Monthly Archives: December 2007

Civilian Irregular Counterpropagandists Bust Iranians and Rub Their Noses in it

I love this!  There are a bunch of people doing good things out there.  This also serves as a lesson for good guys.  Be careful what use you make of hotlinked images.

The People’s Cube PWNS Iranian Media

Iranian Press TV Runs Fake Jew Photo

Ridicule: An instrument in the war on terrorism

An honor-shame culture doesn’t deal well with humiliation and total pwnage.  Fanatics hate being laughed at.  The anatomically inadequate hate being reminded of their shortcomings by American porn stars they can’t resist downloading. 

Kamaraden, saLOOT!

4 Comments

Filed under PSYOP

Facilitating Ideological War

The constant portrayal of government agencies as being more villainous than terrorists only serves to facilitate the ideological war being waged by terrorists. The fact of the matter is the terrorists are heinous villains. There have been few if any protracted media stories criticizing the reality that terrorists want to kill Americans and people like Benazir Bhutto who identify with Western values. A constant stream of stories exposing the senseless and cowardly acts of suicide bombers and terrorists would undermine their ideological war.  — Dennis Lormel, Reflections Concerning National Security, Counterterrorism Blog

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Filed under Idea War

Hurting morale

From Inside the Ring:

Marine Corps Cpl. David Goldich, a University of Virginia graduate who spent two tours of duty in Iraq, says Democratic attacks on the war undermined troop morale.

Cpl. Goldich, who returned from Anbar province in November after about 300 combat patrols, stated in a candid account that negative comments by Democrats had “a dramatic effect on morale, especially on troops who are otherwise indifferent and disdainful of politics in general.”

“I cannot tell you how many times I have overheard Marines and soldiers talking about various inconsiderate comments made from the likes of [Sen.] John Kerry [Massachusetts Democrat], [Rep. John P.] Murtha [Pennsylvania Democrat], [Senate Majority Leader Harry] Reid [Nevada Democrat], and [House Speaker Nancy] Pelosi [California Democrat] about how we cannot win, how we should be brought home, etc.,” he said.

“The Kerry comments really cemented his reputation with the troops and upset people more than anything else. It is unnerving to volunteer for service during wartime hoping to be deployed and having to listen to a politician explain how the troops need to come home, especially when we clearly have not finished what we started.

“There is a widespread perception amongst the Marines I know, even those uninterested in politics, that the Democratic Party does not want us to win in Iraq for whatever reason. This is true even amongst Democrats who still maintain the party viewpoint on almost every other issue but the war. Morale is always a tricky issue to deal with, and it is difficult to tell a Marine to buck up when he sees important people back home undercutting his primary reason for existing at the moment.”

Mr. Kerry came under fire in November 2006 when he joked that soldiers in Iraq were “stuck” there because they did not study hard in school.

Even more undermined than troop morale is troop respect.  Marines come in all political flavors.  Most don’t talk politics at work, but some express themselves at breakfast while Fox News is on in the DFAC.  I overheard some anti-Bush sentiment, especially when 2-136th CAB MNARNG got extended three months, but I don’t recall ever hearing any pro-Pelosi, pro-Reid, pro-Kerry or pro-Democrat remarks.  Disgust at the oxygen thievery and douchebaggery of politicians was mostly expressed either nonverbally or with monosyllabic grunts of profanity.

Maintaining morale, that of the armed forces and that of the citizenry, is a vital function in wartime.  We as a polity seem to have divested our government of any capability to rally our spirits while enhancing the ability of The “Loyal” Opposition to depress the hell out of us.

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Filed under Morale Operations

Better Late Than Never

.gov Marching into Cyberspace not so much like Blucher at Waterloo as Crockett at the Alamo.

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Filed under CND

Somebody Needs to Take Down Wikileaks

And the sources of the leaks need to be broken of their bad habits in a painfully public way pour encourager les autres.   But since I have already seen the document, I may as well share the unclassified portion with you:

(U) Information Operations

(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) This paragraph you will have to find on your own.

