Category Archives: strategery

My Take On Pakistan’s Violation of Diplomatic Immunity

@cannoneerno4 sigh I agree, would like to see Ur take on it, Blog? G

The most obvious dependency is Afghanistan. An entire fighting force is in a landlocked theater, dependent on Pakistan for access to the sea. This gives Pakistan enormous leverage over Obama. Moreover, Obama, in betting on Afghanistan, has staked his political credibility on something the Pakistanis can deep-six. For both military and political reasons, the Pakistanis have Washington over a barrel.

So this is going to be a blog post, requested by another blogger, on Twitter, in response to a tweet I put out copying a comment by Richard Fernandez, another blogger, on his own blog.

My take is that Mr. Ten Percent’s suit and sack are not quite as empty as Obama’s. The Pakis would not have had the audacity to jerk President Bush’s chain in such a way. Obama has been measured and found wanting in all the attributes that keep Axis of Evil type’s heads down.

America went to war in Afghanistan to avenge 9-11. Shooting camels with cruise missiles wasn’t going to cut it. Boots on the ground had to go in and kick ass and take names until America’s thirst for Muslim blood was slaked, lest comparatively “innocent” Muslims in America be persecuted by vigilantes.

The deal made with Musharraf back in 2001 was “give us overflight, a SPOD at Karachi, and an MSR and we’ll give you billions of dollars worth of bribes, plus F-16′s with which to threaten the Indians. We’ll let you play us like rubes as long as you keep the LOC open. Alternatively, we could just nuke you back to the Stone Age.” Musharaff took that deal.

I have the sneaking suspicion that the Uzbek dictator Karimov played us like a bass drum when he offered us the Karshi Khanabad Air Base. We would never have done what we did in Afghanistan in 2001 without K2, and getting kicked out of there in 2005 should have been a war stopper, but F-102 pilots CAN DO and nobody else in the chain of command would say “Whoa, Boss, Can’t Do” so we endeavored to persevere with an economy of force side show on a shoe string at the end of a very long and insecure line of communications while the main effort went to Mesopotamia.

Then the main event sputtered to an unsatisfying conclusion that might be victory, the American people in their infinite wisdom replaced their CAN DO Commander-in-Chief with a WE’RE SORRY C-in-C, and the main event now became a land war in Asia.

The way things are going now it is hard to see a happy ending for OEF.
If we can stave off disaster until our regime can be changed everything might turn out all right in the end. Won’t know for sure we won in Afghanistan until we check the number of Afghan nail salons in our strip malls in 2046.

Dr Brydon, Last Survivor of the Kabul Garrison, Arrives at Jellalabad


Filed under Logistics, strategery, The Forgotten War

Rumsfeld’s victory: a retrospective look at our de facto flytrap strategy in Iraq

Kaslin helped me find this post at Error Theory by Alec Rawls which I heartily recommed you spend some time looking at.  It is long, and I’m not going to excerpt it much:

And so it was settled. Al Qaeda would attack Iraqis, creating media events that the Western media could use to try to lose the war at home. It was understood that this strategy would turn the Iraqis against al Qaeda, losing the war on the ground, but maybe not before the Democrats and their media allies managed to lose the war in America. It would be a race:  could the Democrat/ al Qaeda alliance create defeat in America before the American military would win the war in Iraq?

It was a close run thing.  And another Tet to influence the Presidential election is still likely.   The Democrat / al Qaeda alliance is a phrase you will hear again.

I don’t have any particularly comments to add, other than to tell you to go read.  Your understanding of the enemy, foreign and domestic, will be broadened. 


Filed under strategery

Unnoticed Amid Iowa Hoopla, State Sponsors of Terror Back Up and Regroup

Unheralded victories?

Petraeus Credits Syria for Cutting Flow of Terrorists to Iraq

Iran no longer aids Iraq militants

H/T: War Lord Roggio

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Filed under strategery


Bill Whittle has a long, 2-part piece up about John Boyd and OODA Loops and agility that you really should devote 30 0r 40 minutes of your life to digesting.  He is really hard to excerpt, but I’m going to pick out what I consider some key paragraphs.  Bill’s whole magnum opus is cheer leading for our side, of the kind in past wars our Regulars in the Office of War Information could coordinate.  Nowadays self-mobilized Strategic Citizens acting on their own initiative as Civilian Irregular PSYOP Auxiliaries do for the domestic audience what our government has given up on.

The Political Leadership should be agile. I know, it’s nice to dream, huh? But surely, approaching the five year mark in Iraq, we must realize that the only hope these insurgents have or ever did have is to sow enough despair and hopelessness among the American people that we walk away.

