Monthly Archives: January 2011

Anonymous and Tunisia: A New Cyber Warfare?

Anonymous and Tunisia: A New Cyber Warfare?.

Anonymous certainly didn’t bring down the Tunisian government, and it may not have even altered the landscape of the Tunisian media. But its digital-collective involvement in an intrinsically domestic conflict was undeniably a first. Inspired by the struggles of a repressed Tunisian citizenry, a stateless, international group of free-speech advocates took it upon themselves to engage in a still-undefined form of guerilla warfare. Their tactics are unproven, and their success is undetermined.

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Filed under CNA, G-2, Info Warriors, IW, PSYOP

» Muslim World Uprisings Demonstrate Why Government Involvement with the Internet is a BAD Idea – Big Government

» Muslim World Uprisings Demonstrate Why Government Involvement with the Internet is a BAD Idea – Big Government.

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Filed under CNA, Idea War, PSYOP

Egyptian Civilian Irregular Psychological Operations



Egyptian Activists’ Action Plan: Translated

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Filed under Pamphleteers, PSYOP, Resisters

Journalist, Hacker, Spy, Racketeer (via ZERO ANTHROPOLOGY)

Assange and the Wikileakers are not good guys. That so many ever thought they were demonstrates WL’s PSYOP expertise, and a whole lot of target audience gullibility.

Journalist, Hacker, Spy, Racketeer What if Wikileaks, from the start, had announced itself as an anonymous group of hackers whose work aimed at producing an open access archive of leaked, stolen, and otherwise illegally obtained and illegally reproduced documents? Chances are that in a conflict with the U.S. or any other government, Wikileaks' activists would have found themselves in a "catch me if you can" game. Instead Wikileaks has, from the start, identified a range of descrip … Read More

via ZERO ANTHROPOLOGY

Somebody Should Have Taken Down Wikileaks 3 Years Ago

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Filed under Moonbats, PSYOP

Wasn’t Civil 150 Years Ago, Next One Won’t Be Either

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Filed under Idea War, Morale Operations, PSYOP

In the chatroom with the cyber guerrillas

In the chatroom with the cyber guerrillas

Global chaos is not Anonymous’ aim. As the WikiLeaks and Tunisia cases show, the group targets specific institutions and its attacks are designed to temporarily delay more than destroy. Think of them not as acts of cyber war but as high-profile guerrilla strikes.

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Filed under CNA, Cyber Guerrilla Chieftains, IW, PSYOP Auxiliaries

Afghan government turning to local militias – Army News | News from Afghanistan & Iraq – Army Times

Afghan government turning to local militias – Army News | News from Afghanistan & Iraq – Army Times.

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Filed under IW, The Forgotten War

Le·gal In·sur·rec·tion: Operation Demoralize Is Working

Le·gal In·sur·rec·tion: Operation Demoralize Is Working.

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Filed under Electronic Counter Media, Morale Operations, Old Media

A Media Guide For the Journalistically Challenged

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Filed under Electronic Counter Media, Old Media, Pamphleteers

Anonymous Plans to Implement P2P (via T3h H3r0d07u5 R3p0r7)

Anonymous plans to implement P2P into their DDoS attack strategy, according to a recent posting on pastebin.com. Called "Ghost-P2P", the platform will incorporate a "target voting" feature that will enable participants to vote on DDoS targets to be attacked using LOIC, an open source network stress-testing application. LOIC was recently used by Anonymous to carry out DDoS attacks as part of Operation Payback. "One of the most unspected [sic] appl … Read More

via T3h H3r0d07u5 R3p0r7

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Filed under G-2

We live in a world where a few top-quality hackers can accomplish a considerable amount of damage at the national and strategic level.

Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008 ( http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf )

Read the whole thing, then come back and think about:

