One of the lessons in the School of the Counterpropagandist that I haven’t posted yet was the counterpropaganda technique of restrictive measures.
This technique denies the intended Target Audience access to the propaganda. Jamming, physical destruction, and occupation of media outlets are some examples of this technique. Restrictive measures must be evaluated for their potential negative feedback potential before being implemented. This technique may also bring additional attention to the propaganda and encourage the TA to seek out the propaganda via covert means. When used in peacekeeping operations by U.S. forces, restrictive measures (such as shutting down radio stations) invite hostile propaganda against the supported unit concerning freedom of the media and freedom of speech. In addition, these measures are often used by repressive regimes, inviting the inevitable comparison.
Pressuring the host ISP to take down jihadi websites is also an example of restrictive measures.
Why does our government allow American internet service providers to host them? My assumption is that the government agency tasked with tracking jihadi websites (and I’m not sure which one is) misses a lot of them and is too politically correct to take much action against the sites they do find. I assume this because the government has done nothing to engender any warm and fuzzy feelings that they know what they are doing in the info war. I’m not a defeatist. I support the war. I want to help. My perception has been managed, accidently or by design on somebody’s part, to assume that the Other Government Agencies are incompetent in fighting the War of Ideas. On matters of efficiency, effectiveness, judgement, agility, speed, I don’t give OGA’s much benefit of the doubt. My default position holds them as jacked up until proven otherwise. But it is possible my negative assumptions are not as well founded as I think.
Michael Tanji is concerned about loose cannon cyber vigilantes shutting down fly paper sites that were providing good intel for network analysis.
Spook86 assures us the intel community knows far more about Al Qaida communications than most people realize–and that fact isn’t widely publicized, for obvious reasons.
The Good Guys, both Blue Force Regulars and friendly Brown Force Irregulars, want the same end result. Blue Force failed to mobilize us, so we have come out of the mall and mobilized ourselves. Blue Force failed to convince us that they had everything under control and didn’t need us, and now they have to live with a certain amount of IO fratricide. The genie is out of the bottle. Our non-state actors are engaging their non-state actors in cyber space and Blue Force can influence, persuade and convince but they cannot command us. I recommend they accept the fait accompli, learn to like it, and get people to believe it was their idea all along.
UPDATE: Lessons from the latest intelligence leak We seem to be averse to penetrating networks as far as we can and then destroying the offending terminal or hub.
Tracking Jihadis Online Fox News video
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