(U) Insurgents used IO for both persuasion (e.g., distributing fliers and videos extolling the bravery of suicide bombers) and coercion (e.g., distributing videos of collaborators being beaten or executed).

See (U) Iraq: Employment of Information Technology (IT) by Insurgent Groups and Terrorists for more information on how information technology helps insurgents gain control of the local population.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) This paragraph you will have to find on your own.

(U) Arab satellite news channels were crucial to building political pressure to halt military operations. For example, CPA documented 34 stories on Al Jazeera that misreported or distorted battlefield events between 6 and 13 April. Between 14 and 20 April, Al Jazeera used the “excessive force” theme 11 times and allowed various anti-Coalition factions to claim that U.S. forces were using cluster bombs against urban areas and kidnapping and torturing Iraqi children. Six negative reports by al-Arabiyah focused almost exclusively on the excessive force theme. Overall, the qualitative content of negative reports increasingly was shrill in tone, and both TV stations appeared willing to take even the most baseless claims as fact.

(U) During the first week of April, insurgents invited a reporter from Al Jazeera, Ahmed Mansour, and his film crew into Fallujah where they filmed scenes of dead babies from the hospital, presumably killed by Coalition air strikes. Comparisons were made to the Palestinian Intifada. Children were shown bespattered with blood; mothers were shown screaming and mourning day after day. Follow this link to see an example of the emotional images highlighted by Al Jazeera.

(U) The absence of Western media in Fallujah allowed the insurgents greater control of information coming out of Fallujah. Because Western reporters were at risk of capture and beheading, they stayed out and were forced to pool video shot by Arab cameramen and played on Al Jazeera. This led to further reinforcement of anti-Coalition propaganda. For example, false allegations of up to 600 dead and 1000 wounded civilians could not be countered by Western reporters because they did not have access to the battlefield.

(U) Western reporters were also not embedded in Marine units fighting in Fallujah. In the absence of countervailing visual evidence presented by military authorities, Al Jazeera shaped the world’s understanding of Fallujah.

(U) Conclusions

(U) The relative failure of the first Battle of Fallujah compared to the more successful second Battle of Fallujah (November 2004) offers useful political-military lessons for how to defeat asymmetric adversaries in complex environments.

• (U) The enemy will seek to utilize the human, informational, and physical complexity of urban areas to avoid direct military confrontation and exploit American political and informational vulnerabilities.

• (U) Shaping operations that clear civilians from the battlefield offers many positive second-order effects. In Fallujah in April 2004, I MEF only had a few days to shape the environment before engaging in decisive combat operations. The remaining noncombatants provided cover for insurgents, restrained CJTF-7’s employment of combat power, and provided emotional fodder for Arab media to exploit.

• (U) Information operations are increasingly important in a 21st Century world where cable television runs 24 hours a day and the Internet offers propaganda opportunities for insurgent and terrorist groups.

• (U) The media presence on the battlefield was controlled by the enemy; consequently, they shaped much of the information the world viewed during the fight. In VIGILANT RESOLVE there were few reporters embedded in Marine infantry units; in Operation AL FAJR there were 91 embeds representing 60 media outlets. False allegations of noncombatant casualties were made by Arab media in both campaigns, but in the second case embedded Western reporters offered a rebuttal.

• (U) The Iraqi government was nascent and weak and they offered no political cover for U.S. commanders to finish the operation in a reasonable time period. Without domestic Iraqi political support, offensive operations were halted after 5 days of combat. This stands in stark contrast to the second battle for Fallujah where the Iraqi Interim Government under Prime Minister Ayad Alawi ordered the Marines in and supported them through several weeks of combat.

• (U) Insurgents sometimes get lucky. The Abu Ghurayb scandal and the Shia uprising further enflamed a politically precarious situation and could not have happened at a worse time for Coalition forces.

