Category Archives: PSYOP Auxiliaries

Why False Enemy Propaganda Matters

The Jawa Report: Why False Enemy Propaganda Matters: German Jihadi Motivated by Fake US Soldier Rape Video.

. . . we cannot let such enemy propaganda go unchecked. It affects people. It kills people.

Propagandists with pens are sometimes just as dangerous as those with guns. Especially when the false ideas they sell reinforce a narrative where Americans are the lascivious bad guys and the Taliban and other Islamist groups are simply defending the virtue of Muslim women from them.

We have got to do better at fighting the propaganda produced by the enemy. Which is why I support YouTube smackdown. But we need to do more. We need to organize. And not simply at the individual private level. Fighting enemy propaganda needs to be higher on the priority list of both the CIA and the DOD.

And if the government won’t do this we need to change the government. In the meantime it’s up to you and me to fight the good fight. So, if you see stupid enemy propaganda fight it tooth and nail. It not only makes us look bad, but it also kills.

What arm of the Federal .gov octopus is supposed to be fighting enemy propaganda?

Now you know why America needs Civilian Irregular Information Defense Groups.

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Cyberwar PsyOps: e-Activism and Social Media – SC Magazine US

An Amnesty International e-activist is an individual who uses information and communication tools – such as mobile phones, blogs, emails or social networking sites – to act for human rights. He or she may also organize, mobilize and inspire online communities of individuals to take action for human rights.

via Cyberwar PsyOps: e-Activism and Social Media – SC Magazine US.

Amnesty International probably would not recognize individuals who used information and communication tools – such as mobile phones, blogs, emails or social networking sites — to generate support for Operation Iraqi Freedom as having acted in support of the human rights of Iraqis persecuted by Saddam Hussein, his Former Regime Elements, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, and the Iranian Quds Force-backed Shiite militias. 

American and Coalition soldiers, Marines, airmen and sailors were also human and had some rights  not to be lied about, slandered, libeled, misrepresented or similarly disrespected, and Counter Insurgent Supportive e-activists organized, mobilized and inspired online communities of milbloggers to take action.

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Filed under Idea War, Info Warriors, IW, PSYOP, PSYOP Auxiliaries

In the chatroom with the cyber guerrillas

In the chatroom with the cyber guerrillas

Global chaos is not Anonymous’ aim. As the WikiLeaks and Tunisia cases show, the group targets specific institutions and its attacks are designed to temporarily delay more than destroy. Think of them not as acts of cyber war but as high-profile guerrilla strikes.

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We live in a world where a few top-quality hackers can accomplish a considerable amount of damage at the national and strategic level.

Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008 ( http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf )

Read the whole thing, then come back and think about:

. . . There was another historically unique and critical aspect to the fighting – the emergence of synchronized cyberspace domain actions as an intelligence indicator for strategic, operational, and tactical level military operations. Unlike the (alleged) Russian cyberattack upon Estonia in 2007, the (alleged) Russian cyberattack on Georgia was accompanied by physical domain combat between Russian and Georgian military forces. The (alleged) Russian network attack operations in virtual cyberspace occurred prior to hostilities and later mirrored (apparently synchronized with) Russian combat operations in the land warfighting domain.7 These attacks included various distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks to deny/disrupt communications and information exfiltration activities conducted to accumulate military and political intelligence from Georgian networks. These attacks also included web site defacement for Russian propaganda purposes.8 One of the first elements of Georgian society that were attacked was a popular hacker forum – by attempting to take out Georgian hackers, Russian-supported hacker militia preemptively tried to forestall or mitigate a counter-attack (or returning fire) from Georgian hackers.9 What is not widely known is that pro-Georgian hackers made limited but successful network counter-attacks against Russian targets.10 Hacker wars between (often quite talented) patriotic amateur hackers, cyber militias, and organized criminal gangs have become a widely accepted de facto form of nation-state conflict over the past twenty years (for example: Israeli vs Arab/Muslim (Sept 2000), India vs Pakistan, US vs China (April-May 2001), Russian vs Estonia (April-May 2007), etc…). These non-governmental national assets are generally used for the traditional purposes of imposing one nation’s will and conditions upon another.

Two and a half years later and we can only allege? That’s the plausible deniability irregular information operators offer.

One of the first targets of enemy Civilian Irregular Information Operators will be friendly Civilian Irregular Information Operators.