. . . There was another historically unique and critical aspect to the fighting – the emergence of synchronized cyberspace domain actions as an intelligence indicator for strategic, operational, and tactical level military operations. Unlike the (alleged) Russian cyberattack upon Estonia in 2007, the (alleged) Russian cyberattack on Georgia was accompanied by physical domain combat between Russian and Georgian military forces. The (alleged) Russian network attack operations in virtual cyberspace occurred prior to hostilities and later mirrored (apparently synchronized with) Russian combat operations in the land warfighting domain.7 These attacks included various distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks to deny/disrupt communications and information exfiltration activities conducted to accumulate military and political intelligence from Georgian networks. These attacks also included web site defacement for Russian propaganda purposes.8 One of the first elements of Georgian society that were attacked was a popular hacker forum – by attempting to take out Georgian hackers, Russian-supported hacker militia preemptively tried to forestall or mitigate a counter-attack (or returning fire) from Georgian hackers.9 What is not widely known is that pro-Georgian hackers made limited but successful network counter-attacks against Russian targets.10 Hacker wars between (often quite talented) patriotic amateur hackers, cyber militias, and organized criminal gangs have become a widely accepted de facto form of nation-state conflict over the past twenty years (for example: Israeli vs Arab/Muslim (Sept 2000), India vs Pakistan, US vs China (April-May 2001), Russian vs Estonia (April-May 2007), etc…). These non-governmental national assets are generally used for the traditional purposes of imposing one nation’s will and conditions upon another.

Two and a half years later and we can only allege? That’s the plausible deniability irregular information operators offer.

One of the first targets of enemy Civilian Irregular Information Operators will be friendly Civilian Irregular Information Operators.

What are some of the operational and intelligence lessons that can be drawn from these conclusions? First, for Russia or China to employ their people’s patriotic ‘hacker militia’ to conduct a network attack against a target nation-state, they must engage them first – to motivate and ‘sell’ them on the concept; steer them toward appropriate targets; synchronize those cyberspace operations with combat activity in the physical realm; and discuss the most effective cyberspace tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to be used. The patriotic hackers and cyber militias need to be focused by the aggressor government against the opponent‟s center of gravity and their activities to be synchronized with attacks against that center of gravity from the other domains. These hackers and cyber militias need to understand the opponent‟s center of gravity in order to develop cyberspace domain approaches and techniques to effectively attack it. These preliminary cyberspace activities often create an identifiable signature that can be tracked and monitored in advance of combat operations. Nations need to monitor hacker chat rooms and communications of potential aggressor nations in order to intercept and understand this activity.

How would the United States employ our people’s patriotic ‘hacker militia’?
What arm of the fedgov.mil octopus could engage them, motivate and ‘sell’ them on the concept, steer them toward appropriate targets; synchronize those cyberspace operations with combat activity in the physical realm; and discuss the most effective cyberspace tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to be used?

Nobody in our .gov/.mil could overtly engage them without suffering political retribution from Legislative/Executive branch elements that do not want American patriotic hacker militias engaged. That leaves former or retired .gov/.mil beyond the reach of retribution, and contractors that don’t get much political oversight.

Russian-oriented hackers/militia took out news and local government web sites specifically in the areas that the Russian military intended to attack in the ground and air domains. The Federal and local Georgian governments, military, and local news agencies were unable to communicate with Georgian citizens that were directly affected by the fighting. This provided an intelligence indicator of the ground and air attack locations. It created panic and confusion in the local populace, further hindering Georgian military response. This effect also provides a future aggressor nation with an opportunity to conduct military deception operations via feints and ruses to mislead the target nation population, government, and military. A sudden „blackout’ of cyberspace activities in a specific region may provide an indicator of a tactical or operational level conventional attack. Or it could be used as a sophisticated cyberspace operation as part of a larger deception plan, creating a feint in the cyberspace domain to lure opposing forces into believing an attack is imminent in another warfighting domain. Use of patriotic hackers and cyberspace militia themselves might be a deception effort to attract the target nation‟s attention away from the aggressor nation‟s top-quality military and intelligence community cyberspace operators that quietly conduct the main effort in the overall cyberspace domain operation.

Are we even allowed to use MILDEC anymore? Could any U. S. MILDEC’ers work by, with and through American patriotic hackers and cyberspace militia?

In future combat, aggressor nation patriotic hacker militia can be called upon to conduct cyberspace fire & maneuver operations performed directly in support of forces in other domains, They could also be extensively utilized to conduct deception efforts in cyberspace in support of operations in the other domains or to act as a distraction for other cyberspace operations conducted by government professionals against target nation high value targets (HVT).

UPDATE 012911: This Week at War: Lessons from Cyberwar I

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Filed under CNA, CND, Info Warriors, IW, PSYOP Auxiliaries

Borderland Beat: Mexican Cartels Buying Afghan Heroin

Borderland Beat: Mexican Cartels Buying Afghan Heroin.