(U) In summary, several factors explain the difference in outcomes between Fallujah I and II. Longer shaping operations to evacuate civilians, control of the informational realm, more aggressive COIN operations in surrounding towns to protect Coalition MSRs, solid political backing from a more stable Iraqi government, and larger forces that contained a greater percentage of mechanized units to speed up the campaign all contributed to the relative success of Fallujah II (November 2004) versus the failure of Fallujah I.

Am I doing wrong in calling attention to Wikileaks? Possibly. Conceivably this post will bring them a lot of traffic and put a lot of unauthorized eyes on the leaked material. The counterpropagandist always runs the risk of calling attention to the propaganda. Thus the popularity of silence. Silence is the bureaucratic default position. In this case I judge the risk of aiding and abetting their agenda to be worth siccing the Civilian Irregular Computer Network Attack Force on them.

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Filed under G-2

The Terrorists’ Tet

 COL Bay doesn’t want you to fall for it again.  You fell for it hook, line and sinker last time, unless you weren’t around back then or were too young to pay attention, in which case your parents and grandparents did, with few exceptions.

Sometime within the next six months or so, al Qaeda or Saddamist terrorists will attempt a Tet offensive.. . . At the operational level, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) suffered a terrible defeat. As NVA regiments emerged from jungle-covered enclaves and massed for attack, they exposed themselves to the firepower of U.S. aircraft and artillery. The NVA units temporarily seized many cities at the cost of extremely heavy casualties. However, Tet achieved the grand political ends North Vietnam sought. Tet was a strategic psychological attack launched in a presidential election year during a primary season featuring media-savvy “peace” candidates. “Peace” in this context must be italicized with determined irony; in the historical lens it requires an insistent blindness steeled by Stalinist mendacity to confuse the results of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam (e.g., Cambodia’s genocide) with any honest interpretation of peace. Their “ultimate Iraqi Tet” would feature simultaneous terror strikes in every major Iraqi city. These simultaneous strikes would inflict hideous civilian casualties with the goal of discrediting Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s and General David Petraeus’ assessments that Iraqi internal security has improved. The terrorists would reduce Iraqi government buildings to rubble. Striking the Green Zone would be the media coup de grace, intentionally echoing North Vietnam’s assault on the U.S. embassy in Saigon. Al Qaeda terrorists would also attack Shia shrines. Kidnapping or assassinating of senior Iraqi leaders would be another objective.

. . . the terrorists will attempt a series of terror spectaculars, and kill several hundred civilians in the process, because — in the quadrennial turmoil of an American presidential contest — sensational carnage that even momentarily seeds the perception of defeat is their only chance of victory.

I remember the last Tet.  Yeah, I know, I’m a geezer.  But this time I won’t be a helpless 6th-Grader.  This time I’m empowered.  This time I and my pards have the power to inoculate or to immunize individuals in advance of any propaganda blitz by any of the organized persuaders who seek to gain by carrying the terrorist’s water.

Conditioning. Conditioning is a nonspecific means of eliminating potential vulnerabilities in the domestic audience before they can be exploited. This technique is preemptive in nature. Conditioning is very similar to a preventative action measure.  This technique does not specifically address potential themes that the opponent may use in a propaganda program against the force, but seeks to remove or reduce potential vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.

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Filed under Morale Operations, Old Media, PSYOP

Concerned Netizens for Internal Defense and Development

You’ve heard of the Concerned Local Citizens of Iraq.  Most of you have heard of Foreign Internal Defense.  Some of you have heard of Internal Defense and Development. 

Are there analogous equivalents to these meat space terms in cyber space?

Let’s say for the sake of argument that you are a Concerned Netizen of America,  concerned about military affairs, national security, terrorism and subversion, looking for a way to contribute something useful to the war effort from home on the internet while  keeping your day job, going shopping at the mall, and paying taxes. 

What could you be doing? 

Why is the Government not bombarding you with ideas they would like to see you doing? 