Why is it that the fielded military can adopt Boyd’s concept of agility and maneuverability, but the political leadership remains absolutely blind to the fact that this battle may or may not be won on the streets of Baghdad and Fallujah and Ramadi, but it absolutely can be lost on the CBS Evening News? One would think the insurgents would need a multi-billion dollar, worldwide high-tech satellite network to spread their propaganda. But, being the generous people that we are, we have gallantly lent them ours.

This is an example of Swordlessness: using the enemy’s weapon against him. Two can play at that game, as we will see in a moment. But let’s just take it as read that the Main Stream Media no longer even seriously pretends to report facts. They have made an editorial decision that this conflict is a mistake and we should have stopped looking to them for fairness or balance a long time ago.

This is the battleground. Why – why – is the administration unable or unwilling to commit resources to this theater of operations?

A friend of mine has two brothers serving both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Together, they have been deployed seven times to these war zones. Jake Rademacher is a documentary filmmaker of real talent who had the guts to go to Iraq and live with his brothers outside the Green Zone for several weeks. His film, Brothers at War, is an actual documentary: that is to say, he did not script it and he does not push a viewpoint. What he does do is show his two brothers living in a country that is by turns violent and gentle, with people good and bad, brave and cowardly, and through it all you get to see why his two brothers chose to go back there and risk their lives again and again.

If this film were shown to the American people, support for the war would go up thirty points; not because it has a point to make but simply because it doesn’t. You just see what goes on and you make your own decision.

Brothers at War, and the writings of Michael Yon, Michel Totten and precious few others, are worth entire divisions. They have allowed us a perspective of what is really going on over there. They have lived there for years, long enough to know the people and what makes good news or bad. They have earned my trust and deepest respect for unblinking and courageous reporting that has put the MSM to shame. I suspect Michael Yon has spent more time within the sound of gunfire than any other MSM reporter has total time in country. And he and Mike Totten and a few others have allowed that signal – that small, pure signal – to escape into the ether. Or rather, into the Ethernet.

We have held this line – barely – with the efforts of men like that and a few private citizens writing in their pajamas. The political leadership needs to get in this fight. Now.

I think the Surge has had spectacular success not because of the additional troops so much as for the fact that when the media and the Democrats demanded we cut and run… we did not cut and run. We doubled down. When the calls for defeat and dishonor were at their loudest – sad to say a not unwarranted street rep we had made for ourselves – somehow, somehow we simply just hung on and gave them not a retreat but a charge.

Like Chief Reynolds always says, read the whole thing, and spread it around.

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Filed under Old Media, strategery

“Blitzkrieg of the Mind”

Dawn of the Cognetic Age
Fighting Ideological War by Putting Thought in Motion with Impact

Many terms and concepts held over from the Industrial Age prevent us from thinking and communicating clearly about new threats we face in the Cognetic Age. For example, propaganda does not fit today’s decentralized information-communication environment because we associate it with the centralized control and management of information and communications that reflected the concentration of power during the Industrial Age. With the advent of the Internet and globalization, this concentration of power no longer exists in the hands of the few; indeed, many people now have access to it. This shift in power is the defining feature of the Cognetic Age. Moreover, considerable negative baggage has attached itself to propaganda, a word continually used to describe almost any activity having to do with influencing perceptions, whether for good or ill. This intellectual burden stifles our ability to fight ideological war by tying our minds and tongues to the dogmas of the past.

Pictures of dead women and children, the “collateral damage” of war, carry more explosive weight than a B-52—a weight measured not in tons of explosives but in negative perception, which translates to reduced public support for government policies and initiatives.  Acting like a ball and chain, reduced support impairs the ability of governments to prosecute a long-term war without suffering significant political consequences.

To win, we must neutralize militant Islam’s advantage in the global media.

Ordnance = Content

Delivery Platforms = Global Media

Target = Public Opinion

Because we do not censor the Internet or transnational television, images of death and destruction from terror attacks speed unimpeded (like Germany’s tanks and aircraft) across the flat plains of the global media directly to our TV screens and computer monitors, delivering a mental blitzkrieg attack measured not in explosive weight but in the weight of perception.

Kinetic fire commands like Gunner, coax, TROOPS! morph into cognetic fire commands like Blogger, comments, MOONBATS!
Read the whole thing. 
H/T: Meatball 1


Filed under Info Warriors, PSYOP, strategery

Hope is not a plan, and if you’re depending on InterAgency you’re wrong

At War But Not War-Ready by Hans Binnendijk:

The Defense Department is at war while the State Department still suffers from the post-Cold War notion of a peace dividend. One is on steroids, the other on life support.

The State Department and other civilian agencies are instruments of U.S. national security policy but are unprepared. They need to be authorized and fully resourced to do their jobs. The USIA should be re-created, while USAID needs expansion and restructuring. Civilian agencies need operational cultures more compatible with the changing security environment.

Non-hacker oxygen thieves of no tactical significance.

H/T: Dave Dilegge at SWJ


Filed under strategery