2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment decapitated by whoever inserted this into their briefing:
Monthly Archives: January 2010
Afghan officials and Eikenberry have also expressed concern that unless there is a detailed plan to connect these village security forces to Ministry of Interior oversight, they could fuel the rise of warlords and undermine the already fragile government in Kabul. Another worry is that the local tribal leaders could manipulate U.S. officers who do not understand politics and tribal grievances in a particular area, U.S. officials said.
“Our level of intelligence is so lacking,” said an adviser to the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. “We could be supporting people whose interests are not what we think they are.”
State’s level of intelligence is lacking.
Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level by Christopher D. Kolenda
There is nothing more demoralizing than getting clobbered for a cause that people no longer support.
The community level will be decisive—and that support is entirely up for grabs. Communities have been neutral thus far, in part out of a survival psychology that has emerged over the past 30 years. Moreover, the sentiment of many community leaders is that they have not taken a side in this conflict because no one has taken their side. As several elders have remarked, “We are robbed by our government, bombed by international forces, and beaten by the Taliban.” The side that mobilizes their support will tip the balance.
Addressing the underlying conditions enables us to earn local support, disaggregate the enemy, and then apply appropriate means to coopt and reintegrate local fighters, while isolating and destroying the ideological hardcore in detail. Effective security, governance, and development that enfranchise local communities are existential threats to the insurgency.
The regime in Saigon didn’t much care for the CIDG.
Maliki never cared much for the Sons of Iraq. The Marines noted his concerns and pacified Anbar with the help of Sunni militias anyway.
Now the English-speaking Tajiks in Kabul and all their Euroweenie NGO buddies have convinced the American Ambassador to retard the progress of what could have been a success story.
According to Dexter Filkins, he was the commander of one of the many pro-government armed groups in the Gardez area.
According to Rohullah Samon, a spokesman for the governor of Paktia province, the attack happened at 4:30pm outside a branch of the Kabul Bank when the suicide bomber approached on foot. “The head of a security company… was moving with his convoy when he was attacked by a suicide bomber wearing a suicide vest,”
According to KEYC Channel 12 Mankato, the security teams that were attacked are joint civilian-military units that secure and develop areas of Afghanistan.
According to AP’s reporting of what Paktia Deputy Gov. Abdul Rahman Mangal said, seven people were killed, including the commander of Afghan security guards at a base for a provincial reconstruction team in Logar province.
Is there more than one PRT in Logar?
Do they have any bases other than Shank?
Does this blog have any readers at FOB Shank who can confirm or deny that their ASG commander was killed in Gardez?
If Nasir Paray was the commander of one of the many pro-government armed groups in the Gardez area, which one was it? Do they have a name?
If Nasir Paray was the head of a security company, which security company?
If Nasir Paray was the ASG commander at Shank, what was he doing in a convoy in front of the Gardez branch of the Bank of Kabul on a Thursday afternoon?
And what had he done that so annoyed the Taliban that they expended a PBIED and much good will to take him out?