There are a number of things you could be doing.  Milblogs recommend projects and charities and groups needing contributions every day.  You are free to help all, some or none of them, as you wish.  Nobody is really pushing any of them outside the blogosphere.  Occasionally talk radio pushes one or another.  Rarely do you see a TV news segment about one of them.  It is pretty much up to you what you do, and how much of it.  The maternalistic Government doesn’t tell you to buy war bonds and eat your soup anymore.  Nowadays you have to be hungry enough to seek out a restaurant and peruse the menu.  Our wars are fought by an all volunteer force, and our warfighters are loved, supported and appreciated by volunteer citizens

The Government can’t decide what they would like you to do, besides keep paying your taxes.  Significant factions within the Government would prefer to see you out marching in the streets with protest signs.  These factions couldn’t prevent America from going to war, but they can and do prevent America from applying the full spectrum of Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic power against the “enemy”, whoever the enemy is.  They also veto any effective use by the Goverment of the proven methods of mass communications to bolster the morale of the civilian population and maintain support for the war effort. 

So if you want to do more than is being asked of you by your Government, you’re going to have to mobilize yourself.  If we were foreigners, our Regulars have doctrine to help us with this:

Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is essential for a successful Internal Defense And Development program. If successful, mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the Internal Defense Threat. It is important to realize, however, that this effect may not be directly proportional. Organized crime, a sectarian insurgency and others may continue to maintain viability even as their base of support erodes. This effect can be magnified by those Internal Defense Threats receiving aid from a third party. This effect is further magnified when third party support is effectively immune to interdiction at its source. Mobilization seeks to—

Strengthen existing government, economic, military and social institutions in procedures and capabilites

 Legitimize and if necessary reform those institutions.

 Develop new institutions to respond to demands.

 Enlist and enfranchise all members of society to contribute in some way.

 Permanently discredit and vilify Internal Defense Threats.

 Continuously assess and adjust programs and emphasis as necessary.

 

 Inculcate the sense of permanency of change.

 If necessary, create a national vision towards achieving greater goals.

 

 

 

 

Watch Psychological Operations in Support of Internal Defense and Development Assistance Programs, Part I and Part II

Initial analysis indicates that the target audiences can be broken down into three basic groups: the Subversives, the Government Supporters, and then the big group in the middle, the Uncommitted Civilians.

America is now Hostland.  We are the HCN’s.  And there are no big long-noses jumping into our AO to advise us, train us, equip us or do a damn thing for us.

It falls to us.   And we don’t have a helluva lot of time left.

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Filed under PSYOP Auxiliaries

Christmas In The Rear

It’s been three years since I was home for the Holidays.

Soldiers dance in Kandahar Air Base, Afghanistan, during Mark Wills’ performance. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Reeba Critser.

I was at that show.

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KAF Main DFAC was tents back then. I mostly ate at South DFAC.

Still looking for a pic of the TQ Mainside DFAC.

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I’m happy to be back in the loving arms of Cannonette this Christmas, but, somehow, I feel out of place.

Merry Christmas, everybody!

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Filed under About

Plausibly Deniable Auxiliaries Could Have Handled That

PurpleSlog turned me on to Wikileaks, an uncensorable system for untracable mass document leaking, founded by  Chinese dissidents, journalists, mathematicians and startup company technologists, from the US, Taiwan, Europe, Australia and South Africa.  Well, isn’t that precious.  Perusing the site I come across Wikileaks busts Gitmo propaganda team, thoughtfully provided in Russian as well as English.  I hate to say it, because I am on their side, but it looks like Gitmo PAO got pwned, bad.

Petty Officer W. could have used some Civilian Irregular Information Auxiliaries. 

Listen up MC’s, 46Q’s, 4341’s, and  3N051’s.  There are people in cyber space who want to help you.  Find them.  Establish rapport.  Build your own networks.  Give them some simple instructions.  And for the love of Mike don’t do this on the NIPR from work.  Proxify is your friend.

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Filed under PSYOP Auxiliaries

Non-kinetic Decapitation

“A fish rots from the head,” the BDS-afflicted never tire of telling us.

