge of opponent propaganda techniques and themes assists greatly when using this technique. This technique differs from conditioning in that Irregular PSYOP Auxiliaries preemptively address specific themes that the opponent may use.

Minimization.   Acknowledge selected elements of the opponent’s propaganda, but minimize the importance of the information.  A disadvantage of this technique is that opponent propaganda gains some credibility if counterpropagandists do not fully minimize its importance in the eyes of the audience. Minimization is an alternative to silence. This technique may also build some level of increased credibility in the eyes of the audience, as counterpropagandists appear to be acknowledging some truthful aspects and not just refuting them.


Regular PSYOP personnel often disregard counterpropaganda as there is not always an obvious threat or the task appears to be too difficult, or JAG has convinced them it is forbidden to them. They do not know or do not trust other organizations and agencies to fill the void in the absence of an overt PSYOP effort.

Direct Refutation is essentially fisking.  Subject Matter Experts can pwn most propagandists easily.   We have some of those.

Indirect Refutation is degrading the propagandist’s credibility with the audience.  We can do that.

Silence is what we’ve been getting from the Regulars.  Easy for them.  Hard on the morale of the American domestic target audience.  Silence means consent, agreement, acquiescence, or  emasculation.  We don’t need to do that.

Rusty Shackleford is having some success with Restrictive Measures.  Michael Tanji says Take downs make you feel good, but they accomplish little to nothing save for making it harder to monitor and disrupt online activity.   The possibility for IO fratricide is there, but the Regular InterAgency element that may be monitoring a site for its intelligence value could email guys like Rusty and ask them nicely to leave that site alone.  I think once the problem was explained, cooperation would be forthcoming.

Conditioning is the technique Irregulars can employ best.   That part of the domestic target audience that suspects the Main Stream Media of collaboration with the enemy is already conditioned.  We need to redouble our efforts to kill that messenger.




Filed under PSYOP, PSYOP Auxiliaries

The ‘cold civil war’

Mark Steyn piece here.

Free Republic thread here.

The Long War, the GWOT, the Third Jihad, the Eleventh Crusade, all hang in the balance until Western Christendom’s schizophrenic champion recovers it’s wits.


Filed under Idea War