Propaganda

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14 responses to “Propaganda

  1. suek

    Off topic…but something to raise your blood pressure over the weekend!

    http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=69302

  2. suek

    Here’s another one – unrelated to the one above, but when taken in conjunction, it’ll give you the willies. These people are planning _far_ into the future.

    http://the-gathering-storm.blogspot.com/2008/07/storm-track-infiltration-american.html

  3. Thanks, suek. Good stuff.

  4. programmer, a commenter at The Belmont Club, asks:

    what is your opinion on the long term strategic implications of Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg and the disagreement between Longstreet and Lee?

    The long term strategic implications of Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg were:

    1. — The loss of the Army of Northern Virginia’s aura of invincibility.

    2. — The loss of Marse Robert’s infallibility.

    3. — The irreplaceable losses in Pickett’s Division

    4. — All of the above took the skeer off of the Army of the Potomac and greatly constrained the ANV’s ability to conduct offensive operations for the rest of the war.

    Longstreet was right. Lee should have followed his advice.

  5. programmer

    Hmmmm, pretty much my thoughts. You took the wind out of my sails with that one. However, never being one to miss the opportunity to belabor a point into the ground (pardon the mixed metaphors), I will proceed with windless sails.
    So, it seems to me that one of the issues with a Victory at all costs mindset leads to your point #3. I hear what you are saying about the war of Words, Lord knows that the current administration has not taken that concept seriously enough, if at all. But in my somewhat cursory study of the Civil War, WW1, and WW2 (and others), it seems to me that pursuit of Victory without keeping end game in sight can lead to decimation of skilled leadership, loss of resources, etc. You get my drift, I’m sure.

    Another analogy that pops to mind is the Russians in Afghanistan. We (via proxy) wore them down, drained resources and will and very probably contributed to the fall of the Iron Curtain.

    I am not arguing for an Exit Strategy to just get the troops out of a “quagmire”. I truly believe we have accomplished most of our goals in Iraq and I would like to see our troops conseved for the battles to come and come they will. We need to have our forces in a position where they can react quickly, and frankly, I’m not sure that is Iraq. It certainly isn’t Okinawa, but..

    Any way, I think from looking at your website that we probably agree on many things. Those aren’t the interesting ones to talk about. Thanks for the opportunity to discuss this in more detail.

    programmer, used to be old geek.

  6. The Victory at all costs mindset is necessary to withstand the heartbreaking losses. Pyrrhic victories are bad. Defeats are worse.

  7. programmer

    I am going to have to go and ponder this over. What you say has merit, but as you can probably percieve, it bothers me to say so. Now that I have found your blog, I will be back. I have added you to my favorites. I usually don’t do much commenting, but I am bothered by a lot of the rhetoric that is bouncing around cyberspace and find myself more and more compelled to make comments where I feel that I have something to say. Thanks for the opportunity for civil discourse.

    programmer

  8. The long term strategic implications of Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg were:

    1. — The loss of the Army of Northern Virginia’s aura of invincibility.

    2. — The loss of Marse Robert’s infallibility.

    3. — The irreplaceable losses in Pickett’s Division

    It also discredited the doctrine of making large frontal assaults with massed infantry in nice neat rows with flags waving, at least for the United States. The various European nations learned this same lesson a little later in the First World War, and there was much more than a little stone wall and some cannister waiting for them.

  9. But would not that be a tactical implication?

    According to the TV show Unsolved History there was a stout wooden fence within rifle range of the stone wall that had to be climbed over or knocked down which slowed the advance and bunched them up.

  10. But would not that be a tactical implication?

    True, a tactical implication with strategic ramifications. Once we shifted to the kind of fighting that relied more on maneuver than on big set-piece battles, it served us better to come into the last year or so of the other folk’s wars after they had ground themselves into hamburger. Even the island-hopping strategy of Nimitz was this smarter kind of fighting, but over hundreds of miles of water rather than tens of miles of land.

    According to the TV show Unsolved History there was a stout wooden fence within rifle range of the stone wall that had to be climbed over or knocked down which slowed the advance and bunched them up.

    That was along the Emmitsberg Road, which ran down to the Peach Orchard and the Round Tops. It surely was a fatal obstacle for many, but not a show stopper for Pickett’s charge. It was just one of many things which went wrong that day. The biggest thing was unavoidable: Meade had the high ground. The cannoneers for the ANV couldn’t see what effect their rounds were having, which wasn’t much. If Lee could see, he would have called off the charge. When the rebels got close to the stone wall Colonel Alexander had to cease fire to keep from hitting his own men, while the largely untouched bulk of the union artillery could fire at will, and as we all know, artillery is the biggest troop killer.