President George W. Bush has been the recipient of the most concerted, hate-filled, propaganda campaign ever launched against a sitting President. Washington’s bureaucracy has aided and abetted this outrageous Democrat offensive by conducting a deliberate war of intelligence misinformation and sabotage. The mantras have been repeated so many times, they have insinuated themselves into our daily jargon. “There were no WMD,” Bush’s “misadventure in Iraq,” or “The President’s failed Iraq policy.” Or as someone recently said to me: “I just think he’s so stupid.” Mention the name “Bush” and people bow and shake their heads. It is as though no one even wants to acknowledge we have a President by that name. Bumper stickers declare: “I Can’t Wait for 2008.” Many conservative pundits who should know better are now participating in this pile on.

While George W. Bush has clearly made mistakes in his prosecution of the War in Iraq, he has, unlike other leaders, had the courage to admit and correct many of those mistakes. Halting the attack on Fallujah in the spring of 2004 was a mistake – corrected. Allowing the Madhi Army free rein was a mistake – corrected. The pre-Petraeus conventional approach, a mistake – corrected. Few political leaders in recent times have been willing to do this in any circumstance, let alone during a shooting war. And Bush’s unflinching determination to prosecute this war in the face of a relentless, overwhelmingly hostile, even seditious Western media campaign to discredit the entire effort, and treacherous, underhanded bureaucratic sabotage, may yet see this conflict to a successful conclusion.

We must stop and recognize that this tidal wave of negativity is manufactured relentlessly by our almost uniformly leftist, anti-Bush, anti-Republican, anti-American mass media (with a few notable exceptions), in collusion with the leftist Washington political establishment. Nothing any Republican does will ever satisfy them. Like the Iranians or North Koreans, they welcome Republican attempts at conciliation as a ripe opportunity to take further advantage. They will never like or agree with them. They want to destroy them. And they may well succeed in the upcoming election cycle if we don’t come to our senses.

This is not a non-partisan blog.  I have my ideological bias, which comes out where ideology intersects with war, strategic communications about war, and maintenance of national will to fight war.  Our current Commander-in-Chief is a flawed human being who has done a number of things with which I disagree, and failed to do even more things that desperately need to be done, by somebody.   But despite my disappointment I still cheer-lead, not to toady to the leader but to buck up the led.  I don’t blindly support the man, but I do respect the rank and as long as he is going my way on the war I will go with him for the next twelve months.

The Skipper of this boat has pissed me off many times.  He has steered us into waters I didn’t think we had any business in.  We’ve had heavy seas and a poor catch.  Half the crew has spent the whole voyage grumbling.  Some claim he’s a jonah and plot mutiny.  While others connive and plot for his chair, I’m going to stand my watch, and pull my share of pots, and do my duty until the Skipper’s scheduled relief next year. 

Moby Dick is still out there. 

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Filed under Morale Operations

IO Doctrine for Dummies

FM 3-0 :

7. Dealing with information is hard. The bad people don’t play by the rules and they lie… a lot. One screw-up on our part and all the not so bad people get all upset because the bad people make a big deal about it. We need to spend a lot of time telling the not so bad people why we are different than the really bad people. Usually they don’t get it. Meanwhile the media people are busy trying to uncover the giant government conspiracy that we are supposed to be running. Also every hacker and pedophile out there is trying to screw up our computers and radios. This makes it really hard. Meanwhile the Air Force and Navy are wondering what’s wrong, since it’s not so hard for them. Once in a while, somebody on our side figures out what we should be doing. This is called Knowledge Management.

Got it? 

Humor is one of our strengths.

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Filed under CND, Info Warriors, Lawfare, Moonbats, Old Media, PSYOP

Commanders and political leaders once devoted themselves to winning wars. Today they concentrate their efforts on avoiding criminal indictments.

The triumph of legal defeatism.

Are we less overlawyered than the IDF? 

