5 to 10 acres in a defensible place with an off the grid water source. Greenhouse. Fractional precious metals in .223, .40, .45, .22LR, etc. Some stock like chickens, a pig or two, beef on the hoof. Hunting skills. Stashed starches in enough quantity to live for at least two years. Heirloom seeds.

Hard times are coming. Harder than most Americans can even imagine. Harder even than The Great Depression. Root, hog, or die, and the weakest go to the wall. Those who survive the culling will create a society with a low tolerance for bullshit and high expectations of the people it accepts as full fledged members.

I hope that’s what the unculled do. Hope is not a plan.

It is good to teach young butter bars cyberwar, but there are millions of their contemporaries in the general population who already have madder skills than these proto-Regulars will ever acquire on .gov’s dime. Whose job is it to seek out civilian irregular information operators and rally them to the .gov side?

http://www.stripes.com/news/website-showing-african-rebels-movements-attracts-interest-1.158081

Civilian Irregular Information Operators.

The cybermilitia’s tasks include “stealing, changing and erasing data” on enemy networks and their intrusion with the goal of “deception, jamming, disruption, throttling and paralysis”

What capability does the U. S. military have to mobilize American cybermilitias?

. . . an all-volunteer local defense force that vastly outnumbers the approximate number of insurgents in the district. Capt. Paul J. Kasich, the commander of the Marine police mentoring team in Marjah, estimates ISCI to be almost the size of a battalion.

At that size, ISCI is approximately three times larger than the insurgent force in Marjah was last summer, when resistance to coalition forces was notably stronger. At that time, there were between 200 and 300 insurgents, according to a Small Wars Journal article written by Brett Van Ess last July.

The emergence of ISCI has several implications regarding the counterinsurgency campaign in Marjah. The first is coalition forces obvious size advantage – ISCI being only a sliver of the total coalition force, which also includes a Marine battalion, an Afghan National Army Kandak, and various departments of Afghan National Police.

The deeper implication, however, lies in the composition of the force itself. Unlike the ANA and ANP, which are comprised of Afghans from all over the country, the ISCI is made up entirely of local citizens led by local elders. Members of ISCI patrol their own neighborhoods, which are delineated by a canal system the U.S. helped build during the 1950s. In essence, the local ISCI force represents a grass-roots resistance to insurgents.

Healing the Bleeding Ulcer: A more hopeful prognosis in Southern Helmand province

They’re more interested in creating liberal propaganda than in creating profitable programming. That preference is literally killing television.