And the sources of the leaks need to be broken of their bad habits in a painfully public way pour encourager les autres. But since I have already seen the document, I may as well share the unclassified portion with you:
(U) Information Operations
(S//REL TO USA, MCFI) This paragraph you will have to find on your own.
(U) Insurgents used IO for both persuasion (e.g., distributing fliers and videos extolling the bravery of suicide bombers) and coercion (e.g., distributing videos of collaborators being beaten or executed).
See (U) Iraq: Employment of Information Technology (IT) by Insurgent Groups and Terrorists for more information on how information technology helps insurgents gain control of the local population.
(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR) This paragraph you will have to find on your own.
(U) Arab satellite news channels were crucial to building political pressure to halt military operations. For example, CPA documented 34 stories on Al Jazeera that misreported or distorted battlefield events between 6 and 13 April. Between 14 and 20 April, Al Jazeera used the “excessive force” theme 11 times and allowed various anti-Coalition factions to claim that U.S. forces were using cluster bombs against urban areas and kidnapping and torturing Iraqi children. Six negative reports by al-Arabiyah focused almost exclusively on the excessive force theme. Overall, the qualitative content of negative reports increasingly was shrill in tone, and both TV stations appeared willing to take even the most baseless claims as fact.
(U) During the first week of April, insurgents invited a reporter from Al Jazeera, Ahmed Mansour, and his film crew into Fallujah where they filmed scenes of dead babies from the hospital, presumably killed by Coalition air strikes. Comparisons were made to the Palestinian Intifada. Children were shown bespattered with blood; mothers were shown screaming and mourning day after day. Follow this link to see an example of the emotional images highlighted by Al Jazeera.
(U) The absence of Western media in Fallujah allowed the insurgents greater control of information coming out of Fallujah. Because Western reporters were at risk of capture and beheading, they stayed out and were forced to pool video shot by Arab cameramen and played on Al Jazeera. This led to further reinforcement of anti-Coalition propaganda. For example, false allegations of up to 600 dead and 1000 wounded civilians could not be countered by Western reporters because they did not have access to the battlefield.
(U) Western reporters were also not embedded in Marine units fighting in Fallujah. In the absence of countervailing visual evidence presented by military authorities, Al Jazeera shaped the world’s understanding of Fallujah.
(U) The relative failure of the first Battle of Fallujah compared to the more successful second Battle of Fallujah (November 2004) offers useful political-military lessons for how to defeat asymmetric adversaries in complex environments.
• (U) The enemy will seek to utilize the human, informational, and physical complexity of urban areas to avoid direct military confrontation and exploit American political and informational vulnerabilities.
• (U) Shaping operations that clear civilians from the battlefield offers many positive second-order effects. In Fallujah in April 2004, I MEF only had a few days to shape the environment before engaging in decisive combat operations. The remaining noncombatants provided cover for insurgents, restrained CJTF-7’s employment of combat power, and provided emotional fodder for Arab media to exploit.
• (U) Information operations are increasingly important in a 21st Century world where cable television runs 24 hours a day and the Internet offers propaganda opportunities for insurgent and terrorist groups.
• (U) The media presence on the battlefield was controlled by the enemy; consequently, they shaped much of the information the world viewed during the fight. In VIGILANT RESOLVE there were few reporters embedded in Marine infantry units; in Operation AL FAJR there were 91 embeds representing 60 media outlets. False allegations of noncombatant casualties were made by Arab media in both campaigns, but in the second case embedded Western reporters offered a rebuttal.
• (U) The Iraqi government was nascent and weak and they offered no political cover for U.S. commanders to finish the operation in a reasonable time period. Without domestic Iraqi political support, offensive operations were halted after 5 days of combat. This stands in stark contrast to the second battle for Fallujah where the Iraqi Interim Government under Prime Minister Ayad Alawi ordered the Marines in and supported them through several weeks of combat.
• (U) Insurgents sometimes get lucky. The Abu Ghurayb scandal and the Shia uprising further enflamed a politically precarious situation and could not have happened at a worse time for Coalition forces.
(U) In summary, several factors explain the difference in outcomes between Fallujah I and II. Longer shaping operations to evacuate civilians, control of the informational realm, more aggressive COIN operations in surrounding towns to protect Coalition MSRs, solid political backing from a more stable Iraqi government, and larger forces that contained a greater percentage of mechanized units to speed up the campaign all contributed to the relative success of Fallujah II (November 2004) versus the failure of Fallujah I.
Am I doing wrong in calling attention to Wikileaks? Possibly. Conceivably this post will bring them a lot of traffic and put a lot of unauthorized eyes on the leaked material. The counterpropagandist always runs the risk of calling attention to the propaganda. Thus the popularity of silence. Silence is the bureaucratic default position. In this case I judge the risk of aiding and abetting their agenda to be worth siccing the Civilian Irregular Computer Network Attack Force on them.