H/T: Chief Reynolds

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Filed under Lawfare

Untraceable

Saw Charlie Wilson’s War. Loved it. Go see it, or get the boot leg DVD at your FOB’s Hajji Mart. But before it came on I saw a trailer for Untraceable. I had never heard of this flick until this evening, but I think it is going to have a big impact on how Americans perceive cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism and Computer Network Operations and Information Assurance and Operational Security and a whole bunch of other Information Operations of interest to most of the readership here.

Within the FBI, there exists a division dedicated to investigating and prosecuting criminals on the internet. Welcome to the front lines of the war on cybercrime, where Special Agent Jennifer Marsh (Diane Lane) has seen it all . . . until now. A tech-savvy internet predator is displaying his graphic murders on his own website — and the fate of each of his tormented captives is left in the hands of the public: the more hits his site gets, the faster his victims die. When this game of cat and mouse becomes personal, Marsh and her team must race against the clock to track down this mastermind who is virtually untraceable.

It might suck, but then again, it might not.  If it doesn’t, a lot of people will be talking about CYOP.

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Filed under G-2

CTC Sentinel

Take a look.   I liked Countering Terrorist Use of the Web as a Weapon

H/T:  The Jawa Report

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Filed under Info Warriors

School of the Counterpropagandist — What Is Propaganda?

Meatball 1 finds good stuff, like Finding Weakness in Jihadist Propaganda by
MAJOR Timothy R. King, all of which you should read. It’s a 58-page .pdf, so before anybody’s eyes glaze over, let’s focus on MAJ King’s first chapter:

WHAT IS PROPAGANDA?

A notional understanding

Lies, distortions, fabrications, exaggerations, disinformation, spin, and censorship are words that typically describe propaganda. If propaganda is synonymous with these terms then it is unethical and wrong. These terms are however, examples of a mere notional understanding of propaganda. According to our own Joint Doctrine, propaganda is “propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly4. The civilian equivalent is similar; according to Dictionary.com, the definition of propaganda is “The systematic propagation of a doctrine or cause or of information reflecting the views and interests of those advocating such a doctrine or cause5. By these accounts, propaganda is neutral. Do we misunderstand propaganda because of propaganda? Why does it have such a bad reputation? Is there anything unethical about the propagation of a cause by using information that reflects the views of the advocate? By JP 3-53 and Dictionary.com’s definitions, it is fair to say that we all are exposed to countless propaganda messages every day. Television programming and advertisements, radio commercials, political campaigning, print ads, “pop-ups” on our computers and junk mail are just a few forms of propaganda we encounter daily – and, it is completely acceptable. Does persuasive information become propaganda simply because it comes from the government? What about when the nation is at war – do the ends justify the means? What if the message is morally right and factually true – is it still propaganda? The issue with propaganda is that propagandists have shown little regard for truth in the construction of their persuasive messages and those we label as propagandists have an opposing ideology to ours. In war, one’s patriotic message is another’s wartime propaganda; it is perception and perception is reality.

Skipping on down to Ethics:

According to Stanley Cunningham, in his book The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction, propaganda is pseudo-information with an important philosophical shortfall. His book is reliant on epistemology and ethics; he concludes that propaganda as unethical. He argues that propaganda is inherently unethical because is exploits information, poses as knowledge, generates belief systems, skews perceptions and systematically disregards epistemic values12. He also sites (but disagrees with) a propaganda neutrality thesis13. The neutrality thesis puts the ethical onus on the propagandist – not propaganda itself. Sort of like the adage of: “guns don’t kill people, people kill people”. If the neutrality thesis is right then the ethical onus falls on the ideology, not the process of communicating it. Cunningham argues epistemologically that propaganda cannot be knowledge because of its selective use of truth and its ability to alter beliefs14. Academically, his argument is compelling but the practical application of the argument makes the philosophical definition irrelevant. Philosophical debates seeking consensus in understanding the concept of knowledge cannot even agree on the definition of “truth”15. In the larger sense, it seems folly to be epistemologically concerned with the use of information that seeks to change minds as compared with other mind-changing kinetic methods such as direct combat.