Mexican Cartels partnering with Iranian Qods Force to move Afghan heroin into the United States should be a matter of some concern.  The Iranians have a serious problem back in Iran with opium and heroin addiction.  Diverting some of their domestic traffic towards the Great Satan would be popular.

Qods Force with Mexican Drug Cartel help could get almost anything into the U. S.

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Filed under BorderOps

The Border War: Into The Valley Of Death, USA

BigPeace The Border War: Into The Valley Of Death, USA.

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Filed under BorderOps, IW

Why Israel Is Losing The Information War – Big Journalism

Why Israel Is Losing The Information War – Big Journalism.

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Filed under Info Warriors, PSYOP

Bummer

Pic 'jacked from Journal of Applied Drink Studies International

KATUSA Snack Bar, Camp Casey, 1983. Hazy memories of ramen, rice, kimchee & Jinro.

Korea could be fun back in the day. The ville outside Casey was a regular Mos Eisley spaceport. The Black Rose usually topped the list of joints off limits for VD. Remember The Silver Star? Everybody knew my name in there.

January 5, 2011: The U.S. Air Force has banned their troops in South Korea from having a local liquor, Soju, in their living quarters, or anywhere on base. The reason is that Soju is cheap, popular and kind of sneaks up on you. Similar to vodka, but with a somewhat sweet taste, most Soju is 40 proof (20 percent alcohol). American troops find that they can drink a lot of it before they suddenly find themselves quite intoxicated. The air force considers this a problem because many airmen, while off-duty and on base, are “on call.” If they have been drinking Soju, and are suddenly called in to operate or repair complex equipment, disaster can ensue. Some Soju is 90 proof, but it’s the 40 proof stuff that causes the most problems.

Drinking and whoring used to be a big part of soldiering overseas. We’re so much healthier and politically correct, now.

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Filed under Morale Operations

Kaitseliit

 

Defence League (Kaitseliit)

The Defence League is a voluntary military national defence organisation, which acts in the area of government of the Ministry of Defence. The Defence League possesses arms and engages in military exercises. The main goal of the Defence League is, on the basis of the citizens’ free will and initiative, to enhance the readiness of the nation to defend its independence and its constitutional order, including in the event of military threat.

 

The organisation is divided into 15 Defence League regional units whose areas of responsibility mostly coincide with the borders of Estonia’s counties. Today, the Defence League has over 12,000 members. The affi liated organisations of the Defence League combine more than 19,000 volunteers, in all, and include the Estonian Defence League’s women’s corps Naiskodukaitse, the Estonian Defence League’s boys’ corps Noored Kotkad, and the Estonian Defence League’s girls’ corps Kodutütred.

 

The Defence League plays an important role in supporting the civil structures. Its members aid in putting out wildfires, volunteer as assistant police members, and ensure safety at various events. Units, consisting of voluntary members of the Defence League, also participate in international peace support operations such as in the Balkan states. The Defence League and its affiliated organisations have positive relations with partner organisations in the Nordic countries, the United States and the United Kingdom.

 

The Defence League’s women’s corps also co-operates with other organisations and associations, including the Police Board, the Rescue Board, the Erna Society, the Society for Civil Protection and local governments.

 

The Defence League’s girls’ corps was established to increase patriotic feelings and readiness to defend the independence of Estonia among young girls; to enhance the love for home and fatherland; to encourage respect for the Estonian language and ways of thinking; to be honest, enterprising, responsible, and capable of decision-making; to respect nature; and to respect one’s parents and others.

The Defence League’s boys’ corps comprises approximately 3,500 young men from all over Estonia. The objective of the organisation is to raise these young people as good citizens with healthy bodies and minds. In addition to numerous interesting activities, such as parachute jumping, flying gliders, orienteering, shooting weapons, etc., the boys’ corps also participates in numerous events, the most popular but also the most difficult being the Mini-Erna 35 km reconnaissance competition.

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Filed under IW, Resisters

Estonian Civilian Irregular Information Defense Group

Volunteer Cyber Army Emerges In Estonia

Maybe it won’t be an all-volunteer Cyber Army.

Conscripting Cyber Experts to Protect IT Infrastructure

There is enough national unity in Estonia to have a Cyber Defense League. In America, the usual suspects would beat it to death through PSYOP in the media and LAWFARE in the courts.

Small Wars Council discussion here.

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Filed under CND, Info Warriors, IW, Lawfare, PSYOP