What are some of the operational and intelligence lessons that can be drawn from these conclusions? First, for Russia or China to employ their people’s patriotic ‘hacker militia’ to conduct a network attack against a target nation-state, they must engage them first – to motivate and ‘sell’ them on the concept; steer them toward appropriate targets; synchronize those cyberspace operations with combat activity in the physical realm; and discuss the most effective cyberspace tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to be used. The patriotic hackers and cyber militias need to be focused by the aggressor government against the opponent‟s center of gravity and their activities to be synchronized with attacks against that center of gravity from the other domains. These hackers and cyber militias need to understand the opponent‟s center of gravity in order to develop cyberspace domain approaches and techniques to effectively attack it. These preliminary cyberspace activities often create an identifiable signature that can be tracked and monitored in advance of combat operations. Nations need to monitor hacker chat rooms and communications of potential aggressor nations in order to intercept and understand this activity.

How would the United States employ our people’s patriotic ‘hacker militia’?
What arm of the fedgov.mil octopus could engage them, motivate and ‘sell’ them on the concept, steer them toward appropriate targets; synchronize those cyberspace operations with combat activity in the physical realm; and discuss the most effective cyberspace tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to be used?

Nobody in our .gov/.mil could overtly engage them without suffering political retribution from Legislative/Executive branch elements that do not want American patriotic hacker militias engaged. That leaves former or retired .gov/.mil beyond the reach of retribution, and contractors that don’t get much political oversight.

Russian-oriented hackers/militia took out news and local government web sites specifically in the areas that the Russian military intended to attack in the ground and air domains. The Federal and local Georgian governments, military, and local news agencies were unable to communicate with Georgian citizens that were directly affected by the fighting. This provided an intelligence indicator of the ground and air attack locations. It created panic and confusion in the local populace, further hindering Georgian military response. This effect also provides a future aggressor nation with an opportunity to conduct military deception operations via feints and ruses to mislead the target nation population, government, and military. A sudden „blackout’ of cyberspace activities in a specific region may provide an indicator of a tactical or operational level conventional attack. Or it could be used as a sophisticated cyberspace operation as part of a larger deception plan, creating a feint in the cyberspace domain to lure opposing forces into believing an attack is imminent in another warfighting domain. Use of patriotic hackers and cyberspace militia themselves might be a deception effort to attract the target nation‟s attention away from the aggressor nation‟s top-quality military and intelligence community cyberspace operators that quietly conduct the main effort in the overall cyberspace domain operation.

Are we even allowed to use MILDEC anymore? Could any U. S. MILDEC’ers work by, with and through American patriotic hackers and cyberspace militia?

In future combat, aggressor nation patriotic hacker militia can be called upon to conduct cyberspace fire & maneuver operations performed directly in support of forces in other domains, They could also be extensively utilized to conduct deception efforts in cyberspace in support of operations in the other domains or to act as a distraction for other cyberspace operations conducted by government professionals against target nation high value targets (HVT).

UPDATE 012911: This Week at War: Lessons from Cyberwar I

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Become A Cyber-Scout, Clean Up Thailand’s Internet! (via Saiyasombut)

H/T: Evgeny Morozov

Originally published at Siam Voices on December 17, 2010 In an everlasting attempt to uphold its image as a fierce defender of the royal institution and thus effectively controlling a national narrative the Thai government now sets its aims into the online world. The ministry of justice, where the Democrat party is in charge, has set up a so-called ‘Cyber Scout’ training programme for next week December 20-21 at Kasetsart University. On their web … Read More

via Saiyasombut

See also Cyber Scout: Thailand’s internet police?

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Who is th3j35t3r? (via T3h H3r0d07u5 R3p0r7)

Who is th3j35t3r? Report #THR20101217A Release Date: 12.17.2010 Executive Summary The hacktivist who goes by the handle "th3j35t3r" has been carrying out denial of service (DoS) attacks against suspected jihadist websites since he showed up on the hacktavism scene on January 1, 2010. He uses a DoS tool called XerXes that he claims to be the sole author of. He also claims to be "an ex-soldier with a rather famous unit" and to have served two tours of duty as an air … Read More

via T3h H3r0d07u5 R3p0r7

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Cyber guerrillas can help US

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d3dd7c40-ff15-11df-956b-00144feab49a.html#axzz179p6Blrv

Evgeny Morozov’s “cyber guerrillas” are referred to as Civilian Irregular Information Operators on this blog, but we are both talking about non-state actors. 

Morozov essentially wants somebody to persuade, change and influence the sophomoric Julian Assange to collaborate with traditional media, redact sensitive files, and offer those in a position to know about potential victims of releases the chance to vet the data and turn Wikileaks into a new Transparency International.

I want him dead.

Morozov thinks that would create a global movement of anti-American politicised geeks clamouring for revenge.

Possibly.

Are there enough pro-American politicised geeks to counter vengeful anti-American politicised geeks?

Are there any U. S. .mil /.gov Information Operators capable of  countering vengeful anti-American politicised geeks working by, with and through pro-American politicised geeks?  No real way of knowing.  Bound to be some who are capable of it, but of those, how many are willing to risk their careers associating with politically incorrect  pro-American politicised geeks?

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