Propaganda Techniques written by Henry Conserva is another interesting work on propaganda. Conserva’s background is in education and debate. As a debating coach, he armed his team with a practical knowledge of propaganda. By educating his debate team on the techniques of propaganda, the team could develop better arguments against it16. Conserva defines propaganda as a “… communication of a point of view, moral, amoral or immoral with the ultimate goal of the recipient of the view voluntarily accepting the propagandist’s view.”17 Conserva’s views then are in keeping with JP 3-53 and Dictionary.com. He regards propaganda with certain neutrality but acknowledges that the intentional biases preclude it from being true information. He summarizes by explaining that propaganda causes the reader to suggest, imply and assume; propaganda discourages reflection, reason and understanding.18 Propaganda is biased information that intendeds to persuade the recipient to accept the propagandist’s views. Conserva proclaims that the natural enemy of propaganda is education. If propaganda is so flawed and educated people recognize it as so, then why is it effective?

According to Cunningham, propaganda is effective not only because it simplifies the information (making is indiscernible to the intellectually lazy) but also because we are absolutely inundated with the messages. There are so many propaganda messages, many appearing as information, the victim of propaganda has little time apply to finding the real truth19. Additionally, much propaganda appeals to the prejudices and pre-established attitudes of the recipient. In other words, propaganda tells the recipient what he wants to hear. Preconceived notions and culturally installed biases reinforce propaganda. Propaganda reinforces what we already believe and forms a “safety net” for our norms. It allows us to legitimize our beliefs and it verifies our values are correct. Propaganda allows the individual to think collectively, with safety in numbers20. Cunningham suggests that the victims of propaganda have complicity in propaganda. The propagandee is not an innocent victim; he develops an appetite for the emotionally charged messages and, with acceptance, becomes a willing participant in their own oppression.21 Wartime propaganda feeds on emotions like hate, fear and patriotism – messages that support the individual’s emotions can bolster the passion of the people. Propaganda of all sorts has become so prolific that it becomes difficult to discern where it is and where it is coming from.

Categories and techniques

Perhaps the most useful section of Stanley Cunningham’s book is his categorization of propaganda. Chapter four of Cunningham’s book explains the nine basic categories of propaganda: Agitation, Integration, White, Black, Disinformation, Bureaucratic, Counterpropaganda, Hate, and Deed22.

Agitation Propaganda A form of propaganda that calls attention to a social or political problem. Agitation propaganda uses a variety of emotional messages to generate outrage, fear or anger.

Integration Propaganda A form of propaganda that calls for unity to a cause or group. Integration propaganda calls for people to join a movement.

White Propaganda propaganda that uses facts and truthful messages in a persuasive manner. Although is relies on truth, it is presented in a biased manner.

Black Propaganda the reverse of White Propaganda. Black propaganda relies on lies, or erroneous information.

Disinformation information that is intentionally designed to be misleading. Disinformation is designed to propagate rumors and assumptions.

Bureaucratic Propaganda the use of reports and statistics to convey a point of view. Bureaucratic propaganda masks itself as legitimate scientific findings.

Counterpropaganda – counteractive propaganda designed to nullify or reverse an opponent’s propaganda message. Counterpropaganda inadvertently provides feedback to the original propagandist.

Hate Propaganda a form of agitation propaganda that assigns blame for the problem on a person, race, or nationality. Perhaps the most prolific form of propaganda in the twentieth century. A major goal of hate propaganda is to demoralize the enemy.

Propaganda of the Deed symbolic acts that rely on media attention to convey the message. Deeds follow the adage “actions speak louder than words”. Through the use of video and photography, Deeds transcend language barriers.

Go read the whole thing.  We can do distance learning, too.  Remember Hate Propaganda and use it on BDS-afflicted moonbats.

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Filed under PSYOP, PSYOP Auxiliaries

Achmed the Dead Terrorist

LMAO!

NSFW!