  11. Whoops, that last post was mine, I still had a cookie which had my name as “Jill Pennell”….Oh well

  12. The march from the Southern positions toward the Union lines covered about 3,000 yards. The first 90% of the advance was remarkable for its use of terrain masking. That is, for most of the soldiers in the advance, Pickett chose the route that was shielded from the line of sight of the Union boys and their guns by hills and lines of rises. Casualties in Pickett’s division were relatively low for that part of the maneuver.

    “The last 300 yards or so, the closing phase of the engagement, well…that is another story.

    “That last maneuver of the advance was supposed to be a fast run, up a gently sloping hill against the Union barricades. This type of rapid charge under fire was similar to so many other engagements, of so many other battles that occurred during the Civil War. The tactic was not remarkable for the era, but the outcome has shaped the national destiny ever since the fateful day.

    “The Southern advance encountered an unanticipated problem. There was a 5-foot-tall wooden rail fence down the slope from the Union positions. The fence had not been knocked down by artillery or taken out by advanced units or sappers. The fence was of relatively solid construction, and its presence halted the advance by Pickett’s men.

    “The Union troops rained gunfire and cannon shot down the hill and into the mass of Southerners. By the time the Southerners moved over and past the fence, their momentum of attack had been broken. A very few Southerners struggled their way to the Union lines and beyond, but the energy of the moment shifted to the Boys in Blue. The rest, as they say, is history. And myth. And legend.

    “People say that the Civil War was central to the history and political evolution of the United States. And they say that the Battle of Gettysburg was central to the outcome of the Civil War. And they say that Pickett’s Charge was the key engagement of that battle. And the fence at the bottom of the hill is what broke the momentum of advance of the Southerners.

    “So that damn fence must be the single thing that decided the fate of a nation.”Byron King

  13. Over on the Tony Snow Memorial thread Teresita on Sunday, 13 July 2008
    at 5:59 pm left the below comment which I moved over here.

    The US President must accede to all of the Iraqi president’s demands or Iraq is not sovereign and the evil Americans are occupiers?

    When such demands involve the monopoly of the use of force, which is the essential activity of a sovereign state. Iraq differs from Germany, in that the US forces in Germany are to repel invaders, they do not police the country. If the Army started running around Germany arresting people, and Germany asked us for a timeline of when were were going to stand down, they could hardly be considered a sovereign state if we denied their request.

    Has Maliki told us to leave yet?

    He has made a commitment to a finite occupation a condition of remaining in Iraq. The US says that’s a non-starter, and there’s nothing Maliki can do about it because his nation is under occupation.

    How would Retired Iraqi army officers in the Anbar region know which aircraft at Al Asad are American and which are Israeli? And such unimpeachable sources! Retired Iraqi army officers meaning Baathist thugs who were too dirty to get into the ISF.

    Israel and America want it both ways. They want just enough credibility to shake the Mullahs in Iraq, but enough deniability to keep the Mullahs in Saudi Arabia and Iraq from asserting pan-Arabic pride.

    Turkey is an unoccupied Muslim nation. They allowed the use of their air space in taking out the Syrian nuke site. Jordan is also an unoccupied Muslim nation, which, if your link is true, apparently allowed Israeli overflight.

    Turkey recognized Israel in 1949 and they have strong military ties. Israel sells arms to Turkey, and Turkey has allowed Israeli planes to conduct exercises in their airspace. Jordanian airspace was closed for even the US forces in the Iraq War, but this does not deter Israel, who can enter places like Syria with impugnity. That doesn’t mean Jordan is not sovereign, just not fast enough or strong enough to stop it from happening. But if Israel were using Jordanian bases to land and refuel, we could safely say the King of Jordan was a puppet.

    To which I reply:

    US forces are not really in Germany to repel invaders anymore, Teresita. They were when I was part of that force. Times and justifications have changed.

    You can continue in your mistaken belief that the US is still occupying Iraq if it suits your purpose.

    I ask again, how would Retired Iraqi army officers in the Anbar region know which aircraft at Al Asad are American and which are Israeli? Did the Stars of David they forgot to paint out give them away?

  14. A civilian national security “force” probably means a beefed up FBI.

    I’ve always wondered if people are so into self-delusion, why Bush didn’t take advantage of this fact. Maybe he just could never tolerate being in the same room with such people.

    I truly believe we have accomplished most of our goals in Iraq and I would like to see our troops conseved for the battles to come and come they will.

    When you “conserve” troops stateside for any long period of time, what tends to happen is peace graft, peacetime standards like “readiness” reports get over-emphasized over battle field prowess and results, and various other claptrap. What you end up getting is a bunch of troops that can’t do the job anymore.

    The military has harsh training requirements that kill people, and they accept this fact. You’re going to have to accept the fact that if you want less people to die in the future, you’re gong to have to keep the US military deployed so that they can keep up their skills.

    There is no “place” that allows an army to react the fastest. There is, however, a state of mind.