10 minutes of amusement for counterterrorists with their own internet in their hooch.  YouTube is kinda new to me because I spent a lot of time in places without enough bandwidth to play it, but Civilian Irregular Information Operators who learn to use this tool will do great things.  Weaponized ridicule distributed over YouTube.

And if you’re one of them poor slobs with no band width, I feel your pain.

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Filed under PSYOP Auxiliaries

We ain’t as good as we once was

We got a few years on us now.

But there was a time . . .

Toby Keith never came to TQ when I was there.

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Filed under Morale Operations

Technological Mental Fornication

 

From Strategy Page:

LRAD is basically a focused beam of sound. Originally, it was designed to emit a very loud sound. Anyone whose head was touched by this beam, heard a painfully loud sound. Anyone standing next to them heard nothing. But those hit by the beam promptly fled, or fell to the ground in pain. Permanent hearing loss is possible if the beam is kept on a person for several seconds, but given the effect the sound usually has on people (they move, quickly), it is unlikely to happen. LRAD works. It was recently used off Somalia, by a cruise ship, to repel pirates. Some U.S. Navy ships also carry it, but not just to repel attacking suicide bombers, or whatever. No, the system was sold to the navy for a much gentler application. LRAD can also broadcast speech for up to 300 meters. The navy planned to use LRAD to warn ships to get out of the way. This was needed in places like the crowded coastal waters of the northern Persian Gulf, where the navy patrols. Many small fishing and cargo boats ply these waters, and it’s often hard to get the attention of the crews. With LRAD, you just aim it at a member of the crew, and have an interpreter “speak” to the sailor. It was noted that the guy on the receiving end was sometimes terrified, even after he realized it was that large American destroyer that was talking to him. This apparently gave the army guys some ideas, for there are now rumors in Iraq of a devilish American weapon that makes people believe they are hearing voices in their heads. 

This made more sense when an American advertising firm recently used an LRAD unit to support a media campaign for a new TV show. LRAD was pointed at a sidewalk in Manhattan, below the billboard featuring the new show. LRAD broadcast a female voice providing teaser lines from the show. The effect was startling, and a bit scary for many who passed through the LRAD beam. It appears that some of the troops in Iraq are using “spoken” (as opposed to “screeching”) LRAD to mess with enemy fighters. Islamic terrorists tend to be superstitious and, of course, very religious. LRAD can put the “word of God” into their heads. If God, in the form of a voice that only you can hear, tells you to surrender, or run away, what are you gonna do?

Seems like we need some of these at Gitmo, with a deep-voiced Arabic-speaking voice-over talent saying:

“Mohammed, this is Allah.  You’ve been a very bad boy, Mohammed.  My justice upon your ass is going to hurt!  But if you bring the infidels Osama’s head when they let you out I might have mercy on your scraggily ass.  Oh, one more thing.  Leave the goats and little boys alone from now on, capiche?”

The implications are mind-fuc mind-boggling!

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Filed under PSYOP

Whoever is able to make you believe in absurdities will also be able to make you commit atrocities

If this story is not true, then it is an excellent example of propaganda.  If it is true, and my experiences with the TSA and the security industry in general cause me to give it more credence than others might, this story is a devastating indictment of what my country has become. 

Homeland Security my ass.  Sorry Coasties.  I still love y’all, but you’re lumped in with a dysfunctional abortion that never should have been allowed to see the light of day.

H/T:  Michael Tanji, who got it from Matt Armstrong

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Filed under Morale Operations

“Taking up for the little guy” is why we suck at Asymmetric Warfare

Half of an asymmetric enemy’s psychological warfare objective was already achieved long before that enemy thought about warring on us. 

Reflexive opposition to power and automatic support for the underdog — even when those underdogs fly planes into buildings, bury homosexuals up to their necks and stone them to death, open an average of one new coal-fired plant each week and use child suicide bombers to kill innocent civilians.

We are an open book to our enemies.  They know us better than we know ourselves.

Not plane, nor bird, nor even frog, just little old me, 
Underdogma

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Filed under Idea War, PSYOP